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PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS IN FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS: THE NEED TO BROADLY CONSTRUE THE CRIME
VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT'S MANDAMUS PROVISION
PAUL G. CASSELLt
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Congress passed the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"
or "Act")' to dramatically reshape the federal criminal justice system and
ensure that crime victims are treated fairly in the criminal process. The
Act created a "broad and encompassing" victims' bill of rights,2 guaran-
teeing victims (among other things) the rights to notice of court hearings,
to attend those hearings, and to be heard at particular hearings, such as
plea and sentencing hearings. Congress intended for these rights to give
victims the opportunity to participate in criminal justice proceedings,
protect their interests, and shape the outcome of those proceedings.3
An important feature of the CVRA is its provisions allowing vic-
tims to enforce their rights not only in trial courts, but also in appellate
courts. Among the enforcement provisions is one guaranteeing a crime
victim expedited access to appellate review. The CVRA provides that if
the district court denies any relief sought by a crime victim, the victim
"may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus .... The court
of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72
hours after the petition has been filed. ' 4 In enacting this provision, Con-
gress sought to give crime victims genuine rights at all stages in the
criminal justice process. As one of the CVRA's co-sponsors explained,
"[W]ithout the ability to enforce the [victims'] rights in the criminal trial
and appellate courts of this country any rights afforded are, at best, rhe-
toric."5
The CVRA's appellate review provision appeared to provide crime
victims the same sort of appellate protections as all other litigants-as
several courts of appeals have held in reviewing crime victims' petitions.
t Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah. I thank Doug Beloof, Brigida Benitez, Meg Garvin, Rebecca Hyde, Steven
Joffee, P. Davis Oliver, Greg Skordas, Steve Twist, and Trish Cassell for help in preparing this
article.
1. Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-62 (2004) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)).
2. 150 CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
3. Id. at S4263.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3).
5. 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
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Unfortunately, in a recent decision the Tenth Circuit parted company
with those other circuits and eviscerated the appellate protections prom-
ised to crime victims. In In re Antrobus,6 the Tenth Circuit rejected care-
fully reasoned decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuits and held
that crime victims could only obtain appellate relief if they show that the
district court had made a "clear and indisputable" error.7 The Tenth Cir-
cuit believed that, when Congress used the term "mandamus" in the
CVRA, it meant to drastically restrict the ability of appellate courts to
give crime victims' relief.8 The Tenth Circuit's demanding standard
means that, as a practical matter, it will be very difficult (if not impossi-
ble) for many crime victims to overturn erroneous decisions of district
courts, particularly given that crime victims' rights law is a new and
evolving field in which "indisputable" errors may be hard to prove.
This Article critiques the Tenth Circuit's Antrobus decision, arguing
that the Second and Ninth Circuits got it right and the Tenth Circuit sim-
ply got it wrong. When victims of crime are denied relief in the district
court, they should receive the same sort of appellate protections as other
litigants. This increased protection is what the language of the CVRA
clearly provides and what Congress plainly intended.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the factual
background surrounding Antrobus. Kenny and Sue Antrobus lost a mo-
tion to have their daughter, Vanessa Quinn, recognized as a protected
"crime victim" under the CVRA. Thereafter, despite four separate trips
to the Tenth Circuit, they were unable to secure a meaningful review of
that decision or release of the government's evidence on the issue. The
difficulties Kenny and Sue Antrobus faced in securing appellate protec-
tion of their rights will usefully frame the question of how the CVRA
should be construed.
In Part II, the Article turns to the background leading up to Con-
gress's enactment of the CVRA. The CVRA arose out of Congress's
frustration with inadequate protection of crime victims' rights, in both
the trial and appellate courts. Congress designed the CVRA to give vic-
tims meaningful and enforceable rights-rights that were to be protected
throughout the federal court system.
Part I of the Article then discusses the merits of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's analysis in Antrobus. Contrary to the Circuit's position, the plain
language of the CVRA-requiring appellate courts to "take up and de-
cide" crime victims' petitions--does not mean that crime victims are
limited to discretionary mandamus review of their claims, but rather,
indicates that crime victims are entitled to ordinary appellate review.
6. 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008).
7. Id. at 1130-3 1.
8. Id. at 1127-30.
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Congress did not merely import discretionary mandamus standards into
the CVRA, but instead, plainly changed those standards to forge an ef-
fective and mandatory appellate remedy for violations of victims' rights.
Moreover, the legislative history of the CVRA clearly demonstrates that
Congress wanted crime victims to have ordinary appellate review of their
claims. The CVRA's legislative history is replete with statements from
the legislation's sponsors that the law would require appellate courts to
"broadly defend" crime victims' rights and "remedy errors" of lower
courts. The Tenth Circuit's crabbed construction of the Act clashes di-
rectly with Congress's stated purposes.
The Article concludes by suggesting that the Tenth Circuit should,
at the next opportunity, reconsider its position en banc and follow the
prevailing view in the courts of appeals. If the Tenth Circuit will not,
then the Supreme Court should review the circuit split that the Tenth
Circuit's decision created, and side with those circuits that have given
crime victims the full measure of protection that Congress intended.
I. THE ANTROBUSES' QUEST TO GIVE A VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
The Antrobuses' efforts to give a victim impact statement at the
sentencing of the man who sold the gun used to murder their daughter
produced long and complicated litigation. The history of the litigation is
worth recounting, however, because it shows both the importance of vic-
tims having effective appellate review of their claims and the difficulties
that have arisen in the Tenth Circuit in providing such review. Remarka-
bly, despite four different trips to the Tenth Circuit, the Antrobuses were
unable to have the circuit review a district court ruling against them.
A. The Issue: Was Vanessa Quinn a "Crime Victim" Protected by the
CVRA?
The underlying issue in the Antrobus litigation was whether Vanes-
sa Quinn was a protected "crime victim" pursuant to the CVRA. Mack-
enzie Hunter committed a crime in the summer of 2006, when he ille-
gally sold a handgun to Sulejman Talovic, a juvenile. 9 As Hunter well
knew, Talovic could not lawfully possess a handgun because he was a
juvenile. In fact, it appears Talovic asked Hunter to obtain the gun for
him because he (Talovic) was blocked from buying one. About six
months later, on February 12, 2007, Talovic entered the Trolley Square
Shopping Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. In the largest mass murder in
recent Utah history, 10 Talovic used the handgun and a 12-gauge shotgun
9. Id. at 1124.
10. To qualify "recent" is necessary, because the Mountain Meadows Massacre occurred in
Utah in 1857. See generally JUANITA BROOKS, THE MOUNTAIN MEADOWS MASSACRE 69 (Univ. of
Okla. Press 1991) (1950); RONALD W. WALKER ET AL., MASSACRE AT MOUNTAIN MEADOWS
(2008). The massacre left 120 persons dead, and was probably the largest mass murder in United
States history until the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
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to kill five people and seriously injure four others. A bullet from the
handgun Hunter had illegally sold to Talovic killed Vanessa Quinn,
daughter of Kenny and Sue Antrobus."
On May 16, 2007, a federal grand jury returned a two-count felony
indictment against Hunter: Count I charged him with being a drug user in
possession of a firearm, 2 and Count H charged him with unlawful trans-
fer of a firearm to a juvenile with knowledge or reason to know that it
would be used in a violent crime.1 3 Plea negotiations ensued, and on No-
vember 5, 2007, Hunter entered guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agree-
ment. Hunter pled guilty to Count I (drug user in possession of a firearm)
and a newly filed misdemeanor criminal charge, alleging unlawful trans-
fer of a firearm to a juvenile (without any allegation about knowledge
that the gun would be used in a crime of violence).14 Under the plea
agreement, the Justice Department agreed to move to dismiss the original
Count H at the time of sentencing. After entry of the pleas, the district
court set sentencing for January 14, 2008.
About a month later, on December 13, 2007, having secured pro
bono legal counsel, 5 the Antrobuses filed a motion requesting that the
district court recognize their daughter, Vanessa Quinn, as a "crime vic-
tim" and the Antrobuses as her representatives under the CVRA.' 6 Their
motion noted that the indictment charged Hunter with illegal sale of a
firearm with knowledge that it would be used to commit a crime of vio-
lence. The motion further alleged that, based on an article in the Salt
Lake Tribune newspaper, Talovic told Hunter that he wanted the hand-
gun to rob a bank. Based on the indictment and the bank robbery discus-
sion, the Antrobuses asked that their daughter be recognized as a "crime
victim" under the CVRA.
The CVRA defines a "crime victim" as "a person directly and prox-
imately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense."' 17 The
Antrobuses argued that there could be no doubt that Vanessa was "di-
rectly" harmed when a bullet from the gun Hunter illegally sold to Ta-
lovic killed her. The Antrobuses also argued it was clear that this harm
was "proximately" caused by Hunter's crime. Not only did Hunter make
I1. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 WL 53125, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 3,
2008); Petition for a Writ of Mandamus Regarding Discovery Issues Pursuant to the Crime Victims'
Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3), at 5, In reAntrobus, No. 08-4013 (10th Cir. Jan. 25, 2008).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2006).
13. See id. §§ 922(x)(I )(A), 924(a)(6)(B)(ii).
14. See id. §§ 922(x)(I), 924(a)(6)(B)(i).
15. In the interests of full disclosure, I served as lead counsel for the Antrobuses' legal team
in the litigation described in this article.
16. Memorandum in Support of Sue and Ken Antrobus' Motion to Have Vanessa Quinn
Recognized as a Crime Victim, to be Recognized as Her Representative, to Make an In-Court Victim
Impact Statement, and to Receive Restitution at 2-3, United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK,
2008 WL 53125 (D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (e) (2006) (emphasis added).
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his illegal sale directly to Talovic, but he specifically foresaw Talovic
using the gun to commit a violent crime. That the foreseen crime was a
bank robbery, rather than a mass murder, was of no consequence. The
Antrobuses explained that the tragic death of Vanessa Quinn (among
others) was precisely what Congress intended to prevent by prohibiting
illegal trafficking of guns. The Antrobuses, therefore, urged the district
court to recognize Vanessa as a "victim" of the defendant's crime under
the CVRA. As her representatives under the CVRA, 18 they sought to
deliver a victim impact statement at sentencing, receive restitution for
unreimbursed funeral expenses, and express their objections to the dis-
missal of Count H. Neither Hunter nor the United States filed objections
to these motions.
Nonetheless, on January 3, 2008, the district court denied the An-
trobuses' CVRA motion, holding that Hunter's crime was "too factually
and temporally attenuated" from the death of Vanessa Quinn to recog-
nize her as a "victim" of the crime. 19 The district court acknowledged
that the Antrobuses had referred to a discussion between Hunter and Ta-
lovic about a bank robbery, but deemed this statement "general specula-
tion." 20 "This type of speculation," the court concluded, "does not dem-
onstrate the type of knowledge or foreseeability necessary to finding
Hunter's sale of the firearm to a minor to be the proximate cause of
Quinn's death.",2' Accordingly, the district court held that Vanessa Quinn
was not a "victim" of Hunter's illegal sale of the handgun used to murder
her and, therefore, that Vanessa had no rights under the CVRA for the
Antrobuses to assert. The district court also denied the Antrobuses' mo-
tion to gain access to information (including an ATF Report) about what
Hunter and Talovic had discussed during the sale of the gun.
In one last rebuff of the Antrobuses, the district court further de-
clined to exercise its discretion at sentencing to briefly hear the Antro-
buses for even a few minutes. The Antrobuses made the alternative ar-
gument that, even if their daughter did not technically fall within the
protections of the CVRA, the district court should nonetheless allow
them to present a brief victim impact statement at sentencing.22 The dis-
trict court, however, while conceding it had authority to hear from the
Antrobuses about the murder of their daughter, declined to use its discre-
18. For deceased victims, the CVRA allows a "representative" to assert the victim's rights.
See id. § 3771 (b)(2)(D).
19. Hunter, 2008 WL 53125, at *4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *5.
22. The reasons why the Antrobuses wanted to give a victim impact statement are discussed
in Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 617-18
(2009).
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tionary authority to hear from them because it had "an adequate under-
standing" of their views.
23
B. The Tenth Circuit Erects a Barrier to Review of Victims' Claims that
Fall Short of a "Clear and Indisputable" Error
Having been stymied by the district court, the Antrobuses sought
appellate review of the "crime victim" decision by the district court.
They did so by filing a writ of mandamus, the procedural device spelled
out in the CVRA. 24 Once again, the Justice Department did not object to
the Antrobuses' petition. Defendant Hunter objected, but only on the
ground that the Antrobuses' factual representations below were not suffi-
ciently substantiated.25
The Tenth Circuit denied the Antrobuses' petition. 26 The court be-
gan by stating that it would not follow decisions from the Second and
Ninth Circuits, which held that a CVRA mandamus petition provides
crime victims with ordinary appellate review. Instead, the court held
that the Antrobuses would have to meet a very demanding standard of
showing "that their right to the writ is 'clear and indisputable."'' 28 The
court reasoned that Congress had only authorized crime victims to file a
"writ of mandamus," thereby importing with that phrase "traditional
mandamus standards" that permit relief "only in extraordinary situa-
tions., 29 Even proceeding on that basis, the court conceded that the case
was a "difficult" one. 30 Nonetheless, the court could not "say that the
Antrobuses' right to the writ is clear and indisputable," 3' because it was
not "clear and indisputable" that Vanessa Quinn was a foreseeable victim
of Hunter's criminal firearms sale.32
The majority opinion for the court noted that "[o]ne might question
whether, with additional discovery, the Antrobuses might have been able
to determine whether, in fact, Mr. Hunter knew about Talovic's inten-
tions and what such knowledge might mean for the foreseeability to Mr.
Hunter of Talovic's crimes." 33 The concurring opinion from Judge Tym-
23. Hunter, 2008 WL 53125, at *6.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3) (2006).
25. See Mackenzie Glade Hunter's Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Regarding
Discovery Issues Pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) at 2-3, In re
Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-4013).
26. Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1126.
27. Id. at 1124 (citing Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 101l, 1017
(9th Cir. 2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005)).
28. Id. at 1124 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (per
curiam)).
29. Id. at 1124-25 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S.
at 34-35).
30. Id. at 1125.
31. Id. at 1126 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S. at
35).
32. Seeid. at1125n.l, 1126.
33. Id. at 1125 n.1.
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kovich went even further, adding: "In my view, the district court and the
government erred in failing to permit the Antrobuses reasonable access
to evidence which could support their claim." 34 The court, however, de-
clined to address the discovery issues, finding that those issues were not
raised in the immediate proceeding.
On January 25, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a petition for panel re-
hearing with suggestion of rehearing en banc. On March 14, 2008, the
panel denied the petition, adhering to the "clear and indisputable" stan-
dard for conventional mandamus review. 35 In doing so, the panel added
additional explanation for its holding. The panel began by stating that the
term "[miandamus is a well worn term of art in our common law tradi-
tion., 36 The panel then reasoned that:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor-
rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise in-
structed.
37
In view of the fact that the conventional standard of review for
mandamus petitions is "clear and disputable" error, the panel concluded
that the same standard of review was appropriate for CVRA petitions.
The panel also decided that it had properly applied the standard in reject-
ing the Antrobuses' petition. Accordingly, the panel declined to grant a
rehearing. The panel also rejected the Antrobuses motion to consolidate
the mandamus petition with a parallel appeal that the Antrobuses had
filed (discussed in the next section). 38 The petition for rehearing en banc
was denied at the same time.
C. The Sentencing of Hunter and the Antrobuses' Efforts to Obtain In-
formation About Plans for a Bank Robbery
While their petition for rehearing was pending with the Tenth Cir-
cuit, the Antrobuses renewed their efforts in the district court to obtain
proof of the bank robbery discussion between Hunter and Talovic. On
the morning set for sentencing, January 14, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a
motion for reconsideration of the district court's earlier denial of their
motion for production of the ATF Report. On that afternoon, however,
the district court denied their motion in a written order, on the basis that
34. Id. at 1126 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
35. See id. at 1130.
36. Id. at 1127.
37. Id. at 1127-28 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).
38. See infra note 70.
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the Justice Department had already certified that it had no such informa-
tion. The district court stated:
The government previously informed the court that it did not possess
any information relevant to Hunter's forseeability of Talovic's sub-
sequent crime. There remains no basis for this court to question the
government's position, and this court will not entertain repeated mo-
tions on the same issues, when the effect of those motions [is to] de-
lay a sentencing that is set to proceed.
39
Later that afternoon, having concluded that the Justice Department
possessed no information "relevant" to Hunter foreseeing any crime
committed by Talovic, the district court held a sentencing hearing for
Hunter. At the hearing, counsel for the Antrobuses first requested that the
Justice Department clarify whether the district court's written order was
correct in stating that the Department "did not possess any information
relevant to Hunter's foreseeability" of misuse of the gun in any violent
crime-not just the Trolley Square massacre.40 The following exchange
ensued:
Antrobuses' counsel: "The sentence in the Court's order seems to
suggest that the government has indicated it has no information re-
garding the use of the gun in any subsequent crime of violence. If
that's correct, we need to know that. If it's not-"
Court: "That's my understanding. That's my understanding. Do you
want to say anything about that or not?"
Assistant United States Attorney: "Judge, I'd rather not. I think we
have built a record. We have made representations."
Court: "The record is the record."
4'
The court then adhered to its position. Thus, based on its under-
standing that the Justice Department had no information that Hunter
knew that Talovic would use the gun in any subsequent violent crime,
the district court rejected the Antrobuses' efforts to have Vanessa Quinn
recognized as a "victim" of Hunter's crime under the CVRA. The district
court then proceeded to sentence Hunter without giving the Antrobuses a
chance to make a victim impact statement, as would be their right had
Vanessa been a "victim" under the CVRA.
On January 25, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a mandamus petition
with the Tenth Circuit to compel the Justice Department to turn over
documents, including the ATF Report, that would prove Talovic and
39. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 WL 153798, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 14,
2008).
40. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 5, Hunter, 2008 WL 153798.
41. Id. at 5-6.
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Hunter had discussed a bank robbery. After ordering responses, the
Tenth Circuit denied the petition-again noting that it had previously
established a demanding standard of "clear and indisputable" error re-
view.42 The basis for the denial appeared to be that the Department had
promised to file relevant portions of the ATF Report under seal with the
district court and would have no objection to release of the document to
the Antrobuses, thereby rendering the Antrobuses' mandamus petition
moot.
43
Back in the district court, on February 7, 2008, the Justice Depart-
ment gave notice that it had "filed" the ATF Report under seal.44 The
next day, the Antrobuses filed an unopposed motion for release of the
redacted ATF Report with the district court. Remarkably, however, even
without opposition, on March 17, 2008, the district court tersely denied
the motion. The district court stated that although the motion was unop-
posed, it had not been stipulated to by the Government. The court further
stated: "While the court recognizes that it may have discretion to disclose
the ATF Report, the court is unwilling to create such a precedent to indi-
viduals who are attempting to establish their status as victims of a given
offense. 45
On March 28, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the district court's denial of their unopposed motion for release of
the ATF Report. The Antrobuses contended that because the Justice De-
partment had filed the documents under seal, it was obligated to provide
"good cause" for the sealing under the court's local rules, which strictly
limit what documents can be filed under seal.46 The Antrobuses further
argued that release of the document was required to correct the record in
the case because the district court had previously ruled based on the be-
lief that the Justice Department had no information in its files regarding a
bank robbery discussion between Talovic and Hunter, when in fact there
had been such a discussion-a fact that the Justice Department well
knew.
On April 21, 2008, the district court denied the motion for reconsid-
eration. The court stated briefly that the Government "did not file the
documents" but merely provided them for in camera review.47 Accord-
ingly, the requirements of the local rules were "inapplicable" and nothing
42. In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, slip op. at 3, 10 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008).
43. Id. at 9 n.2.
44. Notice of Sealed Documents Submitted for in Camera Review, United States v. Hunter,
No. 2:07CR307DAK (D. Utah Feb. 7, 2008). The Report was actually submitted for in camera
review. See infra note 49.
45. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, slip op. at 2 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2008).
46. D. UTAH CIv. R. 49-2(b).
47. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, slip op. at 1 (D. Utah Apr. 21, 2008).
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in the Antrobuses' motion persuaded the court to alter its previous rul-
ing.
48
D. The Antrobuses' Unsuccessful Parallel Appeal
Meanwhile, the Antrobuses continued to press for appellate vindica-
tion of their right to give a victim impact statement by a separate proce-
dural vehicle-an appeal to the Tenth Circuit of the district court's deci-
sion denying their motion to be recognized as the victim's representa-
tives. After the Antrobuses' timely notice of appeal, the Justice Depart-
ment filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit
ordered full briefing on the jurisdictional question and the merits, and the
Antrobuses filed their opening brief on May 29, 2008. Two months later,
the Justice Department filed its response brief.49 For the first time, the
Justice Department admitted, in a public record, that Talovic had told
Hunter while the sale was being negotiated that he wanted the gun to rob
a bank. The Justice Department's Statement of the Facts recounted that
"Hunter asked Talovic why he wanted a gun, and Talovic said something
to the effect that he wanted a gun to use to rob a bank."50 The underlying
basis for that particular recounting of the facts was apparently the ATF
Report the Antrobuses had long been seeking, as that specific recitation
of the facts did not appear anywhere else in the public record of the case.
Curiously, the Justice Department did not include a citation for that sen-
tence in its brief, in contrast to other parts of its statement of facts, and
declined to provide the Antrobuses' counsel with any further information
about the source of the statement.
Simultaneously with filing its brief in the Tenth Circuit, the Justice
Department filed a motion to lodge the ATF report under seal, attaching
the ATF Report. 5' The motion stated that the Justice Department was
lodging the ATF Report with the Tenth Circuit "in the interest of com-
pleteness. 'S The Antrobuses promptly filed an objection to the filing of
a sealed document, noting that the Justice Department had failed "to pro-
48. Id. In arguing that the documents had been "filed" with the District Court, the Antrobuses
had been relying on a statement made by the Justice Department describing its submission. Yet, on
May 30, 2008, after the time for challenging the District Court's ruling in the Tenth Circuit had
expired, the Justice Department belatedly filed an "amended notice" regarding the sealed documents.
This notice stated that the Government had "inadvertently used the word 'filed' to describe submis-
sion of documents for in camera review." Amended Notice of Sealed Documents Submitted for in
Camera Review at I, United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK (D. Utah May 30, 2008).
49. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008)
(No. 08-4010).
50. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
51. Motion for Leave to Lodge Under Seal For ex Parte in Camera Review Non-Recorded
Documents Submitted to the District Court ex Parte and Under Seal for Its in Camera Review at 1-2,
Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (No. 08-4010).
52. Id. at 2. The Justice Department did not disclose that the Antrobuses, through counsel, had
been strenuously urging the Department to release the ATF Report as part of its ethical obligation of
candor to the court.
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vide any justification for [the] sealing. 5 3 The Justice Department filed a
reply to this objection, stating that until the Tenth Circuit determined that
it had jurisdiction, it could not act on the Antrobuses' objection.54 In any
event, the Justice Department argued that the Privacy Act provided a
basis for sealing the document 55-apparently concluding that the privacy
interests of a deceased mass murderer came ahead of the Antrobuses'
interests in learning everything they could about how their daughter was
killed.56
On September 2, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a motion for remand in
light of newly revealed evidence in the government's files. 57 The Antro-
buses explained that the Government's admission in its response brief
was the first public disclosure of the bank robbery conversation between
Talovic and Hunter. Because this critical and potentially dispositive fact
had been previously concealed, the Antrobuses argued, a remand to per-
mit the district court to consider the evidence was appropriate.
Following oral argument, on December 2, 2008, the Tenth Circuit
dismissed the Antrobuses' appeal.58 The court concluded that "neither
our case law nor the CVRA provide for non-parties like the Antrobuses
to bring a post-judgment direct appeal in a criminal case." 59 The court
noted that the CVRA provides for mandamus review of denials of crime
victims' rights, but does not explicitly provide crime victims a right to
appeal. Based on this fact, the court reasoned "[t]hat the [fact the] CVRA
does not provide for victim appeals is consistent with the well-
established precept that 'only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment." ' 60 The court ac-
knowledged that the Antrobuses had cited a series of cases in which var-
ious circuits (including the Tenth Circuit itself) had allowed non-parties
to take appeals, including appeals in criminal cases. The court found
those cases unpersuasive, stating, "There is a common thread in those
criminal cases in which courts have permitted non-party appeals: the
53. Appellants' Objection to Government's Motion to Seal ATF Report and Motion to Recon-
sider Provisional Granting of the Motion to Seal at 2, Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (No. 08-4010).
54. Government's Reply in Support of August 1, 2008 Motion to Lodge ATF Report ex Parte
and Under Seal and Opposition to Appellants' August 13, 2008 Motion to Reconsider Order Provi-
sionally Granting Motion to Lodge ATF Report ex Parte and Under Seal at 9, Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308
(No. 08-4010).
55. Id. at 5-7.
56. As something of an additional fallback position, however, the Justice Department stated if
the Court found that it had jurisdiction and if the issue of whether Hunter could foresee Vanessa's
death was not a pure issue of law and if the disclosure of the Report would facilitate the resolution of
the foreseeability question, the Government would "defer to the Court's judgment about the propri-
ety of issuing an order (consistent with Privacy Act Exemption 11 [excluding documents disclosed
pursuant to a court order]) disclosing the pertinent portions of the Report to the Antrobuses' counsel,
subject to an appropriate protective order." Id. at 15.
57. See Appellants' Motion for Remand in Light of Newly-Revealed Evidence in the Gov-
ernment's Files, Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (No. 08-4010).
58. Hunter, 548 F.3d at 1317.
59. Id. at 1316.
60. Id. at 1311 (quoting Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)).
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appeals all related to specific trial issues and did not disturb a final
judgment. ' 61 The court did not explain why the Antrobuses' challenge to
the "victim" ruling was a specific issue apart from the final judgment.
Nor did it explain why it would not reach a final conclusion on that issue,
which would affect issues apart from the final judgment in the case (such
as whether the Antrobuses would receive notice of any parole or other
release for Hunter at some later point in time). The court also relied on
the fact that the Antrobuses could seek mandamus review as a basis for
rejecting their appeal. "To hold otherwise," the court reasoned, "would
effectively grant victims two opportunities to appeal 62-although, in its
earlier ruling, it took great pains to emphasize that it was not giving the
Antrobuses the equivalent of an ordinary appeal.
The court then turned to the Antrobuses' motion for remand for re-
hearing in light of the newly-revealed evidence and the Government's
motion to seal the ATF report. On the remand motion, the Tenth Circuit
declined to reach the merits "because at this stage a motion for a rehear-
ing should be filed in the district court."63 The court noted that it was
proper for the Antrobuses to have first sought a remand in the Court of
Appeals. "But now that the appeal is no longer pending, the district court
is free to grant the relief the Antrobuses seek, and therefore the district
court is the proper venue for the motion for a new hearing." 64 The Circuit
concluded that "[b]ecause we are now dismissing the Antrobuses' ap-
peal, they can -and should-file their motion for a new hearing in light
of newly discovered evidence in the district court."
65
E. The Antrobuses' Final Attempt to Secure a Hearing in Light of the
Justice Department's Newly-Revealed Evidence
Following the Tenth Circuit's direct suggestion, the Antrobuses re-
turned to the district court and filed a motion for a new hearing. The An-
trobuses explained to the district court that the Justice Department's new-
ly-revealed information placed the initial ruling-that Hunter could not
foresee the use of the gun in a violent crime-in an entirely new light.
Once again, however, the Antrobuses were rebuffed by the district court.
On February 10, 2009, in a brief order, the district court denied the
Antrobuses' motion for a new hearing. 66 The district court assumed that
it had the authority to grant the motion but declined to do so for two rea-
sons. First, the district court concluded that "the reference in the gov-
ernment's brief to the conversation between Hunter and Talovic does not
61. Id. at 1314.
62. Id. at 1315 n.5.
63. Id. at 1316.
64. Id. at 1317 n.8.
65. Id. at 1316-17 (emphasis added).
66. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90822, at *4 (D.
Utah Feb. 10, 2009).
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constitute newly revealed evidence. 67 Second, the district court con-
cluded that its ruling a year earlier denying the Antrobuses unopposed
motion for release of the ATF Report constituted a ruling on the merits
of whether the report would change its conclusion. 68 The district court
did not explain why its earlier ruling did not even mention (much less
discuss) the merits of this issue. Nor did the district court explain how it
was fair to the Antrobuses to have ruled a year earlier on the merits of a
claim that had not been presented by the parties and on which they had
not been heard. Nor did the district court explain how it could have pos-
sibly had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the Antrobuses' claim, as
the matter was on appeal to the Tenth Circuit at that time, thereby strip-
ping the district court of the ability to rule on the matter.
69
On February 20, 2009, the Antrobuses filed another mandamus peti-
tion with the Tenth Circuit challenging the district court's ruling. In their
fourth trip to the Tenth Circuit in just over a year, the Antrobuses ex-
plained that the Justice Department's newly revealed evidence placed the
central issue of whether Hunter could foresee his gun being used in a
crime of violence before the court. The new evidence showed that Hunter
was not "surmis[ing] that Talovic might" rob a bank, as the district court
had initially ruled, 70 but rather was told directly by Talovic that this was
his plan for the gun during the course of Hunter's sale. The Antrobuses
also argued, in the alternative, that if the Tenth Circuit was unable to
conclude that any district court error was clear and indisputable, then
they objected to being forced to satisfy that demanding standard of re-
view. They therefore asserted an objection to this standard to preserve
their right to seek further review of the issue.
The Tenth Circuit, however, appeared to want to close the case once
and for all, and rebuffed all the Antrobuses' efforts. The court began by
reaffirming its "clear and indisputable error" standard of review for man-
damus petitions. 71 Moreover, the court gratuitously preempted the An-
trobuses' effort to preserve the issue for review in the Supreme Court.
The court first noted that the holding was now the "law of the case" be-
cause the Antrobuses had not sought certiorari to review the issue ear-
lier.72 The court did not acknowledge that it had effectively prevented the
Antrobuses from seeking Supreme Court review earlier by denying their
67. Id. at *3.
68. See id. at *3-4.
69. While the Antrobuses appeal of the district court's denial of their motion to have their
daughter recognized as a "victim" stripped the district court of jurisdiction to reach the merits of that
claim, it did not strip the district court of jurisdiction to rule on their unopposed discovery motion to
release the ATF report to them-a matter that the Tenth Circuit had essentially sent back to the
district court when it denied the Antrobuses' second mandamus petition. See In re Antrobus, 519
F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2008).
70. See United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 WL 53125, at *5 (D. Utah Jan. 3,
2008).
71. In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).
72. Id.
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motion to consolidate their parallel appeal with the mandamus petition.
73
The Circuit also stated, in dicta, that it would reach the same conclusion
on the petition under either standard of review.
Turning to the merits of the Antrobuses' arguments, the Tenth Cir-
cuit did not repeat-or even acknowledge-its earlier statement that the
Antrobuses "should" pursue the issue of discovery in the district court.
Instead, the court stated that the Antrobuses had failed to articulate a
specific legal standard that the district court failed to properly apply.74
Even if they had provided such a standard, the court continued, the An-
trobuses failed to show that the information about the bank robbery was
"newly discovered." The Circuit stated: "The difficulty is that the Antro-
buses have not demonstrated that they were unable to present evidence
along these very same lines over a year ago, when this litigation be-
gan. 75 Without recounting all of the litigation that the Antrobuses had
pursued in an attempt to obtain the ATF Report, the court stated: "Had
they made a record showing diligent but stymied efforts on this front, we
,,76might have a different case.
To put the final nail in the coffin, the Tenth Circuit then went on to
hold that the Antrobuses did not have any important new evidence. The
court stated: "Most generously, then, the Antrobuses' 'new evidence'
demonstrates only that Hunter knew-rather than just 'surmised' that
Talovic intended to rob a bank. But that is not so substantial a difference
as the Antrobuses insist.
77
At this point, then, the Antrobuses' litigation efforts came to an end.
To add one last insult to injury, however, the Justice Department (which
for more than a year had steadfastly refused to turn over the ATF docu-
ments to the Antrobuses because of the Privacy Act and other purported
impediments), decided to act on a long-pending Freedom of Information
Act request from the Salt Lake Tribune for the same documents. The
Justice Department released the documents, which lead to a newspaper
article headlined "Notes Confirm Suspicions of Trolley Square Victim's
Family. '78 The article explained:
73. See In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *13 (1Oth Cir. Feb. 1,
2008). Because the mandamus petition and appeal were not consolidated, any petition by the Antro-
buses to the Supreme Court seeking certiorari on the standard of review question for mandamus
petitions would have been immediately subject to the attack that the entire petition might have be-
come moot. After all, the Antrobuses might have obtained the same relief they were seeking in their
mandamus petition via the vehicle of their parallel appeal. Thus, the Tenth's Circuit's decision
denying consolidation (for reasons entirely unexplained) constituted, as a practical matter, a bar to
the Antrobuses seeking review in the Supreme Court.
74. Antrobus, 563 F.3d at 1097.
75. Id. at 1099.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1100 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK,
2008 WL 53125, at *5 (D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008)).
78. Nate Carlisle, Notes Confirm Suspicions of Trolley Square Victim's Family, SALT LAKE
TRIB., June 25, 2009, available at http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_12380112.
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Newly released FBI documents say that Sulejman Talovic told a
coworker he wanted a gun to commit a bank robbery.
The statement corroborates an argument made by the parents of a
Trolley Square victim Vanessa Quinn. Sue and Ken Antrobus have
said one of the people who sold Talovic a .38-caliber pistol knew Ta-
lovic was going to use it to commit a crime."
7 9
The Justice Department released these documents to the media-
without first providing them to the Antrobuses, whose daughter was
murdered at Trolley Square-and in contravention of its previous repre-
sentations to the Tenth Circuit that it could not release the documents due
to Privacy Act concerns. Conveniently, all of this happened after the
Antrobuses' opportunity to provide the documents to the Tenth Circuit
had evaporated because their appeal had come to an end.
In summary, it is worth briefly highlighting the net result of the An-
trobuses' tortuous journey through the courts. After the district court
denied their motion to have their daughter recognized as a "crime vic-
tim," they were unable to have the merits of that decision reviewed by
the Tenth Circuit, despite four separate attempts. In the first trip, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the holdings of (at least) two other circuit courts to
erect a demanding "clear and indisputable error" standard of review.
Having imposed that barrier, the court then stated that the case was a
"close" one but that they would not grant relief-with one concurring
judge noting that sufficient proof of the Antrobuses' claim might rest in
the Justice Department's files. The Antrobuses then returned to the dis-
trict court, where the Justice Department refused to clarify the district
court's misunderstanding of what information rested in its files. The An-
trobuses then sought mandamus review of the question of discovering
that information in the Justice Department files, which the Department
"mooted" by agreeing to file that information with the district court and
not opposing any release to the Antrobuses. But the district court stymied
the Antrobuses' attempt by refusing to grant their unopposed motion for
release of the documents.
The Antrobuses then sought appellate review of the district court's
initial "victim" ruling, only to have the Tenth Circuit conclude that they
were barred from taking an appeal. The Tenth Circuit, however, said that
they "should" pursue the issue of release of the material in the Justice
Department's files in the district court. So they did-only to lose again in
the district court. And on a final mandamus petition to the Tenth Circuit,
the court ruled (among other things) that the Antrobuses had not been
diligent enough in seeking the release of the information. With their ap-
peals at an end, the Justice Department chose to release discovery infor-
mation about the case-not to the Antrobuses, but to the media.
79. Id.
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The question arises, then, whether Congress intended for those who
have been victimized by federal crimes to face such barriers in attempt-
ing to assert rights under the CVRA. To answer that question it is useful
to examine the background of the Act and Congress's intended purpose.
II. THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT: REFORMING THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO CONSIDER VICTIMS
A. The Victims' Rights Movement and the Federal System
The CVRA arose from the efforts of the crime victims' movement
to gain broad and enforceable rights in the federal criminal justice proc-
ess.80 The roots of the CVRA can be traced back to the 1982 Report of
the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime. The report concluded:
[T]he criminal justice system has lost an essential balance.... [Tihe
system has deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its
protection .... The victims of crime have been transformed into a
group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them.
This oppression must be redressed.
81
The Task Force advocated multiple reforms, such as a victim's right
to be heard at sentencing. 82 The Task Force also sweepingly proposed a
federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims' rights "to be
present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings. 83 In
the wake of that recommendation, crime victims' advocates considered
how best to achieve that goal. Realizing the difficulty of achieving the
consensus required to amend the United States Constitution, advocates
decided to go first to the states to enact state victims' rights amendments.
They had considerable success with this "states first" strategy84: to date,
about thirty states have adopted amendments to their own state constitu-
tions,85 which protect a wide range of victims' rights.
80. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victinms in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victimv' Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV.
835, 852-924 (2005) [hereinafter Cassell, Recognizing Victims]; Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime
Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 861, 863 (2007).
81. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publicationspresdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf.
82. Id. at 63.
83. Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted).
84. See S. REP. No. 108-191, at 3 (2003).
85. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONsT. art. il, § 2.1;
CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28; COLO. CONST. art. H, § 16a; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8(b); FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 16(b); IDAHO CONsT. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b); KAN.
CONST. art. XV, § 15; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MD. CONST. art. XLVII; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. 1, §
8; N.J. CONST. art. I, T 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. 1, §
10a; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, §
24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I,
§ 8-A; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m.
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The crime victims' rights movement was also able to prod the fed-
eral system to recognize victims' rights. In 1982, Congress passed the
first federal victims' rights legislation, the Victim and Witness Protection
Act, which gave victims the right to make an impact statement at sen-
tencing and provided expanded restitution.86 Since then, Congress has
passed several acts further protecting victims' rights, including the Vic-
tims of Crime Act of 1984,87 the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of
1990,88 the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,89
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,90 and the
Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997.91 Other federal statutes have
been passed to deal with specialized victim situations, such as child vic-
tims and witnesses.92
Among these, the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990
("VRRA") is worth briefly highlighting because its flaws created an im-
petus for Congress to ultimately enact the CVRA. The VRRA purported
to create a comprehensive list of victims' rights in the federal criminal
justice process. The act commanded that "[a] crime victim has the fol-
lowing rights," 93 and then listed various rights in the process. Among
those were the right to "be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim's dignity and privacy,"'
94 to "be notified of court proceedings,"
95
to "confer with [the] attorney for the Government in the case, ' 96 and to
attend court proceedings, even if called as a witness, unless the victim's
testimony "would be materially affected" by hearing other testimony at
trial.9 ' The statute also directed the Justice Department to make its "best
efforts" to ensure that victims received their rights.
98
While the VRRA appeared to promise sweeping rights to crime vic-
tims, it never successfully integrated victims into the federal criminal
justice process and was generally regarded as something of a dead letter.
Along with "standing" problems (discussed below), one likely reason for
the ineffectiveness of the VRRA was that it was curiously codified in
Title 42 of the United States Code-the title dealing with "Public Health
and Welfare." As a result, the statute was generally unknown to federal
86. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248.
87. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
88. Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 502, 104 Stat. 4789,
4820, repealed by Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260.
89. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796.
90. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
91. Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-6, 1 It Stat. 12.
92. See, e.g., Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006).
93. Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 § 502(b).
94. Id. § 502(b)(1).
95. Id. § 502(b)(3).
96. Id. § 502(b)(5).
97. Id. § 502(b)(4).
98. Id. § 502(a).
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judges and criminal law practitioners. Federal practitioners reflexively
consult Title 18 for guidance on criminal law issues. More prosaically,
federal criminal enactments are bound together in a single West publica-
tion-the Federal Criminal Code and Rules. This single publication is
carried to court by prosecutors and defense attorneys and lies on the desk
of most federal judges. Because West Publishing never included the
VRAA in this book, the statute was essentially unknown to even the
most experienced judges and attorneys.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Thwarting of Victim's Rights in the McVeigh
Case
The prime illustration of the ineffectiveness of the VRRA comes
from the Oklahoma City bombing case. Coincidentally, this notorious
example of a court decision denying victim's substantive justice came
from the Tenth Circuit, which denied victims of the bombing any right to
seek appellate review of denials of their claims. Because Congress spe-
cifically singled out the Tenth Circuit's decision in McVeigh as one of
the decisions it specifically intended to overrule with the CVRA, it is
worthwhile to briefly discuss that decision here. 99
McVeigh arose from a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress,
during which the district court sua sponte issued a ruling precluding any
victim who wished to provide victim impact testimony at sentencing
from observing any proceeding in the case. Each victim would have to
choose one or the other: watch the trial or be eligible to testify at the sen-
tencing phase. The court based its ruling on Rule 615 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the so-called "rule on witnesses."' ° In the hour that
the court gave to victims to make this wrenching decision about testify-
ing, some of the victims opted to watch the proceedings, while others
decided to return home and remain eligible to provide impact testi-
mony.'
0 '
Thirty-five victims and survivors of the bombing then filed a mo-
tion asserting their own standing to raise their rights under federal law
and, in the alternative, seeking leave to file a brief on the issue as amici
curiae.10 2 The victims noted that the district court apparently overlooked
99. United States v. McVeigh, 157 F.3d 809, 814-15 (10th Cir. 1998). See generally Paul G.
Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 479, 515-22 (1999) (discussing this case in greater detail).
100. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 4-5, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M
(D. Colo. June 26, 1996) (citing FED. R. EvID. 615).
101. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 6 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 73 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (state-
ment of Marsha A. Kight).
102. See Motion of Marsha and H. Tom Kight [et al.] ... and the National Organization for
Victim Assistance Asserting Standing to Raise Rights Under the Victims' Bill of Rights and Seeking
Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M (D. Colo. Sept.
30, 1996). I represented a number of the victims on this matter on a pro bono basis, along with able
co-counsel of Robert Hoyt, Arnon Siegel, Karan Bhatia, and Reg Brown at the Washington, D.C.,
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the bill of rights contained in the VRRA. The VRRA promised victims
(among other rights) the right "to be present at all public court proceed-
ings ... unless the court determines that testimony by the victim would
be materially affected if the victim heard other testimony at trial.' ' 3
Prompted by the victims' motion, the district court then held a hear-
ing to reconsider the issue of excluding victim witnesses. °4 The court
first denied the victims' motion asserting standing to present their own




After argument by the Justice Department and the defendants, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration. 0 6 It concluded that victims pre-
sent during court proceedings would not be able to separate the "experi-
ence of trial" from "the experience of loss from the conduct in question,"
and, thus, their testimony at a sentencing hearing would be inadmissi-
ble.1
0 7
The victims then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Tenth
Circuit seeking review of the district court's ruling. 0 8 Because the pro-
cedures for victims' appeals were unclear, the victims also filed a parallel
appeal in the Tenth Circuit (the Justice Department likewise sought both
mandamus and appellate review).
Three months later, a panel of the Tenth Circuit rejected, without
oral argument, both the victims' and the United States' claims on juris-
dictional grounds. With respect to the victims' challenges, the court con-
cluded that the victims lacked "standing" under Article III of the Consti-
tution because they had no "legally protected interest" to be present at
the trial, and consequently, had suffered no "injury in fact" from their
exclusion.' 9 In addition, the Tenth Circuit rejected, on jurisdictional
grounds, the appeal and mandamus petition filed by the United States.'10
Efforts by both the victims and the Justice Department to obtain a rehear-
ing were unsuccessful,. 1' even with the support of separate briefs urging
law firm of Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering and Sean Kendall of Boulder, Colorado. For a somewhat
more complete recounting of the victims' issues in the case, see my statement in Hearing, supra note
101, at 106-13 (statement of Paul G. Cassell), and my analysis in Cassell, supra note 98, at 515-22.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4) (2006). The victims also relied on a similar provision found in
the authorization for closed circuit broadcasting on the trial, id. § 10608(a), and on a First Amend-
ment right of access to public court proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980).
104. See Transcript of Hearing on Motions, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M (D.
Colo. Oct. 4, 1996).
105. Id. at 499-500.
106. Id. at 519.
107. Id. at 517.
108. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir.
1997) (No. 96-1484).
109. McVeigh, 106 F.3d at 334 (per curiam).
110. Id. at 336.
111. Order Entered March 11, 1997, at 2, McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (No. 96-1484) (denying
rehearing).
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rehearing from 49 members of Congress, all six Attorneys General in the
Tenth Circuit, and some of the leading victims groups in the nation." 1
2
C. Victims' Efforts to Pass a Federal Constitutional Amendment
Because of the problems with the statutory protection of victims'
rights, victims' advocates decided in 1995 the time was right to press for
a federal constitutional amendment. They argued that the statutory pro-
tections could not sufficiently guarantee victims' rights. In their view,
such statutes had "frequently fail[ed] to provide meaningful protection
whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional
indifference, [or] sheer inertia."" 3 As the Justice Department reported:
[Elfforts to secure victims' rights through means other than a consti-
tutional amendment have proved less than fully adequate. Victims'
rights advocates have sought reforms at the state level for the past
twenty years, and many states have responded with state statutes and
constitutional provisions that seek to guarantee victims' rights. How-
ever, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard victims' rights.
These significant state efforts simply are not sufficiently consistent,
comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard victims' rights. 114
To place victims' rights in the Constitution, victims' advocates (led
most prominently by the National Victims Constitutional Amendment
Network' 15) approached President Clinton and Congress about a federal
amendment." 16 On April 22, 1996, Senators Kyl and Feinstein introduced
a federal victims' rights amendment with the backing of President Clin-
ton. 1 7 The intent of the amendment was to "restore, preserve, and pro-
tect, as a matter of right for the victims of violent crimes, the practice of
victim participation in the administration of criminal justice that was the
112. See Hearing, supra note 101, at 106-13 (1997) (statement of Paul G. Cassell); Cassell,
supra note 99, at 518 n.207. In the meantime, the victims, supported by the Oklahoma Attorney
General's Office, sought remedial legislation in Congress clearly stating that victims should not have
to decide between testifying at sentencing and watching the trial. The Victims' Rights Clarification
Act of 1997 was introduced to provide that watching a trial does not constitute grounds for denying
the chance to provide an impact statement. The legislation, however, had an abortive implementa-
tion, as the district court refused to squarely state that it he would be bound by the law and, as a
result, the victims were unable to make clear decisions about whether to watch the trial or to sit out
and preserve their eligibility to be an impact phase witness. Cassell, supra note 99, at 519.
113. Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Op-Ed., Embed the Rights of Victims in the Consti-
tution: A Proposed Amendment Protects Victims, Without Running Roughshod over the Rights that
Are Due the Accused, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5.
114. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res.
6 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 64 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno, U.S.
Attorney Gen.).
115. See National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Passage, http://www.nvcap.org (last
visited Apr. 16, 2010).
116. For a comprehensive history of victims' efforts to pass a constitutional amendment, see
Jon Kyl, Steven J. Twist & Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their Angels, the Scott Campbell,
Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims'Rights Act, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L REV. 581, 583-91 (2005).
117. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996).
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birthright of every American at the founding of our Nation."" 8 The pro-
posed amendment embodied seven core principles: (1) the right to notice
of proceedings, (2) the right to be present, (3) the right to be heard, (4)
the right to notice of the defendant's release or escape, (5) the right to
restitution, (6) the right to a speedy trial, and (7) the right to reasonable
protection. In a later resolution, an eighth principle was added: stand-
ing.' 19 The proposed amendment, however, never gained the necessary
supermajority support required to move it through Congress.
1 20
Faced with the difficulties of amending the U.S. Constitution, vic-
tims' rights advocates eventually relented. The CVRA resulted from a
decision by the victims' movement to seek a more comprehensive and
enforceable federal statute rather than pursuing the (at that time unattain-
able) dream of a federal constitutional amendment. In April 2004, vic-
tims' advocates met with Senators Kyl and Feinstein to decide whether
to push again for a federal constitutional amendment. Concluding that
the proposed amendment lacked the required supermajority, the advo-
cates decided to press instead for a far-reaching federal statute protecting
victims' rights in the federal criminal justice system. 121 In exchange for
backing down from the constitutional amendment in the short term, vic-
tims' advocates received near universal congressional support for a
"broad and encompassing" statutory victims' bill of rights. 122 This "new
and bolder" approach not only created a bill of rights for victims, but also
provided funding for victims' legal services and created remedies when
victims' rights were violated. 123 The victims' movement would then be
able to see how the statute worked in future years before deciding wheth-
er to continue to push for a federal constitutional amendment.
124
The legislation that ultimately passed-the CVRA-gives victims
"the right to participate in the system." 125 It lists various rights for crime
victims in the process of prosecuting the accused, including the right to
be notified of court hearings, the right to attend those hearings, the right
to be heard at appropriate points in the process, and the right to be treated
with fairness.' 2 6 Rather than relying merely on the "best efforts" of pros-
118. S. REP. No. 108-191, at 1-2 (2003); see also S. REP. No. 106-254 (2000) (listing recom-
mendations for the federal victims' rights amendment).
119. S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong. (1996).
120. See Cassell, Recognizing Victims, supra note 80, at 856-923 (collecting comprehensive
legislative history).
121. Kyletal.,supranote 116, at 591-92.
122. 150 CONG. REC. S4260-61 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
123. Id. at S4263 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
124. Id. at S4263-66 (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney
Gen., Prepared Remarks at the Hoover Inst. Bd. of Overseers Conference (Feb. 28, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.hoover.org/research/conferences/3022346.html?show=transcript) (indicating
a federal victims' rights amendment remains a priority for President Bush).
125. 150 CONG. REC. S4263 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). For a description of victim partici-
pation, see Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1999).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2006).
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ecutors to vindicate the rights, the CVRA also contains specific enforce-
ment mechanisms.' 2 7 Most important, the CVRA directly confers stand-
ing onto victims to assert their rights, a flaw in the original VRRA.1
2 8
The Act provides that rights can be "assert[ed]" by the "crime victim or
the crime victim's lawful representative, and the attorney for the Gov-
ernment,"'129 and explicitly provides that the victim (or the government)
may appeal any denial of a victim's right through a writ of mandamus on
an expedited basis.130 Senator Kyl explained that "[w]ithout the right to
seek appellate review and a guarantee that the appellate court will hear
the appeal and order relief, a victim is left to the mercy of the very trial
court that may have erred."
' 131
The CVRA also broadly provides that courts must "ensure that the
crime victim is afforded" the rights given by the new law.' 32 These
changes were intended to make victims "an independent participant in
the proceedings."''33 And the sponsors of the legislation took a shot di-
rectly at the Tenth Circuit, warning courts in the future not to give the
same sort of chary construction of the new victims' rights law:
It is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled down or
marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. This legislation is
meant to correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of
crime victims in the criminal process. This legislation is meant to en-
sure that cases like the McVeigh case [do not recur], where victims of
the Oklahoma City bombing were effectively denied the right to at-
tend the trial[,] and to avoid federal appeals courts from determining,
as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did, that victims had no stand-
ing to seek review of their right to attend the trial under the former
victims' law that this bill replaces.'
34
I1. VICTIMS' APPELLATE RIGHTS UNDER THE CVRA
In light of the history and purpose of the CVRA, we can now con-
sider the Tenth Circuit's ruling in In re Antrobus 35 that crime victims
must prove "clear and indisputable" error in order to obtain any review in
127. Id. § 3771 (c)-(d).
128. Cf Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, and
Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 350-55 (2005) (identifying this as a pervasive flaw in victims'
rights enactments).
129. § 3771(d)(1).
130. Id. § 377 1(d)(3).
131. 150 CONG. REc. S 10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also Kyl et
al., supra note 116, at 619 (finding that CVRA alters general rule that mandamus is a discretionary
remedy).
132. § 3771(b)(1).
133. 150 CONG. REC. S 10,911 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
134. Id.
135. 519 F.3d. 1123 (10th Cir. 2008). Given the tortuous history of the litigation involving the
Antrobuses, for convenience in the remainder of this Article I use the designation "Antrobus deci-
sion" to refer to the Tenth Circuit's first opinion, denying the Antrobuses relief because of the "clear
and indisputable" error standard.
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the appellate courts. Given Congress's plan to "correct, not continue, the
legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal process," it
would be rather surprising to find that the CVRA contained such a de-
manding level of proof. In fact, neither the language, structure, nor legis-
lative intent behind the CVRA supports such a conclusion. Instead, Con-
gress intended to give crime victims the same sort of access to the na-
tion's appellate courts as other litigants obtain.
A. The Plain Language of the CVRA Gives Crime Victims Ordinary Ap-
pellate Review
The linchpin of the Antrobus decision is the Tenth Circuit's conclu-
sion that the "plain language" of the CVRA dictates a higher standard of
review than would ordinarily be available on appeal. The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that, in using the term "mandamus" in the CVRA, Congress
intended to impose on victims various limitations that sometimes attach
to mandamus petitions. The court ultimately held that "mandamus is a
'drastic' remedy that is 'to be invoked only in extraordinary situa-
tions, ' '' 136 and therefore, the Antrobuses-and all other crime victims
following after them in the Tenth Circuit-had to show that their right to
the writ was "clear and indisputable."'
' 37
The Circuit's review of the "plain language" of the statute was re-
markably truncated. It focused on the term "mandamus" in the Act,
without carefully reviewing the structure of the statute. The relevant pro-
vision in the CVRA not only provides victims with an opportunity to
seek a writ of mandamus, it also guarantees that the courts of appeals
must take up and decide the application:
Motion for relief and writ of mandamus-The rights described in
subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in which a defen-
dant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is under-
way, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.
The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a vic-
tim's right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the
movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.
The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge
pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The court of appeals shall take up and decide such application
forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no event
shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than
five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of ap-
peals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be
clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.
138
136. Id. at 1124 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)).
137. Id. at 1126.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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Antrobus rested its holding on the single word "mandamus" appear-
ing in this provision, while ignoring the broader setting. Had the court
looked at the word in context, it would have seen that Congress intended
a different sort of appellate regime than that constructed by the Circuit-
one that gives crime victims a right to appellate review even in routine
cases. 139 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Kenna v. United States District
Court for Central District of California:
[T]he CVRA contemplates active review of orders denying victims'
rights claims even in routine cases. The CVRA explicitly gives vic-
tims aggrieved by a district court's order the right to petition for re-
view by writ of mandamus, provides for expedited review of such a
petition, allows a single judge to make a decision thereon, and re-
quires a reasoned decision in case the writ is denied. The CVRA cre-
ates a unique regime that does, in fact, contemplate routine interlocu-
tory review of district court decisions denying rights asserted under
the statute. 
1 40
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its construction. The Second Cir-
cuit has also held that "[u]nder the plain language of the CVRA. . . Con-
gress has chosen a petition for mandamus as a mechanism by which a
crime victim may appeal a district court's decision denying relief under
the provisions of the CVRA''14 and, therefore, "a petitioner seeking re-
lief pursuant to the mandamus provision set forth in § 3771 (d)(3) need
not overcome the hurdles typically faced by a petitioner seeking review
,, ,42of a district court determination through a writ of mandamus.
One significant hurdle that a petitioner bringing an ordinary writ of
mandamus faces is that review of the petition is a matter of judicial dis-
cretion. 143 By contrast, under the CVRA, the right to appellate review is
non-discretionary. Section 3771(d)(3) provides that "[tihe court of ap-
peals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours
after the petition has been filed." 144 Clearly, Congress put in place for
crime victims something other than traditional mandamus review. As one
leading authority on crime victims' rights recognized in discussing the
CVRA's mandamus provision:
139. For an excellent, if somewhat briefer, exposition of this argument, see Steven Joffee,
Note, Validating Victims: Enforcing Victims' Rights through Mandatory Mandamus, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 241,249-55 (2009).
140. 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
141. In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Once the petitioner has
established the prerequisites of mandamus relief, the court may exercise its discretion to grant the
writ."); In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 979 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("[Ordinarily, the] issuance of a
writ of mandamus lies in large part within the discretion of the court." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 1979))).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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[T]he problem in review of victims' rights is not the unavailability of
writ review, but rather the discretionary nature of writs. The solution
to the review problem is to provide for nondiscretionary review of
victims' rights violations. . . . One could not credibly suggest that
criminal defendants' constitutional rights are to be reviewed only in
the discretion of the court. Crime victims' rights should be similarly
respected. The solution of Congress in [the CVRA] is excellent, pro-
viding for a nondiscretionary writ of mandamus. 145
Because Congress in the CVRA expressly altered conventional le-
gal principles that otherwise might apply to review of a mandamus peti-
tion, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the rule of statutory construction
involving "borrow[ed] terms of art" 146 was an obvious mistake. Congress
certainly borrowed the term "writ of mandamus" as the tool for crime
victims to obtain quick review of trial court actions. But it plainly sought
to forge that tool into a powerful remedy that would fully protect crime
victims. Moreover, that rule of statutory construction must give way to
the canon of construction requiring remedial legislation to be constructed
"liberally to facilitate and accomplish its purposes and intent."
147
Other provisions of the CVRA also indicate that the statute provides
ordinary appellate review. The CVRA directs that "[i]n any court pro-
ceeding"-presumably including appellate proceedings-"the court shall
ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in [the
CVRA].' 48 The congressional command that appellate courts "ensure"
that crime victims are "afforded" their rights would be fatally compro-
mised if those courts were confined to examining lower court proceed-
ings for clear and indisputable errors. Indeed, if the Antrobus litigation
shows anything, it is that the Tenth Circuit never ensured that the Antro-
buses were provided the rights the CVRA promised them. In rejecting
their initial mandamus petition, the Tenth Circuit described the issue of
whether the district court had clearly and indisputably erred as a "diffi-
cult" one' 49-strongly suggesting that the court would have ruled in the
Antrobuses' favor had the "crime victim" issue been squarely before it
without deferential review. In addition, Judge Tymkovich concurred
(without disagreement from the majority) to decry the Justice Depart-
ment's lack of cooperation with the Antrobuses, noting that the evidence
to prove the Antrobuses' case "may well be contained in the govern-
ment's files. Sadly, the Antrobuses were not allowed a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make a better case."'' 50 But it is one thing to describe a family's
145. Beloof, supra note 128, at 347.
146. In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008).
147. Elliott Indus. Ltd. P'ship v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1118 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Stratton v. Gurley Motor Co., 737 P.2d
1180, 1185 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)).
148. § 3771 (b)(1) (emphasis added).
149. Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1125.
150. Id. at 1127 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
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plight in the courts as a sad one and entirely another thing to do some-
thing about it-in other words, to use appellate court power to ensure
crime victims a reasonable opportunity to vindicate their rights. By hid-
ing behind a heightened standard of review, the Tenth Circuit shirked its
own legal obligation to "ensure" that the Antrobuses' legal rights were
"afforded" to them.
This same provision in the CVRA also requires that "[t]he reasons
for any decision denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated
on the record.' 15' The basis for this provision, as one of the legislation's
sponsors stated in the legislative history, is that "requiring a court to pro-
vide the reasons for denial of relief is necessary for effective appeal of
such denial."' 52 If Congress had envisioned mere cursory review for clear
and indisputable errors, it would have had no reason to add this provi-
sion.
The CVRA also broadly commands that crime victims must "be
treated with fairness" throughout the criminal justice process. 53 Victims
are not treated fairly if, as one of the sponsors of the CVRA noted, they
are "left to the mercy of the very trial court that may have erred."'
' 54
Leaving crime victims without meaningful appellate review deprives
victims of the promised right to be treated with fairness.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's review of the Antrobuses' petition
under traditional mandamus standards leads to an absurd result. Section
3771(d)(4) of the CVRA provides that "[iun any appeal in a criminal
case, the Government may assert as error the district court's denial of
any crime victim's right in the proceeding to which the appeal re-
lates.' 55 This provision gives the government the right (if the defendant
appeals) to take a cross-appeal of an alleged error by the trial court-a
cross-appeal that would presumably receive ordinary appellate review. 156
But this means, under the Antrobus holding, that the Government can
obtain more thorough appellate review of a denial of a victim's right than
the victim, or her representatives, could obtain on mandamus review.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit's holding would also penalize a crime
victim for (as in the Antrobus case) exercising her right to independent
legal counsel rather than having the government assert an error.'
57
151. § 3771(b)(I).
152. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
153. § 3771 (a)(8).
154. 150CONG. REC. S10,912 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
155. § 3771 (d)(4) (emphasis added).
156. See id. The Justice Department appears to have undercut the effectiveness of this provi-
sion by declining to take even a single cross-appeal (as far as I am aware) under this provision in the
more than five years since the CVRA's enactment.
157. See § 3771 (c)(2).
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Finally, the Antrobus opinion violates a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that a statute's provision should not be interpreted so as to
be "meaningless, redundant, or superfluous."' 58 Antrobus interpreted the
language "the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus" to mean only that the movant may petition for an ordinary
writ of mandamus. But before Congress enacted the CVRA, a crime vic-
tim could (like anyone else) petition for a writ of mandamus under the
All Writs Act. 59 Thus, under the Circuit's interpretation, the CVRA
mandamus provision is superfluous.
When the Antrobuses raised this superfluity point in their petition
for rehearing, the Tenth Circuit briefly responded by arguing that it was
interpreting the CVRA's appellate review provision to give victims
"considerably more rights than they would otherwise have."' 6 But the
only new right that the Circuit listed was a right for "putative crime vic-
tims [to] receive a decision from the court of appeals within 72 hours."',
61
This right to a decision within 72 hours is spelled out in a separate sen-
tence from the right to file a mandamus petition,' 62 meaning that the
Tenth Circuit (at a minimum) rendered the sentence giving victims the
right to file a mandamus petition entirely superfluous. Moreover, the
Tenth Circuit never gave any explanation for the language that appears in
the same sentence as the 72-hour-decision requirement-that the "court
of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith."'' 63 This
language can only be read as altering the discretionary nature of manda-
mus review-something that the Tenth Circuit avoided by simply ignor-
ing the language entirely.
For all of these reasons, under the plain language of the CVRA, or-
dinary appellate review applies to crime victims' petitions.
B. Congress Clearly Intended Ordinary Appellate Review for Crime Vic-
tims Under the CVRA
Not only does the plain language of the CVRA clearly demonstrate
that ordinary appellate review applies to crime victims' petitions under
the CVRA, but the legislative history leaves no doubt whatsoever that
Congress intended this result. Indeed, one of the most remarkable things
about the Antrobus decision is that the Tenth Circuit seems to have de-
liberately ignored the legislative history-not discussing (or even citing)
the specific statements made by the legislation's sponsors.
158. Andersen v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 455 F.3d 1102, 1106 (10th Cir.
2006).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). For an example of a victim's mandamus petition, see Petition
for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1484).
160. In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2008) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
161. Id.
162. See § 377 1(d)(3).
163. Id.
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Like other circuits and the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit has
historically looked to legislative history to resolve ambiguities in a stat-
ute." Although the Tenth Circuit did not explain why it declined to re-
view the legislative history of the CVRA in Antrobus (history that had
been specifically proffered by the Antrobuses' 65), presumably, the reason
was that the Tenth Circuit found no ambiguity in the plain language of
the CVRA. But when the Antrobuses filed their petition with the Tenth
Circuit, three other circuits had already addressed the question of the
standard of review-and all three had unanimously reached the opposite
conclusion of the Tenth Circuit.' 66 While it is surely possible that all
three circuits were wrong, it is hard to believe that they had all misread a
statute that unambiguously directed the opposite conclusion. 1
67
The reason the Tenth Circuit needed to blind itself to the legislative
history is that even a quick peek would have left absolutely no doubt that
Congress intended to give crime victims the same appellate protections
that other litigants receive. One of the CVRA's two co-sponsors (Senator
Kyl), for example, specifically described the CVRA as encouraging ap-
pellate courts to "broadly defend" victims' rights and as providing a right
to an "appeal":
[W]hile mandamus is generally discretionary, this provision [18
U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3)] means that courts must review these cases. Ap-
pellate review of denials of victims' rights is just as important as the
initial assertion of a victim's right. This provision ensures review and
encourages courts to broadly defend the victims' rights.
Without the right to seek appellate review and a guarantee that the
appellate court will hear the appeal and order relief, a victim is left to
the mercy of the very trial court that may have erred. This country's
164. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 410 (2002) (looking to legislative
history to resolve ambiguity); Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2006) (same).
165. See Petition for Panel Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing en Banc at 2, Antrobus,
519 F.3d 1123 (No. 08-4002).
166. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir.
2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561-63 (2d Cir. 2005); see also In re
Walsh, 229 F. App'x. 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing and following the Second and Ninth Circuit
decisions, and holding that the CVRA makes "mandamus relief.., available under a different, and
less demanding, standard" than the ordinary mandamus petitioner would have to meet). Since the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Antrobus, two other circuits have weighed in on the standard of review
issue. The Eleventh Circuit followed the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits in reviewing a crime
victims' petition under conventional appellate standards. In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11 th
Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, without explanation of its own, simply followed the
Tenth Circuit's Antrobus decision. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391,393-94 (5th Cir. 2008).
167. The legal commentators on the statute also read it to provide regular appellate review. See
20A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 321.14 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp.
2009) ("[B]ecause Congress has chosen mandamus as the mechanism for review under the CVRA,
the victim need not make the usual threshold showing of extraordinary circumstances to obtain
mandamus relief."); Beloof, supra note 128, at 347.
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appellate courts are designed to remedy errors of lower courts and
this provision requires them to do so for victim's rights. 1
68
Likewise, the other co-sponsor (Senator Feinstein) said the manda-
mus provision "provides that [the appellate] court shall take the writ and
shall order the relief necessary to protect the crime victim's right,"'69
leading Senator Kyl to agree that crime victims must "be able to have
denials of those rights reviewed at the appellate level, and to have the
appellate courts take the appeal and order relief."'
' 70
In Antrobus, the Tenth Circuit described the term "mandamus" as a
"borrow[ed] term[] of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition
and means of centuries of practice." But as explained by Senator Fein-
stein, the CVRA was designed "to be a new use of a very old procedure,
the writ of mandamus. This provision will establish a procedure where a
crime victim can, in essence, immediately appeal a denial of their rights
by a trial court to the court of appeals .... ,,17
It is well settled that statements made by the sponsors of congres-
sional legislation "deserve[] to be accorded substantial weight in inter-
preting the statute." 172 These remarks make clear that Congress would
have wanted the Antrobuses' petition reviewed under ordinary appellate
standards. It is impossible for appellate courts to "broadly defend" vic-
tims' rights and "remedy errors of lower courts" under the CVRA if they
are confined to granting mandamus petitions only where the right to ob-
tain the writ is "clear and indisputable." A crime victim is not allowed to
"immediately appeal a denial of his rights" if all he can obtain in the ap-
pellate courts is deferential review for clear and indisputable errors.
Congress's clear undeniable goal was to give crime victims the same
appellate protections other litigants receive.
While ignoring this clearly expressed congressional intent, the
Tenth Circuit inferred a contrary congressional intent by reasoning that
"Congress could have drafted the CVRA to provide for 'immediate ap-
pellate review' or 'interlocutory appellate review,' something it has done
many times."' 173 On this point, the court was simply mistaken: Congress
has not used those phrases "many times." In fact, neither the Westlaw
nor Lexis federal statutory databases contain even a single use of either
168. 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added); see also Kyl et al., supra, note 116, at 619 (noting that the CVRA alters the general rule that
mandamus is a discretionary remedy).
169. 150 CONG. REC. S4270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (emphasis
added).
170. Id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added).
171. Id. S4262 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (emphasis added).
172. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); accord Kenna v.
U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2006) (giving substantial
weight to remarks of Senators Feinstein and Kyl to interpret the CVRA).
173. In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (1Oth Cir. 2008).
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one of those phrases. The reason the phrase "immediate appellate re-
view" (for example) does not appear is easy to discern: the phrase is
something of an oxymoron. Detailed provisions in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure require appeals to proceed by way of notice in the
district court followed by preparation of transcripts, designation of a re-
cord, and a specific briefing schedule that runs at least 70 days. Writs of
mandamus are burdened by none of these requirements. In light of the
existing appellate rules, Congress could not guarantee "immediate appel-
late review" of crime victims' petitions without overhauling the rules to
eliminate delay. Indeed, in the isolated statutes allowing interlocutory
government appeals in criminal cases, Congress has usually required the
appropriate United States Attorney to personally "certif[y] to the district
court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay."' 7 4 This certifica-
tion requirement reveals Congress's understanding that appeals risk de-
lay, rather than provide prompt review.
When the Antrobuses pointed out in their petition for rehearing that
the Tenth Circuit was flatly wrong in stating that Congress had used the
phrases "immediate appellate review" and "interlocutory appellate re-
view" "many times," the court responded, but not by acknowledging that
its earlier statement was wrong. Instead, in its amplified opinion denying
rehearing, the court simply switched phrases without admitting its earlier
mistake, noting "[a]nd, although it is only a rough measure, a computer-
aided search of the United States Code indicates that the phrase 'inter-
locutory appeal' appears 62 times, and the word 'interlocutory' appears
123 times in the same sentence as the word 'appeal."",175 This new, care-
fully-hedged claim does not address the Antrobuses' point that an imme-
diate interlocutory appeal would be quite difficult to structure under the
appellate rules. Instead, the court proved (at most) that an interlocutory
appeal would be possible in some circumstances.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit used the curious locution that the
phrase "appears" in a "search" of the U.S. Code because it could not
assert that Congress had provided for an interlocutory appeal 123 times
or even 62 times. In fact, most of the times the phrase appears in the
search is because the statutory database has some description of an al-
ready-existing interlocutory process or secondary commentary-rather
than the actual creation of such a process.
176
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2518(10)(b) (allowing govern-
ment appeal of motion to suppress under wiretap act only where U.S. Attorney certifies the "appeal
is not taken for purposes of delay"); cf id. 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 7 (allowing government to take an
interlocutory appeal of order releasing classified information).
175. Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1129 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
176. See, e.g., David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, 9 U.S.C.A. § 16 (West 2010) (discuss-
ing public policies surrounding "interlocutory appeals"); 1sT CIR. BANKR. APP. PANEL R. 8003-1
(providing bankruptcy rules for "interlocutory appeal"); Federal Reserve System Hearing Rules, 12
C.F.R. § 263.17 (2009) (Federal Reserve rules on interlocutory appeals).
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The Tenth Circuit was correct in stating that Congress has provided
for an "interlocutory appeal" in a few circumstances, most notably in
cases involving evidentiary rulings against the government in criminal
cases. 177 But Congress presumably eschewed granting crime victims a
potentially open-ended right to an "appeal" in the CVRA because the
courts might have construed it as making crime victims actual parties to
criminal prosecutions. Allowing a victim to take an "appeal" suggests
that victims could attack anything in a criminal trial or judgment not to
their liking. Although the CVRA does provide crime victims the right to
"re-open a plea or sentence,"' 178 the right to re-open was designed to per-
mit courts to remedy a violation of a victim's rights, not to allow victims
to broadly challenge anything and everything not to their liking in the
outcome of criminal prosecutions. Thus, it is not surprising that Congress
would have chosen a different word than "appeal" to describe the appel-
late right given to crime victims, while at the same time taking steps to
ensure that the appellate right was every bit as effective as conventional
appellate rights. The Tenth Circuit failed to fairly evaluate Congress's
intent in adopting the CVRA.
C. Mandamus Petitions in Other Contexts Receive More Generous Re-
view When Important Rights Are at Stake
One last point is worth brief discussion. Mandamus petitions are a
common vehicle for third-parties whose rights are affected in the crimi-
nal process to seek review of an issue affecting them. In these other con-
texts, third parties receive the functional equivalent of an appeal even
though they proceed by way of mandamus. 1
79
Perhaps the best example of mandamus petitions providing the
functional equivalent of an appeal comes from news media mandamus
petitions challenging court closure orders in criminal proceedings. Like
crime victims' petitions under the CVRA, such petitions involve attempts
by non-parties to assert important rights in an underlying criminal action.
Yet courts of appeals have not typically subjected these petitions to
"clear and indisputable" review, as this would leave First Amendment
freedoms subject to the vagaries of trial court judges. 180 For example, in
the Fourth Circuit, to obtain relief from courtroom closure orders, news
organizations are required to seek a writ of mandamus, rather than being
177. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(f)(5) (2006) (providing for government appeals of rulings
regarding disclosure of classified information at trials).
178. Id. § 3771(d)(5).
179. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2001). See gener-
ally Steven Wisotsky, Extraordinary Writs: "Appeal" by Other Means, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC.
577, 588-89 (2003).
180. See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT El AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3936.3
(2d ed. 1969 & Supp. 2009) (discussing writ review of media claims and concluding that "regular
[appellate] review [of such claims] is justified by the profound interests ... in public access to in-
formation about judicial proceedings").
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permitted to file an appeal, and such closure orders are then reviewed de
novo.1
8 1
The Tenth Circuit also requires the news media to proceed by way
of writ of mandamus to assert First Amendment rights in ongoing crimi-
nal proceedings.' 82 While the standard the Circuit employs to review
such petitions is not completely clear, it typically reaches the underlying
legal merits of a news media claim on mandamus review.' 83 Even in the
one instance where the Tenth Circuit applied the "clear and indisputable"
standard in news media claims, it did so only after reaching the merits of
the petitioner's claim. In Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem,' 84 the Tenth
Circuit granted the writ "[b]ecause Judge Mechem's order was imper-
missibly overbroad," and therefore, "Journal Publishing has a clear and
indisputable right to an order of mandamus reversing the decree."', 85 Of
course, the only way the court could find that the order was "impermissi-
bly overbroad" was for it to first reach the claim's legal merits. This is
consistent with conventional mandamus practices, where appellate courts
reach the underlying claim in deciding whether "clear and indisputable"
error occurred below.' 86 In Antrobus, however, the Tenth Circuit by-
passed this entire process by never actually deciding whether Vanessa
Quinn was a "victim" under the CVRA.
CONCLUSION
As Congress has recognized, "without the ability to enforce the
rights in the ... appellate courts of this country any rights afforded [to
crime victims] are, at best, rhetoric." 87 The Antrobuses' journey through
the courts sadly confirms this point. Although the district court's conclu-
sion that the Antrobuses' daughter was not a "crime victim" rested on
shaky foundations, the Antrobuses were unable to secure full review of
181. See In re Charlotte Observer (Div. of Knight Publ'g Co.), 882 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir.
1989) ("[W]e consider it technically appropriate to review the orders at issue pursuant to our power
under the All-Writ Act .... [O]ur review is essentially a de novo consideration of the constitutional-
ity of the magistrate's directly operative closure order .... "); see also In re Providence Journal Co.,
293 F.3d 1, 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (dismissing appeal papers, then proceeding to review on writ the
district court decision "under the First Amendment's heightened standard of review").
182. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1250 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1998).
183. See, e.g., id. at 1254 ("[This case] requires an analysis of whether the documents are
subject to the [Albuquerque Journal's] First Amendment and common law rights of access, and
whether the district court clearly violated a legal duty in its assessment of how those rights apply to
the documents." (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1997))); McVeigh, 119 F.3d at 812 (considering
whether "the district court orders satisfy the First Amendment standard"); Combined Commc'ns
Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818, 821 (10th Cir. 1982) (reaching merits of television station's man-
damus petition without imposing a higher standard of review).
184. 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
185. Id. at 1237.
186. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 832 n.10 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The 'clear
and indisputable' test is applied after the statute has been construed by the court entertaining the
petition." (emphasis added)).
187. 150 CONG. REc. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
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that decision despite making four separate trips to the Tenth Circuit. In-
stead, the Circuit would only tell the Antrobuses that, proceeding under
the standard of clear and indisputable error, they had presented a "close
case" and it was (as one concurring judge put it) "sad" that the district
court and the Justice Department had not given them the full opportunity
to make their case by revealing the facts of the case. These expressions
of concern, of course, did nothing to vindicate the Antrobuses' rights. To
the Antrobuses, their promised right to make a victim impact statement
on behalf of their murdered daughter was mere rhetoric.
Congress did not intend for victims to be treated so unfairly. To the
contrary, Congress's clear intent in enacting the CVRA was to provide
effective and enforceable rights for crime victims through the criminal
justice system-including the nation's appellate court system. Hopefully,
in a future case, the Tenth Circuit en banc will reverse its unfortunate
decision in Antrobus and provide crime victims with the appellate protec-
tions that Congress intended for them to have. If the Tenth Circuit will
not act on its own, the final word on this subject should come from the
Supreme Court. With a clear circuit split now existing on this important
issue, Supreme Court review is necessary and appropriate. When that
review comes, the Court should read the CVRA as Congress clearly in-
tended and ensure that crime victims' rights receive the same appellate
protections that all other litigants receive.
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UNITED STATES V. NACCHIO AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN
EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT: PRACTICAL AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS OF AMENDING FINANCIAL GAIN AS A
MEASURE OF CULPABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Round two of United States v. Nacchio' before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the defense team arguing that Joseph Nacchio,
former Chief Executive Officer of Qwest, Inc., was over-sentenced under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines due to incorrect calculation of finan-
cial gain-the lynchpin of his sentence determination. 2 Nacchio's sen-
tence was comprehensive: seventy-two months imprisonment for each of
nineteen counts of insider trading, two years of supervised release for
each count (both to run concurrently), and a fine of nineteen million dol-
lars.3 Fundamentally, the appeal was delicately hinged on an unconven-
tional theory: that criminal case law4 provided insufficient precedent for
the calculation of financial gain, so the court must consult civil law to
supplement its interpretation. 5 Finding for the petitioner-defendant, the
Tenth Circuit held that the district court had miscalculated gain for the
purpose of sentencing and ordered the lower court to apply a theory of
civil-remedy calculation to the case on remand.6 Thus, the decision in
Nacchio is at odds with an Eighth Circuit decision7 regarding interpreta-
tion of an infrequently-consulted and highly-technical area of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
In its relative naissance, the circuit split on the calculation of gain
for the sentencing of sophisticated-fraud offenders has flown under the
radar. In the years directly following the 1987 introduction of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 8 circuit courts appeared inundated by the more
litigated issue in economic crimes: the calculation of financial loss. 9
While the loss calculation prompted multiple circuit splits on the various
1. 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.4 (2008).
3. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1066. Mr. Nacchio was also sentenced to forfeit profits totaling
approximately $52 million dollars. Id. Though the Tenth Circuit also reversed on the issue of forfei-
ture of profits, the issue will not be considered in this article.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2005).
5. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 30, United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir.
2009) (No. 07-1311).
6. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1086.
7. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1101.
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008).
9. Frank 0. Bowman, Il, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Anal-
ysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 26 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman, Sentencing Re-
forms].
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elements of the provision-ultimately, requiring the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-the
calculation of gain went unchallenged and remained relatively static.' 0
Today, in light of recent cases from both the Tenth and Eighth Circuits,
the proper calculation of gain is uncertain and poised for debate.
This Comment predicts the emerging circuit split over the calcula-
tion of gain for the sentencing of sophisticated-fraud offenders is an issue
unlikely to be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court because it is
the authorized area of the United States Sentencing Commission to ad-
dress circuit court splits on Federal Sentencing Guidelines interpretation
through amendment to the Guidelines.' Furthermore, this Comment
argues that while the net-gain approach to gain calculation established by
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Mooney tends to result in over-
sentencing, the alternative market-absorption approach based on the civil
remedy of disgorgement established by the Tenth Circuit in Nacchio
provides an unworkable and burdensome calculation methodology. By
paralleling the Commission's prior resolution of the practical problems
of the calculation of loss in similar economic crimes to the current issue
of gain calculation, and by considering the overriding philosophies driv-
ing criminal punishment, this Comment concludes that the ultimate reso-
lution of gain calculation for sentencing purposes demands a new hybrid-
calculation methodology established by amendment of the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Part I of this Comment reviews the structure of the federal sentenc-
ing process since the formation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
1984, and focuses on the interrelated roles of appellate review and the
United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines amendment process.
Part II considers the consolidation of economic crimes through the Eco-
nomic Crime Package amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
in 2001 as the basis for paralleling the resolution of loss calculation to
the current issue of gain calculation. Part m details the emerging circuit
split on the calculation of gain by contrasting the legal theories and ana-
lyses presented in Mooney and Nacchio. Part IV first analyzes both the
net-gain and market-absorption approaches to financial-gain calculation
under the framework established by the 2001 amendment of loss calcula-
tion for similar economic crimes. This is accomplished by contrasting
each theory's approach to the practical application of definition, timing,
and causation. Second, Part V seeks to reconcile the two prevailing ap-
proaches of gain calculation with the underlying philosophies driving
federal sentencing policy and criminal punishment. Finally, Part IV pro-
poses an approach to amending gain as a measure of culpability for so-
1O. See id. at 26, 34; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend 617
(2008) Amendment 617 of the Sentencing Guidelines amended Chapter 2, Part B property crime
provisions of the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines.
ii. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1991).
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phisticated-fraud offenders. The Comment concludes that because nei-
ther approach meets both the practical and policy demands of federal
sentencing, the more judicious approach to the resolution of financial-
gain calculation methodology is for the United States Sentencing Com-
mission to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to reflect a dis-
tinctly new calculation methodology.
I. STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING PROCESS
In 1984, Congress established the United States Sentencing Com-
mission ("Sentencing Commission" or "Commission") through the Sen-
tencing Reform Act. 12 The Commission was charged with reforming and
standardizing the federal sentencing process by promulgating federal
sentencing guidelines designed to make sentencing honest, uniform, and
proportionate in light of the criminal justice objectives of rehabilitation,
incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution.' 3 The product of the Commis-
sion's endeavors-the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing
Guidelines" or "Guidelines")-sought to achieve these goals by correlat-
ing the specific behavior involved in the offense to the characteristics of
the offender, including his or her criminal history. 14 On November 1,
1987, the Sentencing Guidelines took effect, "apply[ing] to all offenses
committed on or after that date."' 15 In standardizing the classification of
crimes into categories corresponding to sentencing calculation tables, the
Commission made uniformity an integral part of sentencing and put of-
fenders on notice of their ultimate sentence term.' 6 Incorporated
throughout the categories and tables was the overarching principle that
not all crimes require the same deterrent effect, nor do they all require
retribution to the same degree.1 7 In weighing the sentencing separately
for each crime, but restricting it to a sentencing range, the notion of pro-
portionality to the crime was affected without sacrificing uniformity
among offenders. 18
Though initially mandatory, the Sentencing Guidelines became ad-
visory in 2005 following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v.
Booker.'9 Booker held that a mandatory sentencing guideline system
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because
the sentencing process permitted consultation of facts not presented to
12. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
13. See id. § 991(b); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008).
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.2 (2008).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 370-71 (2003).
18. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 6 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT].
19. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-61, 264 (2005) (explaining the severance
and excision of two specific provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA2 (2008).
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the jury at trial.20 Nonetheless, Booker still requires judges to begin sen-
tencing determinations by looking first to the Guidelines and its accom-
panying policy statements. 2' Today, a sentencing court is required to
begin with the base offense level specified in the Sentencing Guide-
lines.22 This base offense level-an intersection of the offender's crimi-
nal history and the level designated for the offense in the relevant provi-
sion of the Sentencing Guidelines-anchors23 the sentencing determina-
tion by giving the court a point of departure.24 From there, the offense
level is adjusted upward or downward based on the specific characteris-
tics of the particular criminal conduct.25 The court arrives at a numeric
offense level which corresponds to a pre-determined sentencing range in
the sentencing table; the court retains discretion to deviate from that pre-
26determined range if it finds a departure is necessary.
Ensuring proper execution of the Sentencing Guidelines necessi-
tated a formal review process.27 According to the Sentencing Reform
Act, the purpose of providing for appellate review was to maintain accu-
racy in application of the Guidelines, ensure that disparity in sentencing
was reduced, provide a check to departure from Guidelines sentencing,
20. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (affirming the Court of Appeals holding that Booker's sen-
tence violated the Sixth Amendment); Daniel M. Levy, Defending Demnaree: The Ex Post Facto
Clause's Lack of Control Over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2623, 2638 (2009).
21. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. Recent statistics indicate that post-Booker, the Guidelines still
play a significant role in federal sentencing: the rate of compliance with sentencing has remained
stable at 85.9 percent, only marginally lower than before the landmark case. BOOKER REPORT, supra
note 18, at 46. This is perhaps indicative of a general acceptance of the Sentencing Commission's
expertise in "articulat[ing] rules for nationwide application" better than any single judge. Nancy
Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
137, 140 (2006), http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/2006/07/gertner.html. Thus, the Guidelines continue
to promote uniformity in sentencing, despite their advisory nature. Id.
22. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 558 (1996).
23. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 138 ("Anchoring is a strategy used to simplify complex
tasks, in which 'numeric judgments are assimilated to a previously considered standard.' . . . In
effect, the 300-odd page Guideline Manual provides ready-made anchors.").
24. See id. at 140 ("[Appellate court cases] hold that deviation from Guideline ranges is rarely
appropriate and only for reasons that are based on the same faulty premises that under-girded the
mandatory regime. Appellate courts have insisted that district court judges begin with-effectively,
'anchor' their decisions- in the Guidelines before considering anything else.").
25. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 558.
26. Booker, 542 U.S. at 233-35 (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines have always permitted
discretionary departures from the sentencing range, but that these departures have not been available
in every case and, under the mandatory regime, were rare); see also id. at 246 (explaining that the
remedial majority devises the remedy of making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory while nonethe-
less preserving "a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's real conduct-
a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its Guide-
lines system to achieve"); BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 20-21, 24. Though determination
within the sentencing range has always been at the court's discretion, post-Booker, the courts are
given more leeway to depart from the designated sentence range. Imposition of a sentence outside
the sentencing range is currently subject to appellate review for reasonableness. Id.
27. Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 624 (1992); see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 24 (stating
that the appellate court will not reach the question of the reasonableness of the sentence until it has
considered the lower court's calculation of a sentencing range).
UNITED STATES V. NACCHIO
fine-tune application of provision language, and, finally, to develop a
common law to be used as precedent.2 8 Principally, the standard of re-
view for issues of Sentencing Guidelines interpretation and meaning is
de novo, and both the defendant and the State possess limited rights to
appeal sentencing. 29 The legislative benefit of appellate review of federal
sentencing has been that the appeals courts have discovered "technical
problems, minor inconsistencies, and other glitches in the drafting and
structure of the [G]uidelines.,, 30 The United States Supreme Court in
Braxton v. United States determined that Congress intended federal cir-
cuit court splits concerning interpretation of the Guidelines to be re-
solved by the Commission amending the Guidelines. 31 Hence, it is much
more likely the Sentencing Commission will resolve a circuit split on
interpretational dilemmas than the United States Supreme Court.32
In promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines and its amendments, the
Sentencing Commission aims "to solve both the practical and philoso-
phical problems of developing a coherent sentencing system." 33 The
practical problems of sentencing are the organization of crimes into cate-
gories and provisions, and the application of the technical terms of each
provision in sentencing determination. 34 By contrast, the philosophical
problems are much broader, encompassing the larger framework of goals
and purposes of criminal punishment.35 For gain as a measure of culpa-
bility, the Sentencing Commission must look first to the larger category
of economic crimes to provide a context for considering the necessary
changes to be made to the provision; then to the specific practical prob-
28. Zipperstein, supra note 27, at 624.
29. See id. at 625, 629.
30. Id. at 628.
31. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1991). The Braxton Court held:
A principal purpose for which we use our certiorari jurisdiction... is to resolve conflicts
among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of
provisions of federal law .... Ordinarily, however, we regard the task as initially and
primarily ours.... The Guidelines are of course implemented by the courts, so in charg-
ing the Commission "periodically [to] review and revise" the Guidelines, Congress nec-
essarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the work of the
courts, and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judi-
cial decisions might suggest. This congressional expectation alone might induce us to be
more restrained and circumspect in using our certiorari power as the primary means of re-
solving such conflicts ....
Id. (fourth alteration in original); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAI.2 (2008).
Though the Sentencing Guidelines are a rigid document, they are by no means static; to the contrary,
upon their publication, the Commission emphasized that "the guideline-writing process" was "evolu-
tionary" and would necessitate amendment. Id. Amendment to the guidelines is a frequent occur-
rence: amendments are made annually through submission to Congress and "automatically take
effect 180 days after submission unless a law is enacted to the contrary." Id.
32. Douglas A. Berman, The Sentencing Commission as Guidelines Supreme Court: Respond-
ing to Circuit Conflicts, 7 FED. SENT'G. REP. 142, 142 (1994) (stating that "[w]hen an intercircuit
conflict concerns differences in interpretation of guidelines provisions that do not reach constitu-
tional issues, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Commission has the initial and primary task
of addressing and resolving the conflict" (citing 1993 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, ANN. REP. 14 (1994))).
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lems of gain as a measure of culpability. Finally, the Commission must
ensure any amendment is consistent with the policy framework of the
Sentencing Guidelines and criminal punishment.
II. PARALLELING ECONOMIC CRIMES
Nearly a quarter of all federal convictions are for economic
crimes.36 Most white-collar crimes fall into the category of economic
crimes. 37 Originally, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines divided the great
variety of economic crimes into three broad categories: (1) section 2B I.
covered "Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Receiving,
Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Prop-
erty"; 38 (2) section 2B1.3 covered "Property Damage or Destruction"';
39
and (3) section 2FI L1 acted as a catch-all to cover most economic crimes
not covered by the previous two sections, including "Fraud and Deceit,
Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other
than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the U.S." 4° Insider trading, con-
sidered a "sophisticated fraud" under Part F of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, was included in section 2F1.2.4'
A. The Convergence of Economic-Crime Offenses Under the Sentencing
Guidelines
In 2001, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing
Guidelines' applicable economic crimes provisions through the Eco-
nomic Crime Package-a six-part amendment addressing practical prob-
lems.42 The reform reorganized the economic crimes sections by consoli-
dating sections 2B1.1, 2B1.3, and 2FI.I into section 2B1.1, labeled
"Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud ' 43 because the Commission con-
cluded that the distinction between theft and fraud was "largely illu-
sory,"44 and, thus, impractical. The significance of combining three sepa-
36. Frank 0. Bowman III, Coping With "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal
Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 461 (1998) [hereinafter Bowman,
Coping with Loss].
37. Zvi D. Gabbay, Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm: Restorative
Justice and White-Collar Crime, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 421, 428-29 (2007) (defining
white-collar crime as a "non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by
persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi-professional and utilizing
their special occupational skills and opportunities"); see also Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra
note 9, at 8 (noting that "economic crimes comprise between one-fifth and one-quarter of all federal
sentencings").
38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1. 1(2000).
39. Id. § 2B 1.3 (2000).
40. Id. §2FI.1 (2000).
41. Id. § 2F1.2 cmt. background (2000).
42. Id. app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
43. Id.
44. Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 24.
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rate sections was to eliminate unnecessary distinctions between crimes
with significant similarities in both offense and offender characteristics. 45
The three original sections required consulting one of two loss ta-
bles in section 2B1l.1 or 2Fl.1 to calculate the increase in the offense
level based on the criminal conduct.46 Because the outcome under the
two tables was nearly identical, judges and practitioners increasingly
tried to devise a distinction between the two loss tables and their relation
to applicable Guidelines' provisions, frequently leading to a lack of sen-
tencing uniformity.47 Ultimately, faced with a variety of circuit splits on
the interpretation of loss under the various relevant provisions of the
Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission concluded that the two loss ta-
bles were unnecessarily duplicative and in need of reform.48
The Economic Crimes Package resolved the issue of duplicative
loss tables by consolidating the 2B 1.1 and 2F1. I loss tables into a single
loss table, section 2BlI .49 This had three effects: (1) "increasing the
range of losses that correspond to individual increments"; (2) "compress-
ing the table"; and (3) "reducing fact-finding., 50 In so amending the
Guidelines, the Commission recognized that "inasmuch as theft and
fraud offenses are conceptually similar, there is no strong reason to sen-
tence them differently.",51 Thus, uniformity was further built into the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.52
B. The Economic Crime Package and Considerations of Measures of
Culpability
Traced from its traditional basis in English law, wherein the major-
ity of economic crimes were considered a form of property theft, the
culpability of economic crime offenders has been overwhelmingly meas-
ured by "the magnitude and nature of the economic deprivation ' 53 in-
curred by the victim. 54 In his 2001 article on sentencing reforms, Profes-
sor Bowman noted that the factor distinguishing economic crime from
other criminal conduct is its lack of consideration for the "mental state or
of the nature and quality of the act(s) which make up the crime., 55 He
45. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008); see also Rami-
rez, supra note 17, at 378.
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
47. See id.; see also Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 23-24.
48. See Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 24.
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. § I A 1.3 (2008).
53. Bowman, Coping with Loss, supra note 36, at 465.
54. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BI.1 cmt. background (2000) ('The
value of property stolen plays an important role in determining sentences for theft and other offenses
involving stolen property because it is an indicator of both the harm to the victim and the gain to the
defendant."); Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 16.
55. Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 15.
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elaborated that although a mens rea (mental culpability) is required in
some form, it is almost always "some variant of an intent to steal, de-
fraud, or otherwise deprive the owner of the use or benefit of his prop-
erty. 56 Professor Bowman thus drew the following conclusion:
The consequence of this pattern of historical development is that
there are a variety of well-developed, long realized statutory guide-
posts for distinguishing between more and less serious crimes against
persons, but only one recognized, commonly codified determinant of
the degrees of seriousness of economic crimes-the value of the thing
stolen.
57
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sheer amount of the loss con-
tinues to serve as a proxy for the economic-crime offender's mens rea
and is thereby the most important factor determining sentence length.58
Where loss is difficult or impossible to determine, the sentencing judge
will look to the gain obtained by the offender as an alternative measure
of his culpability. 59 As such, in the area of economic crimes, loss and
gain are outcome determinative for sentencing purposes.
1. Loss as a Measure of Culpability
Since the Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated, loss findings
were required in over 9,000 cases per year, resulting in significant num-
bers of appeals and "numerous splits of opinion between the federal cir-
cuits." 6 ' The Economic Crime Package of 2001 resolved the calculation
of loss to reinstate uniformity in sentencing.61 The circuit splits on loss
calculation had revolved around two key interpretations-definition and
causation-and it was on these two points of contention that the Sentenc-
ing Commission amended the Guidelines so that the measure of loss
would best represent the offender's true culpability in relation to the se-
riousness of his or her offense.
62
The amended Guidelines provision defined loss as "the greater of
actual and intended loss," where intended loss includes "unlikely or im-
possible losses that are intended, because their inclusion better reflects
the culpability of the offender." 63 The Commission defined actual loss as
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 39.
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.3 (2008).
60. Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 26.
61. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008). The Economic
Crime Package included revision to the loss calculation in four key reforms: (1) revision of the
common definition of loss; (2) revision to areas of the Guidelines referring to loss; (3) bringing the
Guidelines into technical conformance with the new definition; and (4) amendment to the specific
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"reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm" 64 resulting from the offense,
acknowledging both cause-in-fact ("but for" causation) and a limit on
cause-at-law (legal causation) as what was reasonably foreseeable.
65
Though the Commission was not compelled to amend the timing factor66
based on a circuit split, it anticipated the issue arising and preemptively
addressed it.67 It adopted the net-loss approach, which specifically ex-
cluded certain economic benefits transferred to the victims from incorpo-
ration in the loss calculation when those benefits were transferred after
the time the crime was detected. 68 This reform codified the time of detec-
tion approach, ensuring that benefits transferred to the victim after the
defendant was made aware that his activity had been detected would not
mitigate the amount of the victim's loss used in calculating the sen-
tence.
69
Thus, the Economic Crime Package transformed the way sentencing
is approached in cases of economic-crime offenders. The consolidation
of the theft, property destruction, and fraud sections, as well as their cor-
responding loss tables, acknowledged their historic and current parallels
in both the eyes of the Sentencing Commission and the judicial commu-
nity at large. Moreover, this consolidation reaffirmed the centrality of the
loss calculation in determining an offender's sentence, and improved its
practical application as a proxy for both the seriousness of the criminal
conduct and the offender's mental culpability.
2. Gain as a Measure of Culpability
Though the Sentencing Guidelines weigh heavily towards applica-
tion of the victim's loss as a measure of the offender's culpability, when
ascertainable, 70 both loss and gain are applicable to the same loss table,
section 2B 1.1.71 Section 2B1.1 states that "[t]he court shall use the gain
that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if
64. Id. (noting that reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm is defined as "pecuniary harms that
the defendant knew, or under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential
result of the offense").
65. Id.; see also Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 42 ("The literature of criminal
law, contracts, and torts usually conceives of causation as having two components, customarily
labeled 'cause-in-fact' and legal cause. Cause-in-fact is about determining the causal relationship
between a defendant's act and a subsequent harm to another. It asks whether the conduct truly was a
part of the chain of events in the physical world that brought about the harm. Legal cause asks a
different question: Assuming that the defendant's conduct truly did play a role in bringing about the
harm, is it just to impose legal liability for the harm concededly caused?") (citations omitted).
66. Infra Part IV.A.3. Timing refers to the point in time at which the court elects to calculate
loss or gain.
67. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
68. Id.
69. Id. (noting that time of detection also includes "about to be detected" to account for situa-
tions where the defendant is cognizant that his criminal conduct is soon to be detected).
70. See Mark D. Harris & Anna G. Kaminska, Defending the White-Collar Cave at Sentenc-
ing, 20 FED. SENT'G. REP. 153, 155 (2008).
71. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 (b)(l) & cmt. n.3 (2008).
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there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined. 72 Thus, gain as a
measure of culpability arises primarily in the sentencing of insider-
trading offenders (a narrow category of fraud found in section 2B1.4),
because the manipulative and deceptive nature of insider trading makes it
particularly difficult to determine not only the victims of the offense, but
the actual pecuniary loss. 73 Under the Sentencing Guidelines section
2B1.4, an offender's culpability is measured by the "gain resulting from
the offense," specifically, the "total increase in value realized through
trading in securities ' 74 and is to be calculated using the loss table in sec-
tion 2B 1.1i.71
Despite being faced with significant disparity in sentencing calcula-
tion based on loss as a measure of culpability during the 1990s, the Sen-
tencing Commission failed to foresee that a similar dispute would arise
out of interpretation of the gain calculation. In fact, the Economic Crime
Package only addressed gain in a cursory fashion by: (1) retaining the
rule that gain may be used as an alternative to loss when loss is unascer-
tainable but specifying that it may only be used when there is an actual
loss;76 and (2) refusing to expand gain to "situations in which loss can be
determined but the gain is greater than the IOSS. ' 7 7 Substantively, gain as
a measure of culpability did not change from the pre-Economic Crime
Package to post-2001 amendment Sentencing Guidelines. 78 Perhaps the
Commission intended to wait for the issue to arise through the appellate
review process before it attempted to define, address, and remedy the
potential complexity of gain interpretation. Or, conversely, perhaps the
issue was indeed entirely unforeseen. Whatever its regard, because gain
has been deemed an alternative measure of culpability, 79 the Commis-
sion's resolution on the methodology for loss calculation should be a
reasonable basis for analyzing the likely resolution of gain as a measure
of culpability by the Sentencing Commission.
111. THE EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF GAIN CALCULATION
As a litigated issue, gain calculation likely evaded judicial scrutiny
for two basic reasons. First, the focus of the Sentencing Guidelines in the
area of economic crimes has been the calculation of loss, the mirror im-
age of gain and which has dominated the sentencing of economic
72. Id. § 2B 1.I cmt. n.3.
73. See id. § 2B 1.4 cmt. background.
74. Id. § 2B 1.4(b)(1) & cmt. background (2008).
75. Id. § 2B 1.4(b)(1).
76. Id. app. C, amend. 617 ("[The Guidelines provision] clarifies that there must be a loss for
gain to be considered.").
77. Id. (noting that expanding gain would not be appropriate "because such instances should
occur infrequently, the efficiency of the criminal operation as reflected in the amount of gain ordi-
narily should not determine the penalty level, and the traditional use of loss is generally adequate").
78. Compare id. § 2F1.2(b) (2000), with id. § 2B1.4 cmt. background (2008), and id. § 2B1. 1
cmt. n.3 loss under subsection (b)(l)(B) (2008) (defining "gain" for sentencing purposes).
79. See id. § 2B .I cmt. n.3 (2008).
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crimes.80 Second, the calculation is primarily used in cases of sophisti-
cated fraud, a defacto subcategory of crimes in which "the victims and
their losses are difficult if not impossible to identify."'8' These cases are
highly complex, have a significant stigmatic affect on their high profile
offenders, and until recently, were rarely prosecuted due to their com-
plexity.82 Though insider trading83 is a highly visible offense, frequently
appearing in the news media, there is little case law on the subject re-
garding relevant sentencing considerations. Given the high profile white-
collar crimes of recent years and the federal government's hard-line on
prosecutions and sentencing, 84 the employment of gain as a measure of
culpability is likely to become more prevalent in criminal sentencing
law.
A. United States v. Mooney
In 2005, Mooney emerged from the Eight Circuit as the first case to
challenge the specific calculation methodology for gain under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines economic-crime provisions. 85 The case involved the
80. See id. app. C, amend. 617.
81. Id. § 2B1.4 cmt. background. Though not officially defined in the Sentencing Guidelines,
sophisticated fraud appears to primarily refer to insider trading (as it is only listed in this section of
the Guidelines), but it may cover other frauds as well. The background commentary to § 2B1.4 states
"[c]ertain other offenses, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13(e), that involve misuse of inside information for per-
sonal gain also appropriately may be covered by this guideline." Additionally, Appendix A of the
Guidelines references 7 U.S.C. § 13(d) and (f), the statute prohibiting insider trading, as correspond-
ing to Guidelines § 2B1.4. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(e) (West 2010) (subsection (f) was re-designated as
subsection (e) in 2008 amendments) and § 13(d) prohibits "[ulse of information by Commissioners
and Commission employees." Therefore, the language of "sophisticated fraud" rather than "insider
trading" is more appropriate in reference to the debacle of gain calculation because the calculation
may apply directly to both insider trading in securities and misuse of Commission information.
Furthermore, the language of the Sentencing Guidelines § 2B 1.1 may further broaden the
application of gain to other yet-unspecified economic crimes. That provision states that "[tihe court
shall use the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a
loss but it reasonably cannot be determined." See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3. By example, in United States
v. Cherif, a mail and wire fraud case, the court referenced § 2F1.2, the guideline for insider trading,
"[t]o justify using the gain to enhance the base offense level." United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692,
702 (7th Cir. 1991). The court explained that despite Cherif's conviction under mail and wire fraud,
not insider trading specifically, § 2F1.2 permitted use of gain to increase the offense level for "cer-
tain other offenses . . . that involve misuse of inside information for personal gain" Id. (alteration in
original).
82. See generally J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The
Justifications for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295
(2005) (discussing white-collar crime as stigmatic because the offenders are public individuals,
problematic to detect because of the level of concealment, and traditionally lightly punished).
Though Dutcher's discussion pertains to white-collar crime prosecution generally, sophisticated
fraud is counted among white-collar crimes.
83. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(e) (West 2010) (stating that insider trading is a felony offense of "will-
fully and knowingly" trading "for such person's own account, or for or on behalf of any other ac-
count" or "disclos[ing] for any purpose inconsistent with performance of such person's official
duties ... any material nonpublic information obtained through special access related to the per-
formance of such duties").
84. Infra Part IV.B.2.a.
85. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Because the federal
sentencing guidelines in effect in 2002 would have resulted in a higher sentencing range for the
amount of gain found to have resulted from his offenses, the district court applied the 1994 guide-
lines .... Section 2B1.4, the guideline at issue in this case, is identical in both versions except for
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former vice president of underwriting at United Health Corporation, Mr.
Alan Mooney, who traded stock based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion he received during the course of negotiations arranging for United to
acquire another healthcare services company, Metra.86 Mooney's suspect
transactions included the sale of 20,000 shares of Metra stock on May
17, 1995, which resulted in profits of $775,000; and the purchase of call
options in United stock with the proceeds of his sale of shares at the price
of $258,283.03. 87 The latter transaction gave Mooney the right to buy
40,000 shares in United. 88 He subsequently sold the call options in July
and October when the stock price had "increased markedly," resulting in
a return of $532,482.49.89
Mooney was formally charged with and convicted of eight counts of
mail fraud, four counts of securities fraud, and five counts of money
laundering. 90 Based on its mandatory consultation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court employed a base level offense of seventeen,
added two levels for knowledge that the proceeds were fraudulently ob-
tained, and added an additional two levels for the significant dollar
amount gained through the transaction. 9 Ultimately, corresponding to
the calculated offense level of twenty-one and a criminal history level of
I, the court imposed a sentence of forty-two months in prison and a
$150,000 fine.92
Mooney appealed his sentence based on the theory that the district
court incorrectly calculated gain by employing the net-gain approach
which overstated his culpability, resulting in over-sentencing. 93 In es-
sence, net gain is calculated by taking the total amount realized from the
trading in securities and subtracting the purchase price of those securi-
ties.94 Mooney's gain, approximated at between $200,000 and $350,000,
had increased his offense level by two levels. 95 The Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's use of the net-gain approach.96 The court found
the plain language of the Guidelines "simple and straightforward, 97 de-
termined that any question of interpretation could be "decisively resolved
by the authoritative definition provided in the commentary to § 2B 1.4, '98
the use of gender neutral language in 2002, and Mooney does not challenge the court's use of the
1994 manual.").
86. Id. at 1095-96.
87. Id. at 1096.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1097.
91. Id. at 1097-98.
92. Id.; see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text; see generally U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2008).
93. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098.
94. See id.; see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1068-70 (10th Cir. 2009).
95. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1097-98.
96. Id. at 1101.
97. Id. at 1099.
98. Id.
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and, finally, concluded that net gain promotes a "simple, accurate, and
predictable rule for judges to apply and follows the congressional man-
date that sentences reflect the seriousness of the offense." 99
B. United States v. Nacchio
In 2009, the Tenth Circuit departed from the Eighth Circuit's me-
thod of gain calculation by expressly finding Mooney to be unpersua-
sive. l°° A case of some notoriety in the Tenth Circuit, Nacchio dealt with
the former CEO of Qwest, Inc., Joseph Nacchio, who traded stock in the
company based on undisclosed insider information in a series of transac-
tions in early 2001.10 At the inception of his suspect trading, Mr. Nac-
chio had knowledge that Qwest was heavily reliant on an ill-performing
stream of income, and that the corporation had not made changes in its
revenue streams necessary to meet year-end guidance levels.102 This
nonpublic information became the basis for his informational advantage
as it was undisclosed during the entire period of his suspect trading. 
103
Nacchio's suspect trading occurred in two primary transaction peri-
ods. 104 First, between April 26 and May 15 of 2001, Nacchio exercised
options in his compensation package averaging sales of 105,000 shares
traded per day at an exercise price in the range of $37 to $42 per share.
10 5
His net sale during this period was 1,255,000 shares. 1°6 Second, between
May 15 and May 29, Nacchio sold additional shares in accordance with
an automatic sales plan permitting him to exercise 10,000 options per
day so long as the stock price remained at least $38 per share. 07 Under
this plan, Nacchio sold an additional 75,000 shares before the stock price
dropped below the exercise price.' 0 8 Nacchio's gross proceeds from the
sales in question were approximately fifty-two million dollars. 1°9 Corpo-
rate earnings were eventually released for the second quarter of 2001 on
July 24th, finally disclosing that Qwest was on the low end of its ex-
pected earnings range. 110 Further disclosure on August 14th decreased
target revenues for the remainder of 2001 and for 2002, and both the
99. Id. at 1101.
100. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1069-72 (10th Cir. 2009).
101. Id. at 1064.
102. Id.






109. Id. at 1067-68 ("The parties do not dispute that: Mr. Nacchio's gross proceeds from the
relevant stock sales were $52,007,545.47; the cost of exercising the options was $7,315,000.00; the
brokerage commissions and fees paid were $60,081.09; and the taxes paid were $16,078,147.81 .").
110. Id. at 1066.
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Securities Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice pursued
investigations into Nacchio's trading activities."'
Nacchio was charged with and convicted of nineteen counts of in-
sider trading for the suspect trades." 2 Though his conviction came down
in 2007'13-after the Economic Crime Package amendments of 2001 had
been made to the relevant sections of the Sentencing Guidelines-the
district court sentenced Nacchio under the Guidelines in effect at the
time of the completion of his criminal conduct (May 2001).' 14 Based on
the 2000 version of the Guidelines for insider trading, section 2FI.1,
Nacchio received a base level offense of eight." 15 From the base level, the
court imposed a two level increase due to "abuse of a position of
trust,"' 16 and a sixteen level increase due to the amount of financial "gain
resulting from the offense," '" 7 ultimately arriving at an offense level of
twenty-six. 118 The district court's final sentence imposed (1) a seventy-
two month term of imprisonment for each of the nineteen counts of in-
sider trading, served concurrently; (2) two years probation for each
count, also served concurrently; and (3) a fine of nineteen million dol-
lars.' 19
Nacchio appealed his sentence based on the premise that the district
court incorrectly calculated the "gain resulting from the offense" by em-
ploying the net gain approach from Mooney. 20 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the district court to em-
ploy a market-absorption approach on remand.121 Principally, the market-
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1064, 1066 (noting that Nacchio was initially indicted on forty-two counts of insider
trading, though only convicted of the nineteen related to the transactions referenced above).
113. United States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545-EWN, 2007 WL 2221437, at *1 (D. Colo. July
27, 2007).
114. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1066 n.5.
115. Id. at 1067 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F. 1.2(b)(1) (2000)).
116. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1069 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3BI.3
(2000)).
117. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1068-69 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2F1.1 (b)(1)(Q) (2000)).
118. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1069.
119. Id. at 1066.
120. Id. at 1069-70.
121. Id. at 1086-87. On remand, the district court will apply the Sentencing Guidelines in
effect at the time of the commission of Nacchio's offenses as was applied in the first sentencing
hearing. By statute, the court is instructed to apply the Guidelines that "are in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § I B 1. 11 (a) (2009). The Sentencing Guidelines further specify that if use of the Guidelines
in effect on the date of sentencing would violate the ex post facto clause, the Guidelines in effect on
the date of commission of the offense should be employed. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.11 (b)(1) (2009). In Nacchio's case, the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing were
post-Economic Crime Package Guidelines and would have substantially increased both the penalty
and likely prison term for the offenses committed, thus likely implicating an ex post facto issue.
Though the various district court and appellate court opinions neither reference nor discuss an ex
post facto conflict, the earlier Guidelines-the 2000 Guidelines in effect at the time of commission
of the offenses-were likely selected for application to avoid such a conflict.
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absorption approach is calculated by taking the value of the shares when
the insider sold them while in possession of material, non-public infor-
mation, and subtracting their market value "a reasonable time after pub-
lic dissemination of the insider information."'' 22 The Tenth Circuit re-
garded this to be the most appropriate calculation methodology because,
it reasoned, "[g]ain should be calculated as the commentary directs, i.e.,
as 'the total increase in value realized through trading in securities,' but
that calculation is applicable properly only to 'the gain resulting from the
offense' specified in the guideline provision itself."'
' 23
IV. BIFURCATED ANALYSIS OF GAIN AS A MEASURE OF CULPABILITY
Similar to the case of loss calculation, section 2B 1.4 of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines has emerged as problematic because it is difficult to apply
a definition of gain in a way that accounts simultaneously for the seri-
ousness of the offense through the amount of harm done while concur-
rently assessing the relationship between the amount of harm and the
defendant's mental culpability.1 24 The issue of gain thus presents two
The issue of whether the Sentencing Guidelines are subject to ex post facto consideration
is a hotly debated issue in light of Booker. The ex post facto clause of the Constitution states that
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed," but fails to elaborate upon what is con-
sidered to be an ex post facto law. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.3. At common law, the Supreme Court
case Calder v. Bull specified that the ex post facto clause prohibits application of any law which
would increase the penalty and punishment for an offense committed before the law came into being.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). Further, in Garner v. Jones, the Supreme Court set out what
is now perceived as a two-prong test for ex post facto laws: (1) whether application of the current
law would increase the punishment on its face; and (2) whether its retroactive application would
result in a longer period of incarceration than the earlier law, and specified that the intent of the test
was to determine whether the defendant would be disadvantaged by applying the law in effect at the
time of sentencing. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000). Though when the Sentencing Guide-
lines were mandatory pre-Booker, the Guidelines were interpreted by the lower courts as being
subject to the ex post facto clause, today there is a split in the circuit courts on whether the ex post
facto clause applies to merely advisory Sentencing Guidelines. See Levy, supra note 20, at 2634
(citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987), a state court case in which the United States Supreme
Court held state sentencing guidelines were subject to the ex post facto clause and the lower courts
interpreted this as sufficiently analogous to Federal Sentencing Guidelines and ex post facto consid-
eration).
The split divides the Seventh Circuit, in which Judge Posner has found that the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines do not implicate ex post facto considerations because advisory guidelines are
not "laws," and principally the Eighth, Sixth, District of Columbia, and First Circuits, all holding
that the ex post facto clause still applies. The Fifth Circuit, rather ambiguously, has stated that it may
favor the Seventh Circuit's interpretation. The issue post-Booker is yet to be considered by the
United States Supreme Court. Compare United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006)
("We conclude that the ex post facto clause should apply only to laws and regulations that bind
rather than advise, a principle well established with reference to parole guidelines whose retroactive
application is challenged under the ex post facto clause."), with United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d
641,643-46 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing ex post facto implications, but finding that the ex postfacto
claim was forfeited), and United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441,446-47 (6th Cir. 2008), and United
States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440,
449 (1st Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 323-24 (5th Cir.
2007).
122. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983))).
123. Id. at 1073 (emphasis added).
124. See Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 41.
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questions: how should the court sanction the offender for the criminal
conduct; and what sanction is proportionate to his criminal culpability?
Thus far, this Comment has established that the Sentencing Com-
mission intended the economic-crimes provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines to parallel one another. Moreover, the provisions' internal
references to one another indicated they were intended to complement
each other. The following discussion first contrasts the practicality of the
two prevailing theories of gain calculation by analogizing them to the
loss-calculation methodology employed for sentencing economic crime
offenders. It will be argued that the loss methodology forms a reasonable
basis upon which to postulate future amendment to gain as a measure of
culpability.' 25 Second, each approach's ability to align with the philoso-
phical underpinnings of criminal punishment will be considered as a
threshold inquiry into whether an approach will be adopted through
Guidelines amendment.
The Sentencing Guidelines contain three relevant authorities. First,
the guideline provisions set out the essential information a court will
need in order to impose a sentence. 2 6 Second, each guideline section has
official commentary which provides notes on application of the guideline
provision, its drafting background, and any other considerations which
may be useful to a court in interpreting ambiguous language. 127 Lastly,
each guideline section contains policy statements that give general ex-
planations of the policy leading to the Sentencing Guidelines and how
the Guidelines are to be employed to further the purposes of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act. 2 8 In Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the "principle that the Guidelines Manual is binding on federal
courts applies as well to policy statements" and that "commentary re-
garding departures from the Guidelines should be 'treated as the legal
equivalent of a policy statement.""129 Thus, in examining the various
calculation methodologies relevant to section 2B 1.4 gain calculation and
section 2B 1.1 reference to gain, the analysis herein will employ all three
authorities.
A. Plain Language and Commentary: Practical Considerations
Section 2B1.4's limited length and sparse explanation makes analy-
sis of the "gain resulting from the offense" problematic, as there is virtu-
ally no direct indication of its suggested use. 130 By contrast, section
2B1.4's sister section-2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and
125. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
126. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41 (1993).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 42-43. Note that though the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, Stinson v.
United States remains good law.
130. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 (2008).
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Fraud)-is extensive, largely due to prior amendment.' 3' Building off of
the commentary132 regarding the reasons for the amendment of loss as a
measure of culpability (which addressed the practical problems of em-
ploying the definition, causation, and timing of loss), the viability of the
two theories of gain calculation are analyzed below.
1. Definition
The net-gain approach put forth by the Eight Circuit in Mooney
strongly emphasizes gain as the "total increase in value realized through
trading in securities.' 33 Beginning with strict statutory construction, the
Eight Circuit stated, "[t]he guideline refers to defendant's gain, not to
market gain, and it ties gain to the defendant's offense... speak[ing] of
gain that has resulted, not of potential gain."'34 By reading gain gener-
ally, as expressed in the Guidelines provision, the court took the ap-
proach that the Commission intended the defendant's gain to be inter-
preted broadly.
2. Causation
As the broader of the two definitions of gain, net gain projects a
predictably wider scope for causation, emphasizing the amount realized
from the illegal activity.' 35 The Eighth Circuit went to great lengths to
establish the definition of "realized" as "well-settled terminology," fi-
nally surmising that "[b]y use of the word realized, the commentary
makes clear that gain is the total profit actually made from a defendant's
illegal securities transactions."' 136 The Eight Circuit chose not to distin-
guish the illegal transaction-what the Tenth Circuit in Nacchio speci-
fied as the disclosure of material, nonpublic information-from the com-
pletely legal activity of trading in general, but rather looked to the entire
trade as a whole. 137 In so doing, the court in Mooney defined gain causa-
tion as the requisite "but for" the trading in securities and did not attempt
to limit its legal causation.
The narrower definition of gain in the market absorption approach
necessitates confining gain causation to but-for, plus a little. The Tenth
Circuit criticized the net-gain approach as "effectively ignor[ing] the
myriad of factors unrelated to [the offender's] criminal fraud that could
have contributed to the increase in value of the securities."' 38 By going
131. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 (2008) with U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.4 (2008).
132. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46 ("[T]he courts will treat the commentary much like legislative
history or other legal material that helps determine the intent of a drafter.").
133. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099-1100 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.4 cmt. background (2002)).
134. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099 (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Id. at I 100 (emphasis added).
137. Seeid. at llOl.
138. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 2009).
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back to the underlying offense in Nacchio-insider trading-the Tenth
Circuit stated that the gain must be that which occurs during the commis-
sion of the offense, and that the offense ends once the material, nonpub-
lic information becomes public and is absorbed by the market.139 The
court reasoned that, "the underlying value of the share of stock, which is
separable from the deceptive practice accompanying its purchase or sale,
should not be attributed to an inside trader." ' 4° The calculation method-
ology the Tenth Circuit settled on was the value of the shares when the
insider sold them while in possession of material nonpublic information,
minus the market value of the stocks "a reasonable time after public dis-
semination of the inside information.'' In doing so, the court effec-
tively added a limit to legal causation. In footnote thirteen, the court
elaborated that, "the court should consider the volume and price at which
[the] shares were traded following disclosure, insofar as they suggested
the date by which the news had been fully digested and acted upon by
investors.,, 142 Thus, market absorption defines but-for gain causation as
that which is strictly related to the illegality of the transaction and con-
fines legal causation to a "reasonable time after" the material, nonpublic
information goes to market.
When amending gain causation, the Sentencing Commission will,
therefore, have to decide whether to limit the legal causation of "gain
resulting from the offense."'143 A comparable issue when the economic-
crimes provisions were amended in 2001, loss causation centered around
three principle concerns: (1) whether to include "foreseen or unforeseen"
losses;144 (2) whether loss should be limited to the amount of loss in the
taken property; 145 and (3) whether loss should include non-consequential
or simply direct damages.1
46
The resulting amendment specifies that actual loss is the "'reasona-
bly foreseeable pecuniary harm' 147 that resulted from the offense."' 148 The
new definition demands at least factual ("but for") causation 49 and af-
139. See id. at 1073; Mooney, 435 F.3d at 1106 (Bright, J., dissenting) ("The offense is not the
purchase, but the deception.").
140. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1073 n. 1i.
141. Id. at 1078 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (I st Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added).
142. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078 n.13 (quoting SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir.
1983)) (alteration in original).
143. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4(b)(l) (2008).
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (citing United States
v. Lopreato, 83 F.3d 571 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995)).
145. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (citing United States
v. Marlatt, 24 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 1994)).
146. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (citing United States
v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (11 th Cir. 1995); United States v. Daddona, 34 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 1993)).
147. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (noting that
"'[reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm' is defined as pecuniary harms that the defendant knew
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fected three key changes in regard to legal causation: (1) consequential
damages are excluded from the definition of causation because "reasona-
bly foreseeable" was deemed sufficient for application of the standard;
50
(2) interest and similar costs are excluded, in most cases, 15 1 thereby de-
creasing unnecessary litigation regarding interest;' 52 and (3) costs rea-
sonably incurred by the government or the victims in investigating and
prosecuting the case are also excluded because of their fact-finding bur-
den and the fear that inclusion of such costs would distance loss from its
purpose as a measure of criminal culpability.'53
The market-absorption approach comes nearer to the amended-loss
causation than net gain because it confines legal causation more tightly.
Both gain-causation theories retain the necessary but-for causation,
though they differ once again in their emphasis on the underlying of-
fense. As to legal causation, the market-absorption approach of "reason-
able time after"'154 parallels "reasonably foreseeable"'' 55 in the loss-
causation. "Reasonable time after"' 156 may nonetheless conflict with loss-
causation in that loss was amended to decrease unnecessary litigation
costs in fact-finding. Determining causation under the market-absorption
approach may become fact-intensive and costly to the judicial system-
and parties involved in the litigation-because it requires significant
fact-finding. 57 Therefore, though market-absorption gain causation is
more consistent with the resolution of loss causation because it puts a
limit on legal causation and keeps the measure of culpability highly re-
lated to the criminal conduct, it may nonetheless defeat the purpose of
reducing judicial costs.
3. Timing
Delving deeper into gain causation reveals that the two gain theories
also differ in their determination of the proper time at which to calculate
gain. Net gain uses the time of sale to calculate gain. This is consistent
with net gain as a broad approach to the total profit generally realized by
the offender. "The use of actual sales to calculate gain provides a clear
and coherent bright-line rule, eliminating the need for extensive factfind-
150. Id.
151. Id. (noting that in the rare occasion "in which exclusion of interest will under-punish the
offender," interest may be included).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1078 (10th Cit. 2009).
155. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.3 (2008).
156. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078.
157. See id. at 1068 n.7 (explaining that expert witness Daniel Fischel prepared an event study
which "looks to how the price of the stock changed after the fraud was disclosed as evidence of the
amount by which it was inflated prior to disclosure" in order to determine the gain specifically
resulting from the trading based on material, nonpublic information); see also id. at 1068 (noting the
State suggests that the expert study is "flawed").
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ing to try to determine when the market has absorbed nonpublic informa-
tion.",5 8
By contrast, the market-absorption approach uses "a reasonable
time after dissemination of the [material nonpublic] information" as the
timeframe to calculate gain.' 59 The reasoning behind this approach is that
the stock has inherent value and its market price will move based on oth-
er factors not related to the disclosure of the inside information., 60 "It is
that illicit, artificially high value [attributable to the nondisclosure of
material, nonpublic information] that should be reflected in gain calcula-
tion, not the underlying value of the stock."'
161
The issue of gain causation, therefore, will also require the Sentenc-
ing Commission to address at what point in time the measure of gain will
be taken. An analogous consideration of loss causation related to timing
reveals that the Economic Crime Package reforms adopted the net-loss
approach, which specifically excluded certain economic benefits trans-
ferred to the victims from incorporation in the loss calculation when
those benefits were transferred after the time of detection of the crime.
1 62
This reform reemphasized the necessary connection between the gravity
of the criminal conduct and the offender's culpability. 63 In conjunction
with net loss, the reform codified the time-of-detection approach, 64 stat-
ing that it was "the most appropriate and least burdensome time for mea-
suring the value of the transferred benefits."' 65 Under the amended
Guidelines, the benefits transferred to the victim after the offender is
made aware that his activity has been detected are not permitted to miti-
gate the amount of loss used in calculating his sentence.' 66
Once again, the timing of gain calculation under the market-
absorption approach is more consistent with timing for the calculation of
loss. Excluding benefits transferred to the victim after the crime is de-
tected in the loss calculation is analogous to the exclusion of market fac-
tors adding to the underlying value of the stock in the gain calculation.
Indeed, both recognize the existence of other factors as beyond the reach
of the offender's conduct so that excluding them more accurately reflects
the offender's culpability.' 67 But, like with the market-absorption causa-
tion, the underlying principle of market-absorption timing may defeat the
goal of codifying the least burdensome approach to measuring culpabil-
158. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005).
159. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078.
160. See id. at 1076-77.
161. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added).
162. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
163. Id.
164. Id. (noting that time of detection also includes "about to be detected" so as to account for
situations where the defendant is cognizant that his criminal conduct is soon to be detected).
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id.; see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 2009).
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ity. Though market absorption clearly emphasizes the culpability of the
offender in calculating gain, it risks requiring courts to employ an un-
wieldy and fact-intensive methodology for finding gain as a measure of
culpability. This is inconsistent with the goals the Sentencing Commis-
sion has in amending the Sentencing Guidelines for practicality pur-
poses. 168
In a strictly statutory reading, market absorption more clearly meets
the practical requirements necessary for amendment of sections 2B 1.4
and 2B 1.1 commentary regarding gain as a measure of culpability. Mar-
ket absorption closely parallels the prior amendment of loss as a measure
of culpability through its definition of gain, and determination of causa-
tion and timing. Yet, market absorption may nonetheless present compli-
cations in execution because its elements of causation and timing may be
burdensome on the criminal justice system. To reconcile these issues
when determining which approach, if either, to codify by amendment,
the Sentencing Commission must look to the larger policy framework of
federal sentencing and criminal punishment.
B. Policy Perspective: Revisiting the Philosophical Framework
The third authority of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Ma-
nual, the policy statements, defines the philosophical framework that
drives the Sentencing Guidelines.' 69 The value of the policy statements is
in their attempt to guide all interpretation of Guidelines provisions to be
consistent with both sentencing policy and the overriding goals and pur-
pose of the criminal justice system, as a sanctioning mechanism for mor-
ally reprehensible behavior. 170 When amending gain as a measure of cul-
pability for the sentencing of economic-crime offenders, the Sentencing
Commission will likely consider: (1) whether the proposed calculation is
consistent with federal sentencing policy; and (2) whether it promotes the
stated goals and purposes of criminal punishment. 171
1. Sentencing Policy: Honesty, Uniformity, and Proportionality
Under the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress set forth three objec-
tives for the Sentencing Commission: (1) create "honesty" by reining in
the discretion of sentencing judges;172 (2) establish "reasonable uniform-
ity" so as to reduce sentence disparity between like offenders; 173 and (3)
create "proportionality" in sentencing, differentiating between the many
168. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008).
169. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,41 (1993).
170. See id.
171. Such an analysis would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's general approach
in establishing the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.3
(2008).
172. Id.; see also Ramirez, supra note 17, at 365.
173. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAI.3 (2008); see also Ramirez, supra note
17, at 366.
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criminal conducts punishable by federal statute while relating sentence
terms to the specific offender's culpability.174 Today, and since promul-
gation, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines embody these principles.
In the realm of economic crimes, the 2001 Sentencing Guidelines
reforms reinstated uniformity in the sentencing of economic-crime of-
fenders by emphasizing proportionality in sentencing without promulgat-
ing costly, in depth fact-finding. 175 This Comment's analysis of the two
gain calculation methodologies resulted in a clear preference for the
market-absorption approach. This outcome can largely be explained by
looking at which sentencing policy each gain methodology promotes:
uniformity or proportionality.
Market absorption arguably requires intensive fact-finding in order
to attain proportionality in sentencing.' 76 But the Nacchio court flatly
rejected the government's argument that "criminal punishment would
turn on experts hypothesizing 'what ifs"' and that "[g]ain would depend
as much on the expert retained and the guesswork permitted as on actual
conduct."'177 The court asserted that proportionality is the primary aim of
the financial-fraud provisions, that "it is axiomatic that a critical objec-
tive of federal sentencing is the imposition of punishment on the defen-
dant that reflects his or her culpability for the criminal offense.' 78 Con-
sequently, the Tenth Circuit addressed uniformity in sentencing as a sec-
ondary purpose'79:
[T]he greater certainty that presumably would be the product of such
a simplistic approach is not a cardinal objective of federal sentencing
in financial fraud cases. Indeed, the Guidelines expressly contemplate
that sentencing computations in financial fraud cases may involve
some element of imprecision .... Therefore, it stands to reason that,
operating within a wide range of discretion in the financial fraud con-
text, courts likely will arrive at different sentencing outcomes on
roughly similar facts and that, consequently, certainty of result can-
not be a controlling objective of the Guidelines. 1
80
In order to conclude that uniformity is not a goal in financial-fraud
cases, the court drew from the statement in the commentary of section
174. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.3 (2008); see also Ramirez, supra note
17, at 369.
175. Note that honesty was not a large consideration in reforming the loss calculation in 2001
because the Guidelines were, at the time, mandatory. Today, honesty might be a larger consideration
because the Guidelines are now advisory, restoring limited discretion to the sentencing judge. Due to
the continuing restraints of the post-Booker advisory system, the impact of honesty in sentencing
policy goes unconsidered herein.
176. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that market absorp-
tion is "inherently speculative" and would "involve extensive factfinding").
177. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 n.14 (10th Cir. 2009); Brief for the United
States at 65, United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1311).
178. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 1077 (emphasis added).
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2FI.1 of the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines that loss need only be a "rea-
sonable estimate."' 18 This seems attenuated: though the Sentencing
Commission purposefully included the "reasonable estimate" provision
in the current Sentencing Guidelines, 182 it arguably did so with the intent
of prompting courts to balance the institutional costs incurred by using a
highly-precise calculation that would result in a truly proportionate sen-
tence, against a simpler calculation which may decrease proportionality
for the specific offender, but would promote uniformity in the aggre-
gate. 183
By contrast, the net-gain approach in Mooney may do the opposite:
by favoring a bright-line rule, the Mooney court emphasized uniformity
in sentencing but overlooked the rule's impact on proportionality. One of
the criticisms raised by the dissent in Mooney was that the net-gain ap-
proach results in "unequal sentences for equal crimes."' 184 But, the major-
ity in Mooney argued that "imprecise standards," such as market absorp-
tion's required determination of a reasonable time after dissemination of
material, nonpublic information, "are particularly inappropriate in the
criminal context."
'1 85
As framed by Mooney and Nacchio, the issue is whether the sen-
tencing goals are coextensive or whether there may be a primary goal at
the expense of another. In Mooney, Judge Bright's dissent reminded the
court that in light of Booker, the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines
"was to move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uni-
formity,' a uniformity that consists of 'similar relationships between sen-
tences and real conduct, ' , 186 thus further emphasizing the desire to bal-
ance uniformity and proportionality against one another to achieve the
most judicious result. Though both courts purport to do exactly that, nei-
ther appears to effectively promote both proportionality and uniform-
ity. 187
By favoring a bright-line rule, the Mooney court emphasized uni-
formity across offenders, but overlooked the rule's impact on proportion-
ality for the specific offender. By articulating a cumbersome and fact-
181. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2FI. I cmt. n.9 (2000)).
182. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.3 (2008).
183. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617, at 687-693
(2008), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I Al.3 (2008).
184. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1101 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 1107 (Bright, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253
(2005)).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that the
focus of the court's holding was on "important objectives of federal sentencing-specifically, sen-
tences should reflect the individual criminal culpability of defendants and avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities"); see also Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1101 (stating that its focus "on the increase in
value realized by the defendant's trades provides a simple, accurate, and predictable rule for judges
to apply and follows the congressional mandate that sentences reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense").
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intensive rule, the Nacchio court's market-absorption methodology pro-
moted proportionality for the specific offender over uniformity within
the sentencing system. Is it therefore possible that uniformity and propor-
tionality, because they emphasize different policy goals, are mutually
exclusive? In application, the current theories of calculating gain as a
measure of culpability under section 2B 1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines
suggest that uniformity and proportionality perhaps cannot be coexten-
sively achieved. In reforming the measure, the Sentencing Commission
must consider whether the goals can be balanced or whether it must elect
which goal will become the primary goal, in light of compounding fac-
tors such as the practicality of the terms for calculation and the larger
policy goals of criminal punishment.
2. The Dilemma of the Purpose of Punishment
The current split in calculation methodology for gain as a measure
of culpability evokes two distinctive aspects of criminal justice and pun-
ishment. The first is that criminal punishment has the unique goals of
retribution and deterrence.' 88 The second is that criminal punishment, as
a system, seeks to sanction moral wrongdoing, rather than price it.' 89 The
sentencing phase is arguably the only feasible point at which the
tort/crime distinction can now be implemented by properly emphasizing
both distinguishing aspects of criminal justice. 190 Therefore, the threshold
inquiry into which methodology, if either, should be adopted by the Sen-
tencing Commission when amending financial gain as a measure of cul-
pability is (1) whether the methodology meets the desired retributive and
deterrent effects of criminal punishment, and (2) whether the approach is
pricing or sanctioning in nature.' 9'
a. Retribution and Deterrence
The Sentencing Commission took a modem approach to sentencing
when it wrote the Sentencing Guidelines by specifically emphasizing two
of the stated goals of the Sentencing Reform Act: retribution and deter-
rence. 92 Retribution emphasizes the nature of criminal law and punish-
ment as indicative of the ideals and values of the community. 93 Thus,
under a retributive theory, commission of the crime is a choice by the
offender to do "evil over good" and the offender deserves to be punished
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 5.
189. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1548 (1984).
190. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappear-
ing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991).
191. Contra supra note 171.
192. Bowman, Coping with Loss, supra note 36, at 468 (stating that "the fundamental philoso-
phical approach taken by the Guidelines... [is) a virtual abandonment of the rehabilitative or medi-
cal model of sentencing in favor a designedly imprecise amalgam of 'just deserts' retributivism and
utilitarian 'crime control' theories of deterrence and incapacitation"); see also Ramirez, supra note
17, at 371.
193. See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 409.
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for his immorality in disobeying a community standard. 194 Though retri-
bution incorporates recognition of the community mores, it is nonethe-
less a theory of just deserts: that "punishment should be scaled to the
offender's culpability and the resulting harms."'195 Ideally, these two con-
cepts-community mores and just deserts-will align; but, as illustrated
in the instance of economic crimes, they may be much more complex in
reality.
Deterrence, on the other hand, "serves to prevent future harm" by
discouraging both the specific offender from recidivism and the commu-
nity, generally, from pursuing similar conduct. 196 Punishment by deter-
rence directs conformity of individual conduct within the bounds of the
law. 197 Though traditional theorists would argue that retribution and de-
terrence theories may be mutually exclusive, the Sentencing Commission
has stated that the Sentencing Guidelines execute both, and that the
choice between retribution and deterrence "was unnecessary because in
most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will pro-
duce the same or similar results."198 Thus, taken together, both theories
punish nonconformance with the moral standards set by society at
large.199
When the Sentencing Commission overhauled the economic crime
sentencing provisions in 2001, it considered the current community per-
ception of the morality of white-collar crime offenders to determine if
the current state of the Guidelines reflected community standards. 200 The
1990s and early 2000s bore witness to numerous high-profile, high-dollar
frauds committed by white-collar corporate offenders, drawing attention
to the reality that most white-collar offenders received only minimum
penalties and were frequently given probation rather than a prison sen-
201tence. Public outcry progressively encouraged the trend of not only
white-collar offenders receiving prison terms, but longer ones. °2 Con-
cluding that there was still a disconnect between current sentencing of
194. Id. at 409.
195. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2009).
196. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for
Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1295, 1303-04
(2005).
197. Id. at 1304.
198. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008) (noting that the Sentencing
Commission references "just deserts" (retribution) and "crime control" (deterrence)).
199. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1360 (1991) (stating that "criminal proceedings are special and different because they
serve as 'affirmation[s] of shared moral purpose"') (alteration in original).
200. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
201. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 557; see also Ramirez, supra note 17, at 380
('The Economic Crime Package illustrates the Sentencing Commission's continued willingness to
move sentencing of high-dollar economic criminal offenses toward more severe terms of imprison-
ment.").
202. Gabbay, supra note 37, at 435.
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white-collar crime offenders and society's perception of their culpability,
the Economic Crime Package universally increased penalties for eco-
nomic-crime offenders.2 °3 Specifically, the reforms amended the loss
table to create substantially higher penalties when moderate to high loss
amounts were incurred.204 With additional reform to white-collar crime
punishment through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted in 2002,205 the
trend has been sustained. 206 Furthermore, despite the post-Booker Guide-
lines' advisory nature and return of more of the discretionary role of sen-
tencing judges-a development welcomed by defense attorneys who
hoped it would be a mechanism for reversing the trend of longer prison
sentences-the average sentence term for white-collar offenders has con-
tinued to increase.
207
In the instance of economic crimes, retribution addresses the fact
that the sophisticated-fraud offender must be made more accountable to
society at large for his gain in violation of the community mores because
neither the specific victims, nor their loss, are easily identifiable. 20 8 Giv-
en the realignment of sentencing for economic-crime offenders and pub-
lic perception of the immorality of economic-criminal offenses, net
gain-not market absorption-appears to be most consistent with the
objectives of retribution. But, the retributive concept of just deserts sug-
gests, conversely, that market absorption better implements retribution
because it exacts a more proportionate punishment. This conclusion
clearly indicates that dependent on the desired retributive effect, either
theory may suffice.
Net gain fits the retributive purpose of criminal justice because it
accounts for society's growing perception that white-collar crime is mor-
ally reprehensible and should be punished more severely. In her article
on punishing economic-crime offenders, Professor Ramirez notes that
"[t]hose offenders whom society has welcomed into its personal or fi-
nancial affairs based upon the faqade of respectability and trustworthi-
ness projected by the offenders seem the most culpable under a system of
retribution" because they are educated, intelligent offenders situated eco-
nomically so that the decision to take criminal conduct is truly a
203. Id. at 436-38 ("[A] national survey on white-collar crime conducted during 1999 found 'a
serious confidence gap between public demand for 'just deserts' for white-collar offenders and the
perception of the criminal justice system's ability, or willingness, to administer adequate punish-
ment.").
204. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
205. Gabbay, supra note 37, at 438-39 (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "directed the
Sentencing Commission to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines so that they 'reflect the serious
nature of the offenses and the penalties set forth in this Act' in order to 'deter, prevent and punish
such offenses').
206. Harris & Kaminska, supra note 70, at 154 (stating that between 2003 and 2007, the sen-
tences of economic crime offenders on average "increased from 22.4 months to 26.2 months and the
median from 15 to 18 months," with fraud offenders experiencing increases from 14.4 months to 19
months).
207. Id. at 155; see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 46.
208. See Bowman, Coping with Loss, supra note 36, at 501, 509.
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choice. 2°9 Net gain's more global approach to uniform punishment,
though tending to increase sentence length because it eliminates finding
costly factual distinctions between like offenders, better actuates the re-
tributive purpose of criminal punishment as "enhanc[ing] the criminal
law's moral credibility" and not undermining the community's percep-
tion of the required means of justice in white-collar crimes. 2'0 Therefore,
the fact that net gain does not promote proportionality for specific of-
fenders (such as just deserts may require) is overcome by its ability to
reflect societal contempt for white-collar crime.
By contrast, market absorption may lose sight of the trend to in-
crease punishments for economic-crime offenders because, by scrutiniz-
ing the exact transaction resulting in gain, final determination of the of-
fender's gain for sentence calculation purposes may in fact be distinctly
different form his perceived moral culpability in society. In Nacchio, the
Tenth Circuit drew significantly on civil law cases and their remedies
because market-absorption approach comes from the civil remedy of
disgorgement. 21 But it has been noted that "criminal and civil law most
clearly diverge when the goal is to exact a penalty capable of expressing
,,212condemnation-commonly termed retribution. Market absorption
clearly reflects this conclusion because, by narrowing the gain calcula-
tion and limiting it to just the illegal transaction, the gain calculation's
punitive potential as "a penalty solely to punish" is diminished.21 3 Con-
clusively, market absorption's emphasis on the proportionality of the
sentence demonstrates just deserts, but it is that exactness in executing
the calculation which may diminish market absorption's retributive ca-
pacity in light of societal mores.
Likewise, net gain better exemplifies the deterrent purpose of crim-
inal punishment. Similar to findings in retribution theory, deterrence
theory has recognized that white-collar crime is generally not committed
out of necessity.214 It is thus widely accepted that punishment of white-
collar crime offenders is most effective as a general deterrent, rather than
a specific deterrent.21 5 The purpose of punishment as a general deterrent
in the instance of white-collar offenders pushes for "substantial prison
terms and . . . financial penalties . . . more severe than [the offenders']
209. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 410.
210. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201,213 (1996).
211. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Dura Pharm. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005); United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2008);
United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cit. 2007); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110,
128 (2d Cir. 2006); SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 52-55 (1st Cir. 1983)).
212. Cheh, supra note 199, at 1355.
213. Id. at 1357.
214. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 417.
215. See id.
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economic gains, forcing offenders to dip into their savings to reimburse
those they cheated" 216 because:
White-collar crime is difficult to detect, time-consuming to investi-
gate, and costly to prosecute, all resulting in less certainty of punish-
ment.... [Liow rates of imprisonment or meager terms ... under-
mine the message of deterrence directed at those who willingly and
knowingly have participated in similar activities but were not crimi-
nally charged.
217
Net gain emphasizes general deterrence because it achieves the re-
sult of a higher sentence and fine through looking at the general culpabil-
ity of the offender and not getting bogged down in the details of his spe-
cific transaction(s).
By contrast, market absorption likely applies more of a specific de-
terrent effect, and a low one at that, because the offender's sentence is
compounded strictly by the gain that he personally obtained from his
illegal transaction. Furthermore, it may not even achieve specific deter-
rence, because gain calculation under market absorption may only com-
municate to the offender "that society has been wronged" and "that he
must pay," much like measures of liability exact a remedy, and less like
punishment imposes a sanction.218 Arguably, this does not send a mes-
sage to the community that sophisticated-fraud offenders will be pun-
ished "more severe[ly] than their economic gains, '' 219 and thus under-
mines the goal of punishing white-collar offenders to achieve general
deterrence.
Given prior amendment to loss as a measure of culpability through
the Economic Crimes Package-which substantially increased penalties
for relevant offenders as a response to public outcry-the Commission
will likely emphasize the community perception of white-collar crime
and the ability of a sentence to deter sophisticated fraud generally, rather
than specifically. Net gain executes retribution in light of the fact that
sophisticated frauds are crimes in which the offender must answer to
society at large-which has increasingly deemed white-collar crime mo-
rally reprehensible and deserving of more stringent punishment-and
properly emphasizes the purpose of punishing white-collar crime for its
general deterrent effect. Net gain is most consistent with the observation
that "the criminal law threatens the defendant with a much sharper, more
discontinuous jump in the costs that the defendant will incur for [his]
violation than does tort law, because the criminal law has little reason to
216. Dutcher, supra note 196, at 1308.
217. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 415.
218. Id. at 416 ("[T]he offender must not be told simply that society has been wronged and that
the offender must pay, but rather that the offender is the wrongdoer and will suffer dire conse-
quences if such course of criminal action is pursued.") (emphasis added).
219. Dutcher, supra note 196, at 1308.
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fear overdeterrence [sic] (that is, the chilling of socially valuable behav-
ior) within its appropriate domain. 22°
b. The Necessary Distinction Between Tort and Crime
The essential division between tort and criminal law "has been a
hallmark of English and American jurisprudence for hundreds of
years., 22' The two systems have largely functioned in tandem, but with
the distinction that criminal law "prefers to deal in moral absolutes, 2 2
signaling violation of a societal norm, while tort law seeks to measure
liability of a wrongdoer, but does not outright condemn the offender for
his action.223 Though in recent years there has been a significant blurring
of the tort/crime line,224 the trend has not made the distinction irrele-
vant.225 Rather, it has been suggested that the role of the Sentencing
Commission in promulgating sentencing guidelines is to reinvigorate the
tort/crime distinction which has been blurred or overlooked by lawmak-
ers.
226
In academia, a renewed emphasis on distinguishing tort from crime
has focused on the essential distinction of pricing conduct in tort law and
sanctioning commission of a criminal offense. In his article Pricing and
Sanctioning, Professor Cooter defines "a price as a money extracted for
doing what is permitted" to require individuals to take into account the
"external costs of their acts," while "a sanction [is] a detriment imposed
for doing what is forbidden. 227 He proposes that in making a determina-
tion whether to impose a price or a sanction, the following should be
observed:
If lawmakers can identify socially desirable behavior, but are prone
to error in assessing the cost of deviations from it, then sanctions are
preferable to prices .... [Ihf officials can accurately measure the ex-
ternal cost of behavior, but cannot accurately identify the socially de-
sirable level of it, then prices are preferable to sanctions.
228
Pricing, therefore, indicates that the offender/tortfeasor could rea-
sonably weigh the external costs of his conduct against its benefits before
committing the offense, thereby making the price imposed a reasonable
220. Coffee, supra note 190, at 195.
221. Cheh, supra note 199, at 1325.
222. Coffee, supra note 190, at 225.
223. Robinson, supra note 210, at 206.
224. See Cheh, supra note 199, at 1325, 1332.
225. See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REv. 741, 758 (1993); see
also Coffee, supra note 190, at 222 (Through discussion of Judge Posner's and Judge Calabresi's
position that both tort and criminal law are means of capturing externalities for allocative efficiency
purposes, Coffee indicates that even prominent economic law scholars still believe there is a neces-
sary distinction between tort and criminal law.).
226. Coffee, supra note 190, at 196, 201.
227. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1523.
228. Id. at 1524.
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means to deter commission of the conduct. By contrast, sanctioning con-
duct would indicate either that the costs are incapable of being identified
accurately, or that the conduct is deemed inappropriate for a cost/benefit
analysis because the goal is to deter any commission of the offense-not
just commission of the offense only when it is above a certain cost pre-
mium.
Historically, economic crimes were a form of property theft and
thus the value of the thing stolen was the primary factor in determining
punishment. 229 In such an instance, the loss to the victim could reasona-
bly be considered an externality of the commission of the crime. Where
the victims and their losses were indeterminate, it would be accurate to
suggest that the externality-the loss to society-was too great to calcu-
late, so gain to the offender would be assessed instead. Thus, economic
crimes have always, to a certain extent, blurred the line between tort-
which would award compensation for the thing stolen (the victim's
loss)-and crime-which would punish commission of the theft itself.
Today, the Sentencing Guidelines, comprised of methodical, arithmetic
calculations which incorporate the value of the victim's loss or of-
fender's gain into determination of the economic-crime offender's sen-
tence, reinforce the overlap to a certain extent by retaining the calcula-
tion of externalities of the criminal conduct in the assessment of the of-
fender's sentence. Nonetheless, criminal sentencing, as a function of the
criminal justice system, has the underlying purpose of sanctioning mor-
ally reprehensible behavior and deterring its commission. 230 Thus, the
area of economic crimes implicates a potential conflict between pricing
and sanctioning at the sentencing stage.
For the specific case of insider trading, Professor Coffee has recog-
nized that the origin of the offense-and indeed its retention as a civil
tort-complicates its distinction today as a crime.
At some point, a civil standard can become so deeply rooted and in-
ternalized within an industry or professional community that its vio-
lation becomes blameworthy, even if it was not originally so. Insider
trading may supply such an example, where the norm has long since
become internalized within the industry. The relationship of the civil
and criminal law here is sequentially interactive: the civil law ex-
periments with a standard, but at some point it may 'harden' into a
community standard that the criminal law can enforce. At that point,
it may be appropriate to prohibit, rather than price, at least if society
believes that the defendant's conduct lacks any colorable social util-
ity.
2 3 1
229. Supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
230. See Cooter, supra note 189, at 1549.
231. Coffee, supra note 190, at 201.
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Thus, in using gain as a measure of culpability, the issue is whether
it is appropriate to adopt a tort law calculation methodology in criminal
sentencing determination precisely because there is an experienced for-
232mula employed in analogous tort liability cases, even when doing so
would put at risk the tort/crime distinction underlying the American legal
system. 33 The analysis of net gain and market absorption in the sections
that follow centers around each methodology's nature as a pricing or
sanctioning mechanism in order to determine whether either is appropri-
ate for adoption into the Sentencing Guidelines.
The net-gain approach proposed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Mooney exemplifies sanctioning because "for behavior that soci-
ety wishes to prohibit, a deliberately sharp and discontinuous jump
should be structured into the sentencing guidelines." 234 Through com-
parison to the loss calculation, it was evidenced that net gain takes a
broad definition of gain, employs virtually no limit on causation, and
calculates gain at the time of sale. Although the Tenth Circuit criticized
this approach by stating that net gain overstated the gain, thereby leading
to over-sentencing, the Eighth Circuit court asserted that "[t]he public
interest that is served by sentencing criminal defendants has broader
goals" than limiting the penalty to disgorgement of the exact gain ob-
tained from the illegal transaction.235
The theory of criminal punishment as a sanctioning mechanism spe-
cifically characterizes an "upwardly biased penalt[y] that seek[s] to 'pro-
hibit' rather than 'price.' '' 236 Net gain is consistent with this approach and
moreover, is consistent with the supposition that in sanctioning, "[i]t is
not essential that the sanction equal the harm caused by the act .... It is
only essential that the sanction be large enough so that his [or her] pri-
vate costs are minimized by conforming to the legal standard.2 37 In
sanctioning, "the critical determination is not the price to set, but the
standard of conduct to mandate, because behavior will be extremely
responsive to even a small change in a legal standard that is backed by a
232. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 (2009) (citing United States v. Mooney,
425 F.3d 1093, 1107 n. 11 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J., dissenting)).
233. See generally Cooter, supra note 189. Cooter suggests that "economists tend to view law
as a set of official prices" while legal scholars tend to view "law as a set of obligations backed by
sanctions," both blindly ignoring the utility of the other. He argues that the behavioral effect of
punishment differs depending on whether the reprehensible behavior is sanctioned or priced. His
analysis is based on the principle that traditionally, civil liability has employed pricing mechanisms
because the intended effect is for the potential offender to perform a cost/benefit analysis, while
criminal liability is perceived as requiring a sanctioning mechanism because it seeks to prohibit
certain behaviors.
234. Coffee, supra note 190, at 242.
235. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099.
236. Parker, supra note 225, at 746.
237. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1527.
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highly punitive sanction, '238 thereby increasing the general deterrent
effect.
239
With the goal of reducing costs of both enforcing and prosecuting
the law, net gain as a sanctioning mechanism is most appropriate for
gain-calculation methodology because sanctioning is required where
lawmakers "have better information about community standards than
about external costs." 240 Gain as a measure of criminal culpability is spe-
cifically used in the instance of sophisticated fraud where the victim and
the victim's losses-characterized as external costs-are indetermi-
nate. 241 Sanctioning of sophisticated-fraud offenders is thus preferable to
prices because the loss is unknown and the precise gain is fact-intensive
and time consuming to determine.242 Furthermore, increasing the sanc-
tion is "virtually costless and is extremely flexible '243 for the judicial
system because it does not require committing additional funds to law
enforcement for detecting these highly evasive criminals, nor does it
require judges to ponderously scrutinize the facts in order to determine
with complete precision the amount of gain attributable to the criminal
conduct.
In recent years economic analysts have acknowledged "that social
policy may safely assume that gain is always less than harm, that there is
no surrounding productive behavior to be overdeterred, or that it is im-
possible to overdeter an activity whose optimal level is zero. ' 244 This
supports using the net-gain calculation because it "deemphasize[s] con-
cerns about the adverse welfare effects of overly punitive penalties.,
245
Net gain emphasizes the harm done to society and does not overly-
consider the impact of the punishment on the defendant, as might be
more appropriate when finding tortfeasor liability. 246 Hence, sanctioning
the offender through net gain does not overemphasize the potential to
over-sentence at the expense of under-deterring criminal conduct whose
optimal level is nil.247
238. Coffee, supra note 190, at 226 (emphasis added).
239. THOMAS S. ULEN, The Economic Case for Corporate Criminal Sanctioning, in DEBATING
CORPORATE CRIME 119, 127 (William S. Lofquist et al. eds., 1997).
240. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1549.
241. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B I. I cmt. n.3 (2008).
242. Compare United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 2005), with United
States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1068-69 (10th Cir. 2009).
243. ULEN, supra note 239, at 128.
244. Parker, supra note 225, at 760.
245. Id. at 759.
246. Compare Mooney, 425 F.3d at I 100, with SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 54 (1st Cir.
1983).
247. See Parker, supra note 225, at 769 ("[Plrecisely determining the parameters of optimal
enforcement is very costly. Therefore, law enforcement institutions have been arranged in such a
manner as to only roughly determine penalty levels, with an upward bias to minimize the possibility
of underdeterrence."); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.4 (2008). The Guide-
lines have a built-in safeguard against overrepresentation of culpability in sentencing calculation by
permitting courts to use downward departures to reduce the sentence. This is reinforced by Booker's
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By contrast, the market-absorption approach proposed by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Nacchio is akin to a pricing mechanism.
With its origins in the tort law remedy of disgorgement, this was inevita-
ble.248 "Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed to deter future
violations of the securities laws and to deprive defendants of the pro-
ceeds of their wrongful conduct., 249 It is traditionally employed for un-
just enrichment and "the remedy is remedial, not punitive, and.., a court
may only order that the defendants restore, with interest, the amount of
their profit. 250 In Mooney, the Eighth Circuit specifically noted that
"[t]his theory of recovery has been characterized as solely remedial in
nature in contrast to criminal punishment., 251 Hence, market absorption
based on disgorgement, when employed in the criminal context, prices
the violation at the expense of not fully sanctioning its commission.
Pricing criminal conduct presents several complications in light of
criminal punishment goals. First, pricing systems do not reinforce socie-
tal mores because they do not underline the offense as prohibited; they
emphasis only the liability derived from the conduct.252 Second, civil
remedies emphasize the quantum of the remedy, not the quality, and
therefore "embod[y] elaborate and fairly rigorous fact-finding procedures
to determine the amount of damages to compensate. 253 Third, rather
than deterring criminal conduct entirely, pricing instigates a cost-benefit
analysis at the margin, meaning that in a pricing system, "behavior is
more elastic. 254 The second and the third implications reinforce each
other: "[s]ince individuals are responsive to the magnitude of the price
and the frequency of its collection, accuracy is crucial to induce behavior
that is efficient or otherwise desirable. 255
Because it is a pricing mechanism, the market-absorption approach
may be ill-suited to the criminal context, regardless of its ability to pro-
mote proportionality in sentencing. As noted by the Eighth Circuit in
Mooney, using a tort remedy is unsupported "in judicial decisions for
incorporating a civil law standard into the interpretation of a sentencing
guideline., 256 The unprecedented use of a "close-fitting civil ana-
log[y] ' '257 such as market absorption from disgorgement to achieve the
limited restoration of judicial discretion in sentencing through making the Guidelines advisory.
Thus, the risk of over-deterrence through overrepresentation of culpability in gain calculation may
be further discounted.
248. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 2009).
249. 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 1616 (2009).
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098 (emphasis added).
252. See Coffee, supra note 190, at 225.
253. Parker, supra note 225, at 756 (noting that, by contrast, "criminal sentencing decisions are
more rough-hewn and are avowedly punitive").
254. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1531.
255. Id. at 1532.
256. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1101.
257. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Mooney, 425 F.3d
at 1107 n.I I (Bright, J., dissenting)).
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sentencing result has remarkable implications for federal sentencing,
several of which may not be consistent with the goals of criminal pun-
ishment. Market absorption uses "a reasonable time after public dissemi-
nation" of the material, nonpublic information as legal causation.258 In
the criminal context filled with moral absolutes where the optimal level
of prohibited conduct is zero, bright-line rules are exceedingly more ef-
fective in obtaining a deterrent effect than such "fuzzy standards" as
market absorption's causation standard.259 Moreover, "[i]t is very diffi-
cult to compute the cost of crime to its victims, so large errors would
occur [under a market absorption approach]. Thus the information re-
quirements of pricing crime are prohibitive, while the information re-
quirements for sanctioning crimes are relatively low.''26° Market absorp-
tion may not be practical because it is an unwieldy calculation, which
becomes expensive and time-consuming. Though still punitive-the re-
sulting numeric value is inserted into the sentencing table for computa-
tion into a prison term-market absorption risks the necessary distinction
between tort and crime by deemphasizing the sanctioning function of
criminal law. The underlying ineffectiveness of deterring morally repre-
hensible criminal conduct in a pricing system by implicating a
cost/benefit analysis by the offender rather than outright deterrence may
make the market-absorption approach inconsistent with federal-
sentencing policy and the goals of criminal punishment.
c. Amending Gain as a Measure of Culpability
The guidelines will not please those who wish the Commission to
adopt a single philosophical theory and then work deductively to es-
tablish a simple and perfect set of categorizations and distinctions.
The guidelines may prove acceptable, however, to those who seek
more modest, incremental improvements in the status quo, who be-
lieve the best is often the enemy of the good, and who recognize that
these guidelines are, as the Act contemplates, but the first step in an
evolutionary process.261
Conclusively, from a policy perspective, market absorption's preci-
sion in calculation is the downfall of its employment in criminal sophis-
ticated-fraud cases. In comparison to loss calculation, market absorption
met the criteria set out by the Sentencing Commission in the 2001
Amendment; however, its emphasis on the underlying offense and nar-
row calculation of gain directly resulting from that offense reduced both
its deterrent effect and potential to exact retribution. From its origins in
tort law's disgorgement remedy, market absorption is unavoidably pric-
ing in nature. In so doing, it defeats the purposes of creating a workable
258. Id. at 1078 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004)).
259. See Coffee, supra note 190, at 226.
260. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1550.
261. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008).
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calculation methodology that is not cost prohibitive and appropriately
sanctions moral wrongdoing. Its adoption into the Sentencing Guidelines
through amendment by the Sentencing Commission would potentially
disregard the recent trend toward increasing punishment of economic
offenders through sanctions cognizant of the prohibitive nature of insider
trading and similar sophisticated frauds as federal criminal offenses.
The alternative approach, net gain, likewise falls short of the requi-
site for codification into the Sentencing Guidelines by amendment.
Though net gain meets the policy objectives of retribution and general
deterrence through sanctioning criminal conduct without an unnecessary
fear of over-deterrence, the approach lacks the definition and causation
specifications of a comprehensive calculation methodology preferred by
the Sentencing Commission. In sum, as two divergent methodologies
emphasizing different practical and policy considerations, neither the
market-absorption approach, nor the net-gain approach fully satisfies the
stated requirements of a measure of culpability for sentencing purposes.
Thus, in amending the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission must reconcile the divergent approaches to calculating gain
as a measure of culpability by promulgating a hybrid calculation meth-
odology which meets the following three goals: First, the new gain calcu-
lation methodology must balance the goals (inasmuch as is possible) of
promoting uniformity and proportionality when determining the appro-
priate definition, causation, and timing for practical application of gain as
a measure of culpability. Second, the Sentencing Commission must keep
in mind the overriding trend of increasing penalties for white-collar of-
fenders by imposing a sanction likely beyond the precise ill-gotten gains
in order to ensure sufficient retribution and a general deterrent effect.
Finally, the new calculation methodology need not emphasize precision
in calculation at the detriment of imposing costly fact-finding on the sen-
tencing courts; rather, it must recognize that criminal law deals in "moral
absolutes' 262 and is willing to make "upwardly biased penalties"2 63 when
sanctioning offenders. Accordingly, the Sentencing Commission will
effectively amend gain as a measure of culpability in the sentencing of
sophisticated-fraud offenders.
CONCLUSION
United States v. Nacchio presents the unusual occasion to consider
the complementary roles of the federal appellate courts in identifying
inadequacies in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing
Commission's role in resolving circuit splits on provision interpretation.
Through the lens of Mooney and Nacchio, the appellate courts have iden-
tified the limitations of the current gain calculation in section 2B 1.4 of
262. Coffee, supra note 190, at 225.
263. Parker, supra note 225, at 746.
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the Sentencing Guidelines. Though they number only two at present,
these cases are merely the beginning of a line of cases that will likely
appear across the federal circuits, highlighting the current inadequacy of
gain as a measure of culpability in cases of sophisticated fraud. The
emergence of these cases will be slow, but the relatively infrequent oc-
currence of challenges to section 2B 1.4 gain calculation should not dis-
count its evident need for reform.26
Federal Sentencing Guidelines section 2B1.4 gain calculation meth-
odology currently lacks specificity and clarity. In its current statutory
form, gain calculation methodology defies precise definition and proper
determination of the elements of causation and timing. In looking to re-
cent criminal case law on the issue of interpretation, neither the net-gain
approach nor the market-absorption approach comprehensively calculate
gain as a measure of culpability for sophisticated-fraud offenders. While
the market-absorption approach to the interpretation of 2B 1.4 appears to
be most consistent with the practical construction of the amended-loss
calculation for similarly categorized economic crimes, it falls short of the
sentencing reform goal of balancing proportionality and uniformity with
the punitive nature of the federal felony offenses of insider trading and
other sophisticated frauds. Furthermore, market absorption's historic
roots as an equitable remedy in tort law reveals its true nature as a pric-
ing mechanism, thus its employment in criminal law risks underempha-
sizing the sanctioning of morally reprehensible conduct and may ineffec-
tively deter criminal activity, both of which are central objectives of
criminal punishment.
Amendment of section 2B 1.4 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
is a requisite to the proper execution of gain as a measure of culpability
in cases of sophisticated fraud. That amendment must contain a new hy-
brid-calculation methodology in order to satisfy both the practical appli-
cation needs of gain calculation and the policy objectives of federal sen-
tencing and criminal punishment.
Nicole Black*
264. Berman, supra note 32, at 143 ("[C]onflicts that create significant unwarranted disparities
and are likely to impact a sizeable number of cases should be identified and resolved expeditiously.
In many respects, the Commission would appear ideally suited to be primarily responsible for ad-
dressing such conflicts.").
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professors Tanya Bartholomew and Justin Marceau for their insight and constructive criticism.
Additionally, I am grateful to the editorial staff of the Denver University Law Review who painstak-
ingly crafted the Tenth Circuit Survey issue. In particular, Ana Maria Gutitrrez deserves specific
recognition for her tireless revisions and constant support. Of them all, I could not be more apprecia-
tive.
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"OUR FEDERALISM" OUT WEST: THE TENTH CIRCUIT AND
YOUNGER ABSTENTION
INTRODUCTION
In the Tenth Circuit's recent disposition of Brown ex rel. Brown v.
Day,' the majority found Younger abstention inapplicable to ongoing
state administrative proceedings deemed remedial in nature.2 In doing so,
the Tenth Circuit heeded the approach of several other circuits in apply-
ing Younger deference solely to coercive state administrative proceed-
ings, adopting court created tests that deem proceedings coercive if either
the State initiates the proceeding or the substance of the action is in re-
sponse to an alleged "bad act."3 Despite enduring criticism from academ-
ics challenging the constitutionality of federal abstention doctrines,4 the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Day will have significant implications for
practicing attorneys, state administrative systems, and federal plaintiffs
seeking Section 1983 relief from state proceedings gone awry.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of Judicial Abstention and Its Adoption in American
Courts
The practice of judicial abstention is rooted in age-old equitable
customs originating in the English King's Court of Chancery.5 The Court
of Chancery, a legal tribunal in which equitable relief flowed from the
King's "Fountain of Justice, ' 6 sought to render "executive justice rather
than justice according to law" through a chancellor who spoke "directly
in the name of the king."7 As the authority of the chancellor steadily
grew, particularly between the reigns of Edward I and Edward IV,8 their
rulings gradually established the long recognized precedent that courts of
equity possess internal discretion to forbear on exercising their own ju-
I. 555 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. Id. at 884.
3. See id. at 889, 891.
4. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judi-
cial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71,77 (1984).
5. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 571 (1985).
6. JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 9 (1828) ("It is well known,
that in the fictions of law and the language of Lawyers, the King is the 'Fountain of Justice.' Justice,
or what was denominated justice in England, has from time immemorial been administered in the
name of the King.").
7. M. T. VAN HECKE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 3-4 (4th ed. 1948); cf. PARKES,
supra note 6, at 10 (citing records from the Treasury of the Exchequer that Henry II, Richard III, and
Henry VI1 "often presided personally in Court").
8. VAN HECKE, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that under Edward the IV's reign the Chancery
became a separate jurisdiction but still lacked authority to issue decrees by virtue of his own title
until 1474).
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risdiction.9 The chancellor's discretion to abstain from hearing cases was
reconciled primarily with the court's equitable power to issue injunctive
relief.'0 In this sense, the chancellors used their injunctive discretion to
halt litigation that was, at least in their own individual determinations,
contrary to the best interest of the court or society at-large.",
Centuries later, these pivotal canons of English legal heredity were
incorporated into the American system through the ascendancy of Article
III of the Constitution, as well as its enabling legislation-namely, the
Judiciary Act of 1789.12 Both of these documents equipped the federal
courts with authority to issue equitable relief-an impetus to the early
adoption of "doctrines of judicial restraint developed in the English
Chancery Court," including a wide range of situations favoring absten-
tion.'
3
Despite the unambiguous historical authority of equitable courts to
decline jurisdiction, uncovering legitimate legal justifications for absten-
tion in American courts has persistently haunted the federal judiciary
since the early days of the Republic.1 4 Due to the particular limitations
set forth in the United States Constitution, the utilization of abstention by
federal courts ushers in far-reaching implications for separation of pow-
ers 15 and federalism.' 6 Indeed, even the great Chief Justice John Marshall
once commented on the tenuous foundation abstention theory enjoys: "It
is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it
is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should."' 7 Nevertheless,
the longstanding American roots of equitable discretion empowered fed-
eral courts to create and shape varying abstention doctrines. In a famous
maxim, the Supreme Court proclaimed: "Courts of equity may, and fre-
quently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in further-
ance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only
private interests are involved."' 8 Thus, through the continued application
of equitable authority to shape public priorities, the judiciary has allo-
cated federal abstention a unique and active role in American jurispru-
dence.
9. See id. at 571.
10. LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 501 (3d ed. 2009).
11. See Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
382, 383 (1983).
12. See id. at 384.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.").
15. ROBERT N. CLINTON, RICHARD A. MATASAR & MICHAEL G. COLLINS, FEDERAL COURTS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1228 (1996).
16. YACKLE, supra note 10, at 491 (describing the complex relationship of abstention among
state and federal courts).
17. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404.
18. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
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B. Congressional and Judicial Abstention
Congress, as the primary architect of federal court jurisdiction, 19 has
utilized its nearly plenary authority over the courts to enact several im-
portant statutes that compel federal abstention. 20 These include the Anti-
Injunction Act,21 three-judge court statutes, 22 the Johnson Act,23 and the
Tax-Injunction Act.24 In light of Congress's undisputed role in defining
federal jurisdiction, these statutes remain a settled byproduct of our con-
stitutional system.
Conversely, abstention doctrines emanating from Supreme Court
edicts remain the subject of significant controversy.25 To some, the act of
forgoing jurisdiction expressly given by Congress to the courts is strictlyS • 26
disallowed by the Constitution. Specifically, opponents argue that judi-
cially created abstention doctrines violate separation of powers principles
due to the inability of federal courts to "ignore or invalidate" congres-
sional statutes conferring jurisdiction merely because they disagree "with
their substance. 27 Others rebuff this contention and argue that federal
abstention safeguards states' rights28 and promotes longstanding stan-
dards of federalism by allowing state courts to retain decision-making
authority over areas of law with which they are familiar.29
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently justified absten-
tion in order to ensure the federal government cannot easily encroach
upon state interests. 30 In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. ,31
the Court issued its first major abstention decision to the lower courts.
32
19. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1-2.
20. See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 10, at 491-92.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006) (barring federal court interference by staying state court proceed-
ings).
22. Id. § 2284 (mandating three-judge district court review of legislative apportionment
cases).
23. Id. § 1342 (prohibiting federal court enjoinment of state agency decisions regarding utility
rates).
24. Id. § 1341 (excluding federal courts from suspending state tax enforcement).
25. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 4, at 75-76.
26. Id. at 77 ("If Congress intended that the federal courts exercise a particular jurisdiction,
either to achieve substantive legislative ends or to provide a constitutionally-contemplated jurisdic-
tional advantage, a court may not, absent constitutional objections, repeal those jurisdictional grants.
But one may question why, if the courts do not possess the institutional authority to repeal the legis-
lature's jurisdictional scheme, they possess any greater authority to modify the scheme in a manner
not contemplated by the legislative body. In either repealing or modifying the legislation, the court
would be altering a legislative scheme because of disagreement with the social policy choices that
the scheme manifests. Thus, if a judge-made form of partial abstention is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent to leave federal court jurisdiction unlimited, the fact that the abstention leaves intact a
portion of the jurisdictional grant will not insulate it from a separation-of-powers attack.").
27. Id.
28. See Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV.
1097, 1117-18 (1985).
29. Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 550 (1989).
30. See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 10, at 500.
31. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
32. Id. at 501-02.
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In Pullman, which entailed a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a then-
controversial Texas law regulating railroad staff, the Court pronounced
that federal courts should abstain from hearing cases centered on uncer-
tain state laws until state courts first attempt to resolve the ambiguity.
33
Two years later, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,34 the Court mandated federal
abstention when complex state regulatory schemes are at issue. 35 In the
late 1950's, the Court laid down ground rules in Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux36 for federal courts to mimic Pullman
abstention when sitting in diversity, despite Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins's 37 requirement that federal courts apply state law when deciding a
case founded on diversity jurisdiction. 38 Lastly, in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States,39 the Court held that "exceptional
circumstances" permit federal courts to abstain when parallel proceed-
ings exist in a state court.4°
These examples illustrate the numerous and frequently employed
federal abstention doctrines. While all of the foregoing cases represent
the Supreme Court's slow expansion of abstention principles, Younger
abstention, at issue before the Tenth Circuit in Day, has undergone per-
haps the most significant individualized expansion of any judicially cre-
ated abstention doctrine.
C. Younger and Its Progeny
1. The Birth of "Our Federalism": Younger and Abstention in State
Criminal Proceedings
In 1971, the Supreme Court, again relying on its equitable authority,
handed down its seminal opinion in Younger v. Harris.41 The case re-
volved around a challenge to the California Criminal Syndicalism Act by
plaintiff John Harris Jr., who was arrested under the Act for distributing
political pamphlets that encouraged "force and violence or unlawful me-
thods" for attaining political change.42 The Los Angeles District Attor-
ney, Evelle J. Younger, brought charges against Mr. Harris in California
state court.43 In response, Mr. Harris filed suit in federal district court
alleging that the Act violated his constitutional rights under the First and
33. See id. at 498-500.
34. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
35. See id. at 320, 324-25.
36. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
37. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Consti-
tution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state").
38. See Louisiana Power & Light Co., 360 U.S. at 29-30.
39. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
40. See id. at 813-14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting County of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).
41. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
42. Id. at 40 n.1.
43. Id. at 40.
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Fourteenth Amendments. 44 In light of the purported constitutional viola-
tions, the district court issued an order halting District Attorney Younger
from prosecuting Mr. Harris in state court. 45 On appeal, the U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court, proclaiming that federal jurisdic-
tion in this instance would constitute "a violation of the national policy
forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceed-
ings except under special circumstance.""6
Notwithstanding some elaboration on the types of state proceedings
that warranted federal abstention, the Court relied heavily on the annals
of American legal history to justify their decision.47 Noting that Congress
had long directed federal courts to refrain from employing their equitable
discretion to interfere with state court proceedings,48 the Court rested its
reasoning on the importance of upholding notions of "comity" that pro-
mote "a proper respect for state functions. '49 The Court highlighted its
"belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa-
rate ways." 50 The Court labeled this concept "Our Federalism," describ-
ing it as "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests
of both State and National Governments" and where federal interests do
not "unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States., 51 The
convictions at heart in "Our Federalism" thus formed the basis of the
Supreme Court's rigid abstention doctrine preventing federal courts from
intervening in ongoing state criminal proceedings.
52
2. The Gradual Expansion of Younger Deference to State Civil
Proceedings
While the Younger rule has received serious criticism for its consti-
tutional and equitable implications, 53 the Court has continued to expand
Younger's main tenet of non-interference with state proceedings into
other areas of state law.54 As Judge Ebel observed in the Day opinion,
"[flrom the Younger acorn-a holding barring federal courts from en-
joining ongoing state criminal prosecutions-a judicial oak has grown."
55
Indeed, the extension of Younger to other types of state proceedings be-
sides criminal prosecutions has been precipitous.
44. Id. at 39.
45. Id. at 40.
46. Id. at 41.
47. Id. at 41,43.
48. Id. at 43.
49. Id. at 44.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 54.
53. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 637 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for
Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 194-95 (1977).
55. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 2009).
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The first major expansion of Younger abstention was into ongoing
state civil proceedings. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 6 a case involving a
civil challenge to an Ohio law branding pornographic theatres as a public
nuisance, the Court held that the criminal nature of state nuisance laws
justified Younger abstention even though nuisance suits are generally not
considered true criminal proceedings.57 A few years later, in Trainor v.
Hernandez,58 the Court expanded Huffman and mandated federal absten-
tion in all state civil proceedings in which the state is a party.59 Follow-
ing on the heels of Trainor, in Moore v. Sims,60 the Court applied Young-
er deference to state civil proceedings where the state is a party and the
substance of the proceeding involve "important state interests.', 6' In
1987, after experiencing a steady increase in the applicability of Younger
to state civil proceedings, the Court dramatically expanded Younger in
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.62 to include private state civil proceedings
that involve important state interests.63 However, two years later in New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,64 the Court de-
clined to go as far as mandating federal abstention in all civil litigation,
and conversely, held that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over
ongoing state civil proceedings under limited circumstances.
65
3. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc.66 and Abstention in State Administrative Proceedings
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court first considered extending
"Our Federalism" and Younger treatment to state administrative proceed-
ings. 67 In Dayton Christian Schools, the Court solidified the applicability
of Younger abstention to state administrative proceedings "in which im-
portant state interests are vindicated., 68 Dayton Christian Schools in-
volved a sexual harassment claim filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission, prompting the defendants to file suit in federal district court to
enjoin the state administrative proceeding. 69 The Court declared that the
district court should have abstained because federal courts should not
56. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
57. See id. at 604.
58. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
59. See id. at 444.
60. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
61. See id. at 423.
62. 481 U.S. I (1987).
63. See id. at 13-14.
64. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
65. See id. at 372-73.
66. 477 U.S. 619 (1086).
67. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432-34
(1982).
68. See Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 627.
69. Id. at 621, 623-24.
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interfere with state administrative actions when a state proceeding has
already been initiated and involves important state interests.7°
While the evolution of Younger deference has been volatile over the
last several decades, the Tenth Circuit summarized the relevant Younger
case law into a paragraph-long test encompassing all of the Supreme
Court's major rules of law:
Under Younger and its progeny, "[a] federal court must abstain
from exercising jurisdiction when: (1) there is an ongoing state crim-
inal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides
an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint,
and (3) the state proceedings 'involve important state interests, mat-
ters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or impli-
cate separately articulated state policies."'
71
1I. BROWN V. DAY
A. Facts and Procedural History
Dena K. Brown, a developmentally disabled adult, possessed the
mental capacity of a three to four year-old child.72 Due to her disabilities,
Ms. Brown lived at a private residential care facility in Kansas.7 3 Ms.
Brown's monthly income was limited to the $864 she receives in Social
Security payments.74 Because her Social Security payments were not
substantial enough to cover the $5,000 monthly cost of residing at the
facility, Ms. Brown relied on Medicaid payments to defray the remaining
balance due. 75 The State of Kansas, as a participant in the Medicaid pro-
gram, is bound by federal statute to cover "categorically needy" indi-
viduals collecting Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") from the Social
Security Administration. 76 Congress-in an attempt to preclude states
from shortchanging the "categorically needy"-limited a state's ability to
disqualify these individuals by mandating that any Medicaid termination
reflect "reasonable standards that only factor in income and resources
which are available to the recipient and which would affect the person's
eligibility for SSI."' 7 7 To further brighten the line for states participating
in Medicaid, the Social Security Administration promulgated rules out-
lining sources of income that could potentially disqualify a SSI recipient
70. See id. at 627-28.
71. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original)
(quoting Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 187 F. 3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999)).





77. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2006)).
20101
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
under Medicaid.78 These sources include assets available for liquidation
and trust funds that the beneficiary controls.
79
In 2003, upon the death of her mother, Ms. Brown was named the
beneficiary of a residuary trust comprised of a cash gift, two annuities,
and the rights to land in Kingman County, Kansas. 80 Each of the three
trust components was valued well over $10,000.8 However, in light of
Ms. Brown's disabilities, her brother was designated trustee over the new
assets and retained sole discretion over funds spent on Ms. Brown's be-
half.82 On July 1, 2004, Kansas amended its Medicaid eligibility law to
recognize trust income "to the extent, using the full extent of discretion,
the trustee may make any of the income or principal available to the ap-
plicant or recipient of medical assistance."83 As a result of the new state
law, Robert M. Day, Director of Kansas's Division of Health Policy and
Finance ("HPF"), informed Ms. Brown that her Medicaid benefits would
be terminated after August 31, 2005.84
Through her attorney, Ms. Brown requested a hearing before the
HPF to challenge the cancellation of her benefits on grounds that the new
state law could not be applied to her retroactively. 85 The HPF officer
conducting the hearing determined the new law did not extend retroac-
86tively to trusts previously vested, ruling in Ms. Brown's favor. Despite
Ms. Brown's victory at the hearing, Director Day proceeded with his
ultimatum and issued a final order on April 26, 2006 to discontinue Ms.
Brown's benefits because she could temporarily finance her own care
with the trust's assets.87 In the decree, Director Day mentioned that Ms.
Brown had thirty days to seek state court review of the HPF's final or-
der.
88
Ms. Brown did indeed pursue judicial review. However, she side-
stepped her uncontested right to state review under Kansas Law89 and
filed a claim against Director Day in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas.9° Ms. Brown based her complaint on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging HPF breached "federal Medicaid law when it determined that
the assets in the trust left to Brown by her mother are 'available as-
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 886.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(e)(3)(B) (1997
& Supp. 2008)).
84. Id. at 885-86.




89. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-613(b) (1997 & Supp. 2008).
90. See Day, 555 F.3d at 886-87.
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sets."' 9' Considering a prayer for equitable relief, the district court
granted Ms. Brown's motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the
HPF from terminating her benefits.92 The district court reasoned that the
HPF's final order was an arbitrary and capricious violation of the federal
Medicaid statute's prohibition against eligibility tampering among the
"categorically needy."93
One month later, Director Day filed a motion to dismiss the court's
order contending that the federal courts should abstain from hearing the
case on account of Ms. Brown's failure to exhaust her state court reme-
dies.94 The district court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing that
"Younger v. Harris and its progeny commanded abstention" because Ms.
Brown failed to exhaust her state options, those state options were ade-
quate to address her claims, and Kansas had sufficient "interest in
'[p]rotecting the fiscal integrity of public assistance programs.' ' 95 After
Ms. Brown's motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, she
appealed the district court's decision to the Tenth Circuit for review. 96
B. Majority Opinion
Judge Ebel, writing for the majority, quickly noted the Tenth Cir-
cuit's prior position on the precarious circumstances Younger abstention
invites into federal courts: "[T]his court 'must be sensitive to the compet-
ing tension between protecting federal jurisdiction and honoring princi-
ples of Our Federalism and comity.' 97 From there, Judge Ebel narrowed
the disposition of the case to nothing more than resolving the first prong
of the Younger complex: whether "there is an ongoing state criminal,
civil, or administrative proceeding." 98 To properly analyze this question,
the majority split the prong into "two sub-parts": (1) identifying whether
an ongoing state proceeding existed, and if so, (2) "whether that proceed-
ing is the type of state proceeding that is due the deference accorded by
Younger abstention." 99 Noting that both sub-parts presented issues of
first impression for the Tenth Circuit, the majority declined to abstain
under Younger because the type of proceeding in question was im-
proper.' °° In doing so, the court chose not to address the remaining sub-




95. Id. (alteration in original).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 887-88 (quoting Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1997)).
98. Id. at 887.
99. Id. at 888 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,
369 (1989) ("Respondents' case for abstention still requires, however, that the Council proceeding
be the sort of proceeding entitled to Younger treatment.")).
100. Id.
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part of whether there was an ongoing proceeding, effectively reserving
that question for future litigation.''
In support of its holding that the proceeding initiated by the HPF
did not warrant Younger deference, the majority relied on the Supreme
Court's opinion in Dayton Christian Schools and gleaned factors that
determine the types of administrative proceedings that warrant Younger
abstention.' °2 As the majority put it, Dayton Christian Schools serves to
clarify "some of the occasions when Younger deference was appropriate
and some occasions when it was not."'' 0 3 The Dayton Christian Schools
holding was an important case for the majority because it differentiated
the types of proceedings from another relevant Supreme Court case, Pat-
sy v. Board of Regents of Florida.'°4
In Patsy, the Supreme Court allowed a federal claim to proceed de-
spite the availability of adequate state administrative proceedings.0 5 This
stands in stark contrast with the Dayton Christian Schools decision,
which serves as the legal backbone for applying Younger deference to
state administrative proceedings." °6 To justify the apparent disparity be-
tween the two cases, Dayton Christian Schools distinguished Patsy on
the ground that the administrative proceedings were remedial rather than
coercive.'0 7 More precisely, the Court elaborated on the difference be-
tween the two cases by noting:
The application of the Younger principle to pending state administra-
tive proceedings is fully consistent with Patsy, which holds that liti-
gants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to brining
a § 1983 suit in federal court. Unlike Patsy, the administrative pro-
ceedings here are coercive rather than remedial, began before any
substantial advancement in the federal action took place, and involve
an important state interest.
10 8
Hence, according to the majority's interpretation of the Supreme
Court's language in Dayton Christian Schools, if a state administrative
proceeding is classified as "remedial," then a federal court does not have




104. See id. (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fa., 457 U.S. 496 (1982)).
105. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516.
106. Compare id. (holding exhaustion of state judicial and administrative remedies is not a
prerequisite to a discrimination action under § 1983), with Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 620 (1986) (holding the district court should have abstained from
deciding the case based on the Younger doctrine).
107. See Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 627 n.2.
108. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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hand, if the administrative proceeding is deemed "coercive," then federal
courts must abstain under Younger.
10 9
Because the Supreme Court declined to formulate a test to deter-
mine whether a state proceeding is remedial or coercive, and because the
concept of remedial and coercive administrative proceedings constituted
a matter of first impression to the Tenth Circuit, the majority in Day re-
sorted to the relevant case law from their "sister circuits." 10 As such, the
majority adopted the approach taken by the First Circuit in Kercado-
Melendez v. Aponte-Roque. 111 The First Circuit's test "asks the court to
consider two issues in deciding whether Dayton Christian Schools or
Patsy controls." ' 12 The first prong seeks to discover if "the federal plain-
tiff initiated the state proceedings of her own volition to right a wrong
inflicted by the state (a remedial proceeding) or whether the state initi-
ated the proceeding against her, making her participation mandatory (a
coercive proceeding)."' 13 The second prong of the First Circuit's test
prompts the courts to "differentiate cases where the federal plaintiff con-
tends that the state proceeding is unlawful (coercive) from cases where
the federal plaintiff seeks a remedy for some other state-inflicted wrong
(remedial)."
1 14
In addition to the First Circuit's approach in Kercado-Melendez,
and in an attempt to further resolve the coercive and remedial distinction,
the majority turned to cases from other circuits that involved the correla-
tion between Younger abstention and the punishment of bad acts." 5
These cases usually entail federal plaintiffs seeking to "thwart a state
administrative proceeding" initiated against that plaintiff for punishment
of a bad act. 1 6 Accordingly, the majority deduced that "a common thread
appears ... that if the federal plaintiff has committed an alleged bad act,
then the state proceeding initiated to punish the plaintiff is coercive,"
thus inviting Younger deference. 17 In a case decided by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the court held that the plaintiffs conduct violating Maryland's De-
watering Act, which resulted in fines to a mining company, was a suffi-
ciently bad act to justify abstention."i8 Additionally, in a case challenging
the City of Philadelphia's parking ticket procedures, the Third Circuit
favored abstention on a bad act theory because "[t]he plaintiffs had
amassed a slew of parking tickets over the years and sought to avoid
109. See id.
110. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 889 (10th Cir. 2009).
Ill. Id. at 890 (citing Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255 (1 st Cir. 1987)).
112. ld. at 889.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. ld. at 891.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 166-67 (4th Cir. 2008)).
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paying them."'" 9 Last, in a ruling handed down by the Seventh Circuit,
abstention was upheld when the federal plaintiff "had allegedly eutha-
nized elderly patients.' 120 Following this approach, the majority reasoned
that bad acts and punishment are important indicators into the propriety
of Younger abstention.
12 1
Last, the majority analyzed other important Younger abstention cas-
es, such as Huffinan and Moore, and concluded that "[t]he essence of
each of these opinions is that a state's enforcement of its laws or regula-
tions in an administrative proceeding constitutes a coercive action, ex-
empt from Patsy and entitled to Younger deference."'' 22 On the other
hand, the majority contended, administrative proceedings not in line with
the coercive model are automatically considered remedial in nature.123
In applying the case law to the situation at hand, the majority dis-
agreed with the district court's reasoning that the HPF proceedings were
coercive "because they stemmed from Kansas's decision to terminate
Brown's benefits.' 24 Instead, the majority adopted the First Circuit's test
and concluded the HPF proceedings against Brown were remedial. 125 The
majority articulated three main reasons for its conclusion. First, Brown's
participation in the proceeding was not mandated by any State action
against her, but rather she initiated the hearing herself. 26 Second, the
court reasoned that the basis of Brown's claim "alleged that the applica-
tion of this new law to her violates federal law because it contravenes
certain terms of the federal-state Medicaid pact," and not the underlying
state proceedings themselves. 127 Last, in accordance with the bad act
jurisprudence of the other circuits, the majority noted that Brown did not
commit a "cognizable bad act that would have precipitated state coercive
proceedings. 12 8 In light of its conclusion that the HPF proceedings
against Brown were remedial, rather than coercive, the Tenth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.
129
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Tymkovich issued a dissent challenging the majority's hold-
ing that the HPF proceedings were remedial. 30 In addition, Judge Tym-
kovich faulted the majority for failing to address the second prong of the
119. Id. at 892 (citing O'Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 788-89 (3d Cir. 1994)).
120. Id. (citing Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1998)).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 890.
123. id.





129. Id. at 894.
130. Id. at 894 (Tynkovich, J. dissenting).
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Younger test: whether the state administrative proceeding is ongoing."'
In making these two points clear, the dissent began by questioning the
applicability of the Dayton Christian Schools's remedial and coercive
distinction, observing that the Supreme Court not only refused to elabo-
rate on the variances, but also communicated them obscurely in a foot-
note of the Dayton Christian Schools opinion.' 32 The dissent questioned
the effectiveness of the First Circuit's test in Kercado-Melendez, remark-
ing that the test for determining coercive versus remedial proceedings is
not correctly detected by examining "who initiate[d]" the administrative
process. 133 Instead, the dissent applauded the district court for adopting
the tests formulated by the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, which
look "to the underlying nature and substance of the proceedings rather
than to the initiating party." 134 Judge Tymkovich noted that "focusing
primarily on who initiates administrative process fails to recognize that
the labels 'remedial' and 'coercive' can simply be opposite sides of the
same coin."' 35 As he explained:
If a federal plaintiff initiates a state administrative process, the First
Circuit's approach in Kercado-Melendez would call that process re-
medial. But that federal plaintiff surely felt coerced by the challenged
state action he or she is now seeking to remedy. On the flip side, if
the government initiates administrative process against a would-be
federal plaintiff, Kercado-Melendez would label that process coer-
cive. But that would-be federal plaintiff, forced into the state-initiated
administrative proceedings, can also be described as attempting to
remedy governmental coercion through the administrative hearing.
Kercado-Melendez's interpretation of the coercive-remedial distinc-
tion, while easy to apply, does not explain why it modifies the
Younger abstention doctrine. 1
36
Rejecting the First Circuit approach, the dissent favored a different
test for distinguishing the remedial from the coercive: "The question we
must therefore ask is whether administrative proceedings represent state
enforcement efforts-regardless of who initiates them."'
' 37
Additionally, the dissent argued that the "bad act" test used by the
majority was also inconclusive for the purposes of applying Younger.
Primarily, Judge Tymkovich took issue with the fact that some violations
of the law, under the majority's test, are not considered "bad acts."' 38 As
an operation of law, the dissent argued, any violation of the law should
131. Id.
132. Id. at 895 (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
627 n.2 (1986)).
133. Id. at 896.
134. Id. (citing Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (D. Kan. 2007)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 897.
138. Id. at 898.
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be considered a "bad act."' 139 As Judge Tymkovich wrote, "An element of
subjective moral culpability seems unimportant to this inquiry."'
40
Hence, considering Ms. Brown did violate the Kansas statute dictating
the terms of Medicaid benefits, the dissent contended that the majority's
"bad act" approach "weighs in favor of finding the proceedings here
were coercive in nature."' 4' Following this line of reasoning, and because
Judge Tymkovich argued the proceedings were still ongoing, the dissent
asserted that Younger deference was indeed warranted.
42
III. ANALYSIS
A. Day and the Coercive-Remedial Distinction as a Remnant of the Pat-
sy-Dayton Christian Schools Disparity
1. The Circuits and the Rise of the Coercive-Remedial Distinction
The majority and dissenting opinions in Day demonstrate the sub-
stantial strain that beleaguers lower federal courts due to the conflicting
holdings in Patsy and Dayton Christian Schools.14 3 As discussed in Part
I.C, the Supreme Court vaguely distinguished Patsy from Dayton Chris-
tian Schools on grounds that the proceedings in the latter case were (1)
coercive rather than remedial, (2) began before substantial advancement
in the federal action, and (3) involved an important state interest.144 Con-
sidering there is no other Supreme Court pronouncement to help decipher
the practical meaning of these three differentiating factors, a lingering
sense of uncertainty has compelled federal judges to elicit new tests to
determine whether Younger deference is warranted.145 The approach tak-
en by the First Circuit in Kercado-Melendez, as well as the reasoning
applied in the various "bad act" cases, reflects the laborious effort put
forth by the courts to adequately define the coercive and remedial divid-
ing line.1 46 The opposing viewpoints presented in Day are no exception
to this ongoing endeavor.
In fact, as inferred from the analysis of the Day opinions, the enig-
matic character of the three factors separating Patsy and Dayton Chris-
tian Schools has become so pronounced that the circuits have clashed
considerably over the coercive-remedial dynamic, producing a textbook
"circuit split on the issue.' 47 Nevertheless, as Judge Tymkovich argued





143. See id. at 895-96.
144. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 n.2 (1986).
145. See Day, 555 F.3d at 896 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 888-89 n.5 (majority opinion); Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d
255, 260 (1st Cir. 1987).
147. Day, 555 F.3d at 896 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
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must have thought the distinction important, because otherwise no need
for differentiating between coercive and remedial proceedings exists."
'148
Accordingly, as a court considering the coercive-remedial issue for the
first time, the Tenth Circuit majority made clear from the onset that they
would consider the distinction "as the touchstone for determining wheth-
er the administrative proceeding is the type of proceeding that merits
Younger abstention."'' 49 Yet in arriving at this course of action, the ma-
jority supported the decision to concentrate on the coercive-remedial
distinction not because they believed the Supreme Court had so man-
dated them, but instead because their "sister circuits tend to use that ar-
ticulation."' 50 This is arguably an important concession by the court, as it
illustrates the influence exerted by the circuits in shouldering the coer-
cive-remedial distinction to the forefront of the Younger-Dayton Chris-
tian Schools abstention analysis.15' Despite other crucial intricacies sur-
rounding Younger abstention, the circuits have clearly elevated the coer-
cive-remedial distinction as the chief obstacle litigants must overcome in
order to shield a state administrative proceeding from federal considera-
tion under a Younger-Dayton Christian Schools theory.' 
52
2. The Inherently Coercive Nature of Younger and Its Progeny
One apparent explanation for the rise of the coercive-remedial dis-
tinction among the circuit courts can be traced back to the underlying
fact pattern in the Younger case. 153 Some circuits cling to the abstract
coercive-remedial distinction because the principal holding in Younger
originally compelled federal abstention only in state criminal proceed-
ings.154 As Judge Ebel described it, "The Younger doctrine originated in
concerns that federal plaintiffs might stymie state coercive proceedings
by bringing suit in the federal courts." 155 Under this line of reasoning, it
is argued that no other type of legal proceeding embodies the coercive
nature of governmental action more irrefutably than criminal proceed-
ings. 56 This viewpoint commands substantial respect, as it was even
supported by Judge Tymkovich in a portion of his dissent rejecting the
Kercado-Melendez test. 57 He stated that "the Supreme Court in Dayton
likely employed the coercive-remedial distinction to limit the extension
of Younger to those administrative proceedings-and only those admin-
istrative proceedings-that are most like Younger itself, which was a
148. Id. at 895.
149. Id. at 888-89 n.5 (majority opinion).







157. See id. at 896 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
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criminal case."' 58 With little guidance from the Court regarding the ambit
of the coercive-remedial distinction, it is certainly a tenable conclusion
for circuit judges to assume that the coercive test should turn on the pres-
ence of prosecutorial action or the immoral behavior of individuals.'
59
Further bolstering this line of reasoning is the argument put forth by
the majority in Day that Younger abstention's encroachment into civil
proceedings was originally recognized only because the civil suits in
question were "closely related to criminal statutes," and therefore coer-
cive in nature.'6 This rationale is most evident in the reasoning handed
down by the Court in Huffman, Trainor, and Moore. In Huffman, the
Court held that proceedings triggered by violation of an Ohio state nui-
sance law were "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil
cases."' 161 Likewise, in Trainor, the Court extended Younger abstention to
a civil fraud proceeding because the "state authorities also had the option
of vindicating the[] policies through criminal prosecutions."', 62 This line
of thought was also employed by the Court in Moore, where Younger
deference was applied to a civil state proceeding involving child abuse
because of its innate relationship to criminal law.' 63 Thus, it is likely that
the Court's dearth of clarification in Dayton Christian Schools spurred
the circuit courts to turn to Younger and its progeny for guidance regard-
ing the true origins of the coercive-remedial distinction, an undertaking
that has only heightened the distinction's prominence in the post-Dayton
Christian Schools era.'
64
B. The Various Coercive-Remedial Tests and Day's Modification of
Current Precedent
1. The First Circuit's Kercado-Melendez Test
The Day case is a prime resource for better understanding the mul-
tiple coercive-remedial tests currently employed by the federal courts.
Given that the coercive-remedial distinction is likely to serve as the pre-
dominate factor in determining a state administrative proceeding's com-
patibility with Younger abstention, it is important to isolate the separate
standards and their ramifications. Chief among these standards, and the
one most relevant to the disposition in Day, is the approach handed down
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., id. at 889 n.5 (majority opinion).
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979)).
161. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,
604 (1975)).
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444
(1977)).
163. Id. (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 423).
164. See id.; see also id. at 896 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
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by the First Circuit in Kercado-Melendez.'65 That case involved an edu-
cator's wrongful termination claim that culminated in the plaintiff's elec-
tion to file a § 1983 action instead of pursuing available state administra-
tive remedies.' 66 The School Board argued that Younger and Dayton
Christian Schools compelled federal abstention.' 67 The First Circuit ulti-
mately rejected the argument for two primary reasons grounded on in-
herent differences between Patsy and Dayton Christian Schools. First,
the court held that Younger abstention was not applicable in this situation
because, similar to Patsy, the claim in question was not obligatory but
initiated voluntarily by the plaintiff.168 Second, the court opined that "[i]n
Patsy and cases like it, abstention was unnecessary because the federal
plaintiffs did not allege injury arising from, or seek relief directed to, an
ongoing state proceeding." 69 Because the plaintiff was contesting the
legality of actions taken by the state, and not conduct related to the state
proceedings, the state interest component of Younger abstention was
"severely diminished."' 7 °
The majority in Day adopted the Kercado-Melendez approach of
scrutinizing the coercive-remedial distinction through the lens of the
initiating entity. 71 In addition to the arguments put forth by Judge Tym-
kovich's dissent in Day,172 the implications of the First Circuit's test
might also undermine the traditional principles of Younger-Dayton
Christian Schools by further constraining the autonomy of state adminis-
trative proceedings. Considering that one of the fundamental aims of the
Younger abstention was to secure a system in which "[s]tates and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa-
rate ways,"' 173 the Kercado-Melendez approach seems to unnecessarily
invite federal jurisdiction into essentially coercive cases solely because
the state was not the initiating party. 174 That is, a whole class of state
administrative proceedings with criminal underpinnings could be heard
in federal court merely because a non-governmental individual or or-
ganization filed the complaint. In this scenario, an individual filing a
"remedial" claim similar in scope to Trainor or Moore, hinging on a civil
claim with criminal parallels (such as child abuse or fraud), possesses the
authority to litigate solely in federal court and shut out state participation
165. See id. at 890 (majority opinion) (citing Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d
255 (1st Cir. 1987)) ("The First Circuit has provided the clearest guidance as to how to decide
whether a state administrative proceeding is coercive or remedial.").
166. Kercado-Melendez, 829 F.2d at 257-58.
167. Id. at 258-59.
168. Id. at 260.
169. Id. at 260-61.
170. Id. at 261.
171. See Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 893 (10th Cir. 2009).
172. See id. at 896 (Tymkovich, J. dissenting).
173. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
174. See Day, 555 F.3d at 897 (Tymkovich, J. dissenting) ("The question we must therefore
ask is whether administrative proceedings represent state enforcement efforts-regardless of who
initiates them.").
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altogether. In doing so, the First Circuit's approach to the coercive-
remedial distinction carves out a substantial role for federal courts to
adjudicate the merits of at least some state administrative proceedings, a
number of which could involve important state interests.
2. The "Bad Act" Test
The second test employed by the Day court is examining whether or
not the federal plaintiff committed a "bad act."' 75 Specifically, the test
first seeks to unearth whether "the federal plaintiff has committed an
alleged bad act," and if so, "then the state proceeding initiated to punish
the plaintiff' is deemed coercive, effectively requiring federal abstention
under Younger.176 As noted in the Day dissent, this test centers "on the
underlying nature and substance of the administrative proceeding[],"
standing in direct contrast to the Kercado-Melendez test. 177 As discussed
in Part II.B, the "bad act" test is the test other circuits most commonly
used to unravel the coercive-remedial quandary. 78 The test has been
employed by the Third Circuit in O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia,79 the
Fourth Circuit in Moore v. City of Asheville180 and Laurel Sand & Gra-
vel, Inc. v. Wilson,18 1 and the Seventh Circuit in Majors v. Engel-
brecht.182 The majority in Day captured the core reasoning of these cases,
opining that:
Each of these cases addressed state administrative enforcement
proceedings; that is, each originated with the state's proactive en-
forcement of its laws (horse training regulations, noise ordinances,
parking ticket procedures, and licensing laws for the nursing profes-
sion). As such, each federal case arose out of situation where the fed-
eral plaintiff had engaged in misconduct and sought to block pro-
ceedings that would ultimately impose punishment for that miscon-
duct.
183
Echoing Judge Tymkovich's criticism of this approach, the "bad
act" test unduly demarcates the coercive proceedings to only those in
which a federal plaintiff possesses "[a]n element of subjective moral
culpability."' 84 It seems contrary to the spirit of Younger and Dayton
Christian Schools to abstain only when the federal plaintiff has commit-
ted an act with a mens rea component. After all, even the basis of the suit
against the federal plaintiff in Younger-political speech-would plausi-
175. See id. at 893 (majority opinion).
176. Id. at 891.
177. Id. at 896 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
178. See id.
179. 32 F.3d 785, 791 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1994).
180. 396 F.3d 385, 393 (4th Cir. 2005).
181. 519 F.3d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 2008).
182. 149 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 1998).
183. Day, 555 F.3d at 892.
184. Id. at 898 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
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bly be immune from the "bad act" test, as the plaintiff was originally
charged with a crime likely afforded some First Amendment protection
in the wake of Brandenburg v. Ohio.1 85 Hence, the "bad act" test appears
to overcomplicate an essentially simple concept: compliance with the
law. In keeping with analogies to the coercive nature of criminal law,
perhaps the courts would better serve the Younger ethos if they adopted a
"strict-liability" approach that commanded abstention anytime a federal
plaintiff violated the law, irrespective of individual immorality.
3. The Day Test as a Combination of Judicial Precedent
The Day majority appears to have created a third test for abstention
under Younger, although it did not admit as much. In addition to the Ker-
cado-Melendez test and the "bad act" approach, the Day majority argua-
bly formulated a new test by combining those two standards into one.'
86
While the majority expressly acknowledged that the Kercado-Melendez
approach "provided the clearest guidance as to how to decide whether a
state administrative proceeding is coercive or remedial,' 87 under the
Tenth Circuit's methodology in Day, the "bad act" test also stands as a
sentry to abstaining under Younger.188 In practice, this two-pronged for-
mula may lead to scenarios that undermine key portions of the Day ra-
tionale.
For example, suppose Director Day, in an effort to terminate Ms.
Brown's Medicaid benefits in accordance with the new Kansas statute,
was the individual who originally initiated the proceeding against Ms.
Brown. Had that been the case, under the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, the
underlying nature of the proceeding would be classified as coercive, thus
requiring Younger deference. Yet, considering nothing in this altered fact
pattern fundamentally modified Ms. Brown's own actions, the court
would be hard-pressed to assert any other holding contrary to the actual
disposition in Day, and thereby conclude that Ms. Brown "committed no
cognizable bad act."189 Accordingly, under the second prong of the Day
test, the proceeding would be characterized as remedial.
Conversely, assume that Ms. Brown was the initiating party-as she
was-to contest an HPF decision terminating her Medicaid benefits.
Now suppose further, in arguendo, that the HPF's basis for termination
was not an alteration in the Kansas statute, but merely evidence suggest-
ing Ms. Brown committed insurance fraud vis-A-vis the state Medicaid
185. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (197 1) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969)) (noting that while the Court's decision did not turn on the constitutionality of Califor-
nia's criminal syndicalism, the Supreme Court has held criminal syndicalism statutes that forbid or
punish mere advocacy of violence unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
thereby overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)).
186. See Day, 555 F.3d at 893.
187. Id. at 890.
188. See id. at 893.
189. Id.
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program. If the HPF terminated the benefits immediately and gave Ms.
Brown only notice and the opportunity to be heard, the state would force
Ms. Brown to be the initiating party if any proceeding were to be held.
Under the two-pronged test in Day, this framework would create a situa-
tion where the federal plaintiff committed an alleged "bad act," inviting
Younger deference, even though the underlying nature of the proceeding
is designated "remedial," which effectively encourages the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.
The foregoing examples demonstrate the inherent conflict that could
possibly arise when both the Kercado-Melendez and "bad act" tests are
used in tandem. While the facts of Day did not involve a situation capa-
ble of creating a "perfect storm" of contradiction, the vast legions of state
administrative claims are bound to produce some such result eventually.
Consequently, it would be advisable for courts confronting the coercive-
remedial distinction as an issue of first impression to be mindful of the
discordant results that might ensue when both tests are utilized simulta-
neously.
4. The Coercive-Remedial Distinction and the Importance of Ve-
nue
Even without determining the positive or negative implications of
each test, an aggregate analysis of all the varying coercive-remedial
standards leads to one definitive conclusion: when attempting to either
quash or achieve Younger deference for a state administrative proceed-
ing, venue matters.' 90 It is clear that the outcome of a Younger claim
turns on the circuit in which it is brought. For instance, the party initiat-
ing the claim may carry less weight in the eyes of the Fourth Circuit,' 9 '
but could be the dispositive factor in the First and Tenth Circuits., 92 As
such, until the Supreme Court reconciles the competing standards, venue
may be the best barometer of whether or not federal courts will abstain
under Younger.
C. State Activity and State Interest as the True Custodian of Younger
Deference
The tendency of the circuit courts to dwell on the coercive-remedial
distinction, while certainly important, neglects other key factors that fur-
ther elucidate whether Younger abstention is proper or not. These alter-
nate factors embody the other two abstention prongs referenced by the
Court in Dayton Christian Schools: whether the state proceeding (1) be-





gan before substantial advancement in the federal action, and (2) in-
volved important state interest.193
First, differentiating Patsy and Dayton Christian Schools solely
through the coercive-remedial distinction does not adequately distin-
guish Patsy as a case centering on § 1983 exhaustion instead of Younger
abstention. 94 When understood in this context, the main contrast be-
tween the two cases appears not to be grounded on coercion, but the
presence of state action. Second, while the Tenth Circuit did not directly
confront the state interest prong in Day, the majority suggested in dicta
that even if the first two prongs were met, the state interest requirement
might be preempted by the federal interest in enforcing Medicaid laws.195
Though the merits of this assertion are certainly open to debate, at the
very least the majority's dicta represents the looming quandaries the
courts will face in sorting out notions of federalism in the state-interest
prong.
1. Patsy and Dayton Christian Schools: The Importance of State In-
terest
To adequately understand the importance of the state interest prong,
it is crucial to analyze the facts and rationale of the Patsy and Dayton
Christian Schools cases more closely. The Patsy case revolved around a
Florida International University ("FIU") employee who asserted that FIU
"denied her employment opportunities solely on the basis of her race and
sex."' 196 She filed a § 1983 claim in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well
as damages in the alternative.' 97 In response, the FlU Board of Regents
filed a "motion to dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available
administrative remedies."' 98 The essence of the Board of Regents' argu-
ment was that, even though neither party initiated a state proceeding, the
plaintiff should be barred from federal review until she had exhausted all
remedies available via state administrative proceedings. 99 On that ac-
count, the underlying issue in Patsy was not whether or not the federal
court should abstain, but if the federal plaintiff should exhaust available
state administrative remedies z.20 All the same, however, there was no
193. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 n.2 (1986).
194. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fa., 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982) ("This case presents the
question whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.").
195. See Day, 555 F.3d at 894 n. 10.
196. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 498.
197. Id. at 498-99.
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pending or ongoing state administrative proceeding present in Patsy,
only the prospect that the plaintiff could commence one as a remedy.
20 1
Ultimately the Supreme Court rejected the Board of Regents' claim
due to the unique legislative history of § 1983, which according to the
Court, was designed as a mechanism to ensure the Civil Rights Act of
1871 "'open[ed] the doors of the United States courts' to individuals who
were threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. 202 On these historical grounds, the Court held that peti-
tioner's § 1983 claim could proceed because "policy considerations
alone cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is
consistent with congressional intent. '20 3 Thus, while implications for
federal abstention were certainly at stake, the underlying issue in Patsy
was narrowly focused on the exhaustible capability of § 1983, and not
whether there was an ongoing proceeding with sufficient state interest to
trigger Younger treatment.
2°4
On the other hand, in Dayton Christian Schools, the facts and tim-
ing surrounding the federal claim were much more conducive to Younger
deference. The plaintiff was a teacher who alleged that her employer,
Dayton Christian Schools, a private nonprofit organization providing
elementary and secondary education, wrongfully refused to renew her
contract because she was pregnant. 20 5 Upon receiving a letter from the
plaintiff's lawyer threatening litigation unless she was reinstated at the
school, Dayton immediately terminated her.206 In response, the plaintiff
filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission on grounds that
Dayton's conduct "constituted sex discrimination" in violation of Ohio
state law.20 7
The Commission commenced a preliminary investigation and in-
formed Dayton that failure to consider a settlement would lead to formal
adjudication.20 8 After concluding that there was probable cause that the
plaintiff was wrongfully terminated, the Commission "sent Dayton a
proposed Conciliation Agreement and Consent Order that would have
required Dayton to reinstate" the plaintiff.2°9 The consent order was con-
ditional, carrying with it the specter of formal proceedings if rejected.
2 ,0
Dayton did not agree to the consent order and the Commission initiated
formal proceedings. 21 Because Dayton's employment policies were
201. See id. at 498-99.
202. Id. at 504 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., I st Sess. 376 (1871)).
203. Id. at 513.
204. See id. at 498.
205. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 622-24 (1986).
206. Id. at 623.







promulgated in accordance with their religious beliefs, Dayton filed a
§ 1983 claim in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio seeking to halt the state proceeding, arguing that "any imposition
of sanctions for Dayton's nonrenewal or termination decisions would
violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." 212 In reply, the
Commission contended that the district court "should refrain from en-
joining the administrative proceedings based on federal abstention doc-
trines. 21 3 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, observed that "concern for comity and federal-
ism is equally applicable to certain other pending state proceedings, 214
and that the case law mandating abstention in criminal and civil proceed-
ings "govern the present" state administrative proceedings as well. 21 5 As
justification for extending Younger deference to the Commission's pro-
ceedings, the Court specified that "the elimination of prohibited sex dis-
crimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the present
case within the ambit of the cited authorities" and that the Commission
would provide Dayton with "an adequate opportunity to raise its consti-
tutional claims. 21 6
When analyzed in this comparative light, Patsy and Dayton Chris-
tian Schools demonstrate a fundamental difference that reflects a more
comprehensive justification regulating Younger abstention than the coer-
cive-remedial approach. The absence of Younger abstention in Patsy can
be more readily explained by the conspicuous lack of state activity con-
cerning the underlying dispute, a fact precluding Younger deference re-
gardless of possible coercive and remedial dividing lines. 217 While there
is no doubt that the plaintiff initiated the § 1983 claim in Patsy, deeming
it remedial under current tests, the federal courts in Patsy possessed the
ability to abstain only in a vacuum, due to a complete dearth of state ac-
tivity regarding the original suit.2t 8 To the contrary, in Dayton Christian
Schools, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission expended substantial time
and resources on the wrongful termination claim before the § 1983 action
was commenced. 219 Notwithstanding differences in the coercive-
remedial distinctions, the Dayton Christian Schools Court had both the
advantage and capability to defer to an existing state proceeding in a fa-
shion that coincided with the Younger rationale of "Our Federalism.
220
212. Id. at 624-25.
213. Id. at 625.
214. Id. at 627.
215. Id. at 628.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 627 n.2.
218. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Ha., 457 U.S. 496, 498-500 (1982).
219. See Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 623-24.
220. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("The concept does not mean blind defer-
ence to 'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue
in our National Government and its courts.").
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In Younger, the Supreme Court relied on "Our Federalism" and
comity between state and federal government as the impetus for vindicat-
ing federal abstention in state proceedings. 221 While the coercive-
remedial distinction should continue to play an active role in Younger
cases, perhaps federal courts would better honor the principle of "Our
Federalism" by attempting to move away from the dubious coercive-
remedial distinction and attempt to employ the second prong of state
interest more zealously. 22 Federal courts faced with a Younger absten-
tion decision would both comport with Supreme Court precedent and
ease their own burden if they initially analyzed the degree of state time,
resources, and energy devoted to a given proceeding when considering
whether or not the federal court should exercise jurisdiction. Certainly, if
the Day court had not been so squarely boxed into the coercive-remedial
distinction, the Tenth Circuit would have been able to probe into the
HPF's activities and more accurately resolve the propriety of Younger
deference.
2. Medicaid and the State-Interest Prong
Because the Day majority decided the case based on the coercive-
remedial distinction, the third prong of Younger abstention-whether the
state proceeding entails a sufficient state interest-was not officially
223considered in the majority opinion. However, in dicta, Judge Ebel
hinted at an interpretation that considered the third prong against compet-
224
ing state and federal interests in the Medicaid program. Specifically,
Judge Ebel rendered the following analysis:
The district court held that the "third requirement of Younger is
met because important state interests are implicated in this case."
Specifically, the court noted the state's interest in "[p]rotecting the
fiscal integrity of public assistance programs" and in "construing
state statutes with regard to federal law challenges to those statutes."
However, the court did not mention the obvious federal interest in
ensuring that Kansas does not enact and enforce laws that contravene
the Medicaid federal-state covenant. Given that Congress created the
Medicaid program as a cooperative federal-state endeavor, it would
be peculiar to hold that a state's handling of Medicaid issues is a
"matter[] which traditionally look[s] to state law for their resolution
or implicate[s] separately articulated state policies." Therefore, this




222. See Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 627 n.2.
223. See Brown ex reL Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 894 n.lO (10th Cir. 2009).
224. See id.
225. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1992)).
692 [Vol. 87:3
BROWN V. DAY
This language reveals the possibility that courts will disagree about
the state interest prong when considering federal legislation administered
in conjunction with the states.226 Joint federal and state ventures, such as
the Medicaid program,227 invite further confusion into the Younger anal-
ysis by clouding the level of state interest necessary to abstain. As an
example, under a pro-Younger argument, the Tenth Circuit in Day
usurped congressional authority conferred to Kansas and precluded Kan-
sas state courts from defining the contours of their state Medicaid stat-
utes.228 On the other hand, an argument in support of Judge Ebel's dicta
might suggest that the source of all state authority over Medicaid flows
from Congress, and as such, the federal interest in Medicaid administra-
tion supersedes any local considerations.
While both arguments are persuasive, perhaps Congress should step
in to clarify any looming uncertainty. Otherwise, the resolution of the
state interest prong regarding complicated state and federal programs
will ultimately fall to the courts. Congress is better equipped than the
federal courts to set guidelines for abstention in joint state and federal
ventures, because its authority over Medicaid regulation is supreme and
its knowledge of local administrative considerations can factor into craft-
ing a solution that comports with both state and federal interests.
CONCLUSION
In Brown v. Day, the Tenth Circuit joined the First Circuit in hold-
ing that Younger abstention is not applicable to state administrative hear-
ings designated "remedial" in nature. According to the Tenth Circuit,
Younger abstention-a judicially created mechanism that prohibits fed-
eral jurisdiction over ongoing state proceedings-is tenable only when a
state initiates the proceedings in question or the federal plaintiff has
committed an alleged "bad act."
This approach to the coercive-remedial distinction will likely create
more confusion in the future than it will alleviate. Conflicting results
follow from both tests and more important indicators of abstention, such
as state activity and interests, are lost in the process. Nonetheless, the
new test adopted by the Tenth Circuit to decipher remedial and coercive
administrative proceedings offers a new blueprint for western district
courts considering the applicability of Younger. At the very least, there is
now some guidance in place for district courts attempting to wade
through the difficult interpretive issues accompanying Younger absten-
tion.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 893. Under the Medicaid program, the federal government provides states with
"financial assistance" to deliver health care services for the needy. Id. at 885. So long as the states
administer their health care service programs "in compliance with federal statutory and regulatory
requirements," states can continue to receive federal funds indefinitely. Id.
228. See id. at 894 n. 10.
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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: THE OPERATION OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
It's not every day we overturn a state jury verdict for first-degree
murder when the defendant admits he received a fair trial and no one
questions that his conviction is supported by overwhelming evidence.
It's not every day that we exacerbate a split of authority over the
recognition of a new constitutional right, and do so despite warning
signs from the Supreme Court against our course. And it's not every
day we refuse to rehear a panel decision that every single state with-
in our jurisdiction has urged us to revisit. Today we do all these
things .... I
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that a defendant has counsel present at all critical stages of the criminal
2procedure. The Supreme Court has made clear that plea bargaining is
one of these critical stages; therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel applies to representation during the plea
bargaining process. 3 In addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly em-
phasized that the right to effective assistance of counsel serves the pur-
pose of protecting the right to a fair trial.4 Generally, these doctrines co-
exist in the analysis of a Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.5 However, because the increased use of plea bargaining
has largely circumvented the need for a full-fledged trial, an unnerving
tension has developed between these fundamental principles-the right
to counsel during plea bargaining and the Sixth Amendment's purpose of
ensuring a fair trial. In the ordinary Sixth Amendment challenge to plea
bargaining, the petitioner argues that as a result of deficient counsel he
did not get a fair trial; and, as a consequence, his resulting conviction is
unlawful.6 The problem that arises, and the question that was recently
presented to United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Wil-
liams v. Jones (Williams IJ),7 is "[w]hat, if any, remedy should be pro-
1. Williams v. Jones (Williams 1ff), 583 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
2. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) (citing United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218,227-28 (1967)).
3. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
4. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (holding that the "ight
to ... effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it
has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial").
5. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59 (1985).
6. See Williams v. Jones (Williams II), 571 F.3d 1086, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
7. 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009).
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vided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotia-
tions if the petitioner was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to a fair
trial ?,
8
There are very few principles within American jurisprudence that
resonate stronger than that stated in Marbury v. Madison9: for every vio-
lation of a right, there must be a remedy.' ° Nonetheless, constitutional
law scholars recognize that in reality, the law of remedies is "inevitably
'a jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is lost between declaring a right
and implementing a remedy.""' While full remediation remains the
ideal, the current constitutional landscape gives rise to a prominent right-
remedy gap.12 This right-remedy gap demands compromise in the mod-
em criminal justice system rather than adherence to strict constitutional
remediation. Remedy requirements should only be bound by "a general
structure of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government within
the bounds of law."' 3 This Comment will illustrate that in the context of
plea bargaining, a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel has the potential to exacerbate the right-remedy gap. The peti-
tioner in Williams II was ultimately successful on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, yet the Tenth Circuit found that "[iln the end, no
remedy may restore completely the parties' original positions."' 4 The
question remains whether, and to what extent, plea bargaining is one
such instance where a Sixth Amendment violation can be adequately
remedied.
Through an in-depth analysis of case law involving the Sixth
Amendment, as well as the Tenth Circuit's decision in Williams II and
the ensuing circuit split, this Comment demonstrates that neither the con-
8. Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 1008, 1008 (2007) (directing parties to brief and argue this
question), vacated as moot, 552 U.S. 117 (2008) (petitioner abandoned ineffective assistance of
counsel claim). See Williams 11, 571 F.3d at 1088 (addressing "whether, having determined that Mr.
Williams received ineffective assistance of counsel in rejecting a plea offer, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals ("OCCA") fashioned a constitutionally permissible remedy") (per curiam); see
also infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
9. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
10. See id. at 147.
11. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 87
(1999) (quoting Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983)).
12. See Jeffries, supra note 1I, at 88-90 (arguing that the doctrine of qualified immunity
increases the right remedy-gap because the plaintiff has limited capacity to receive a remedy that is
equivalent to the alleged constitutional violation); see also Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that "harmless error, alone among these
doctrines, has the capacity to make the separation of rights from remedies permanent"). The fight-
remedy gap is further exacerbated by the interplay between judicial interpretation and state or con-
gressional legislation. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1552-53 (1972) ("[Wlhere the judiciary independently infers reme-
dies directly from constitutional provisions, Congress may legislate an alternative remedial scheme
which it considers equally effective in enforcing the Constitution and which the Court, in the process
of judicial review, deems an adequate substitute for the displaced remedy.").
13. See Jeffries, supra note I1, at 88 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991)).
14. Williams v. Jones (Williams II), 571 F.3d 1086, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009).
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stitutional right of effective assistance of counsel in the context of plea
bargaining nor its appropriate constitutional remedy has been clearly
defined. Naturally, the adequacy of the imposed remedy "cannot be eva-
luated without first determining the scope, if any, of the constitutional
violation."' 5 This Comment argues that the lack of clarity as to Sixth
Amendment rights and remedies arises because of the inexorable pres-
ence and influence of plea bargaining in the contemporary criminal proc-
ess. First, this Comment demonstrates that the nature of plea bargaining
within our adversarial system of justice has cultivated an often over-
looked but dangerously influential dynamic: strategic overcharging.
6
Second, this Comment argues that, in a system where plea bargaining is
encouraged and overcharging is commonplace, a defendant's rejection of
a plea due to deficient counsel has the potential to produce fundamen-
tally unfair results for the defendant. To wit, the defendant may still suf-
fer prejudice notwithstanding a subsequent fair trial. The role and influ-
ence of plea bargaining has made a significant impact upon the modem
landscape of constitutional criminal procedure such that it is necessary
for the Supreme Court to revisit to what extent the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel applies during plea bargaining.
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I recounts the history of
U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing the scope of the Sixth Amendment
to provide the context within which the Tenth Circuit's decision in Wil-
liams II emerged. Part II discusses a defendant's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. Additionally, Part II addresses a peti-
tioner's burden in proving a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights as
set forth by the two-part Strickland test, which requires the petitioner to
prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Part II also contrasts the
Williams II decision with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States
v. Springs'7 in order to exemplify the larger body of case law in which
courts are struggling with the application and interpretation of Strick-
land's prejudice element in the context of plea bargaining. Part H argues
the ubiquity of plea bargaining and the prevalence of overcharging in
contemporary criminal prosecution suggest that even if a petitioner re-
ceives a fair and impartial trial, he can still be prejudiced by deficient
counsel during the plea bargaining process. Part TV then addresses the
various constitutional remedies employed by circuit courts for Sixth
15. Id. at 1095 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
16. Strategic overcharging is a prosecutorial tool used to charge one criminal act under over-
lapping and multiple charges for the purpose of inducing a guilty plea. See Jacqueline E. Ross, The
Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717,
728 (2006). There are two types of overcharging: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal charging occurs
when the public prosecutor charges the alleged criminal with multiple counts of the same or similar
offense. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings,
82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1254 (2008). Vertical overcharging takes place when a prosecutor charges the
defendant with an offense higher than the accumulation of evidence may reasonably support. Id. at
1254-55.
17. 988 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Amendment violations in the context of plea bargaining, and suggests
that the most judicious remedy is to simply reinstate the original plea
offer. Finally, this Comment concludes the Supreme Court must clarify
the indeterminate nature of the law governing the rights and remedies
under the Sixth Amendment by revisiting the issue with particular em-
phasis on plea bargaining.
I. U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: THE SCOPE OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
The U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial through the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 8 The basic elements of a
fair trial are defined through several provisions of the Sixth Amendment,
including the Counsel Clause:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence.
19
In McMann v. Richardson,20 the Supreme Court interpreted the
Sixth Amendment and determined that "the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel."'2 As a consequence, "effective assistance
of counsel" has been the key language and touchstone justification for a
Sixth Amendment challenge to effective counsel. It was not until
Strickland v. Washington,23 fourteen years later, that the Supreme Court
assessed the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel and its
role in ensuring the fundamental right to a fair trial.24
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases Interpreting the Right to Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel
1. Strickland v. Washington
In Strickland, the Court recognized that "[t]he right to counsel plays
a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amend-
ment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to ac-
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
20. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
21. Id. at 771 n. 14 (emphasis added).
22. See id. at 771; see also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45,57 (1932).
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. Id. at 684.
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cord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecu-
tion.' 25 Thus, in articulating the breadth of the Sixth Amendment, the
Supreme Court established a two-prong test for evaluating a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.26
In order to assert a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, the petitioner must prove (1) counsel's per-
formance was deficient and (2) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a re-
sult of counsel's deficient performance. 27 With respect to the first prong,
the appropriate standard for determining attorney performance is that of
"reasonably effective assistance. 28 This standard is objective, and there
is a strong presumption that counsel's performance is reasonable. Indeed,
courts will presume that counsel's challenged conduct "might be consid-
ered sound trial strategy., 2 9 According to the Court, deferential treatment
of counsel's performance enables a fair assessment of attorney conduct
that "eliminate[s] the distorting effects of hindsight" and allows the
Court to "evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.,
30
The second prong of the Strickland test requires the petitioner to
demonstrate that the deficiencies in counsel's conduct resulted in preju-
dice to his defense.31 The Court made clear that "[t]he defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.
32
2. Hill v. Lockhart
Strickland marked the first time the Court articulated a clear test to
determine the constitutionality of a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, the Court had occasion to revisit
the Strickland test just a year later in Hill v. Lockhart.33 There, the peti-
tioner pled guilty to charges of theft and first-degree murder. 34 Two years
after his conviction, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that his "court-appointed
attorney had failed to advise him that, as a second offender, he was re-
quired to serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for
parole., 35 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
two-part standard adopted in Strickland applied to a claim of ineffective
25. Id. at 685 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)).
26. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
30. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
31. Id. at 692.
32. Id. at 694 (holding that "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome").
33. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id.
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assistance of counsel when the petitioner alleged incompetent advice of
counsel during plea-bargaining, and if so, whether the petitioner satisfied
this test.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit,
concluding not only that the Strickland test applies to challenges of
guilty pleas under the Sixth Amendment, but also that the petitioner
failed to meet his burden of proving prejudice from the alleged deficient
performance.37 Though the Court applied the Strickland test, it promul-
gated a slightly modified and exacting analysis for Sixth Amendment
challenges in the context of plea-bargaining.
38
Under Hill, the petitioner must still prove that counsel's perform-
ance was deficient as compared to a reasonable and competent attorney
under prevailing professional norms. 39 However, in order to satisfy
Strickland's second prong, the petitioner "must show that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."40 Following
case precedent, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he longstanding test for
determining the validity of a guilty plea is 'whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant."' 4' Thus, in Hill, the Court determined that when
counsel's advice or conduct falls outside of "the range of competence
,,42demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and when "counsel's consti-
tutionally ineffective performance affect[s] the outcome of the plea proc-
ess," guilty pleas can be considered involuntary.43
The Supreme Court's recognition and evaluation of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has not been ex-
plored for its own sake, "but because of the effect it has on the ability of
the accused to receive a fair trial."'44 In fact, the Court makes clear that a
"plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in
itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other
constitutionally protected interest. 4 5 It is the subsequent guilty plea as
36. Id. at 53-55.
37. Id. at 53, 58.
38. Id. at 59.
39. See id. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
40. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The Court in Hill noted that "several courts of appeals have adopted
this general approach." Id. at 59 n.** (citing Thomas v. Lockhart, 738 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir.
1984)).
41. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)); see also
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493
(1962).
42. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
43. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
44. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
45. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984). A cursory look at the United States Consti-
tution seems to lend a potential source of law that would guarantee a defendant legal entitlement to
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embodied in a judgment of the court that leads to a defendant's convic-
tion and which may potentially give rise to a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.46
B. The Tenth Circuit Addresses the Right to Counsel in Williams H
In Williams II, petitioner-appellant Michael Williams was arrested
and charged with first-degree murder.47 Concerned about a lack of suffi-
cient evidence on the eve of the trial, the assistant district attorney of-
fered Williams a ten-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea to first-
degree murder.48 Williams expressed his desire to accept the plea; how-
ever, his attorney threatened to withdraw from the case and force Wil-
liams to retain new counsel if Williams accepted the plea offer.49 The
case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Williams guilty of first-degree
murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole.50
In reviewing Williams's subsequent ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA") found
accept or reject a pre-trial plea offer, namely, the Due Process Clause. See Williams v. Jones (Wil-
liams 1ff), 583 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. amend. V;
see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992). However, the Supreme Court has declined
to apply the Due Process Clause in order to essentially draft a new and unenumerated constitutional
right. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 443. This is because in the realm of criminal law, the framers of the
Constitution "have defined the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very nar-
rowly based on the recognition that, 'lb]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation."' Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Furthermore, it is clear from case precedent that the Supreme Court has consistently held
that crime prevention as well as criminal prosecution are police powers; these are state powers not to
be infringed by the Federal Government. See id. at 445. Thus, state criminal procedures, convictions,
and sentencings will not be held to offend the Due Process Clause unless they "offend[ ] some prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal." Id. As a result, it seems the plea process has successfully circumvented the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Mabry, 467 U.S. at 511 (noting that the Due Process
Clause "is not a code of ethics for prosecutors; its concern is with the manner in which persons are
deprived of their liberty").
46. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507-08.
47. See Willians II, 571 F.3d, 1086, 1088 (10th Cir .2009).
48. Williams v. Jones (Williams 1), No. CIV-03-201-RAW, 2006 WL 2662795, at *10 (E.D.
Okla. Sept. 14, 2006), rev'd, 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009).
49. Willias I1, 571 F.3d at 1088; infra note 69 and accompanying text.
50. Willias I1, 571 F.3d at 1088. Mr. Williams conceded that he had a fair trial. Willias Ill,
583 F.3d at 1256 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The government had a very compelling argument and
produced overwhelming evidence of Williams's guilt, such that the jury unanimously reached a
guilty verdict. Id. at 1257. The evidence in summation is as follows:
In 1997, someone entered the home of Larry and Dolores Durrett with a gun. The gun-
man shot Mr. Durrett three times in his sleep, and twice more when the victim tried to
pursue him. Mr. Durrett later died of his wounds. During a routine traffic stop the next
day, police discovered Mr. Williams and his girlfriend, Debra Smith, with packed suit-
cases and a rifle matching the shell casings left at the Durrett's home. At trial, several
witnesses reported hearing Mr. Williams threaten to kill Mr. Durrett over a botched drug
deal. Evidence also revealed that Mr. Williams's friend and eventual co-defendant, Stacy
Pearce, drove Mr. Williams to the Durretts's home the day of the murder and watched
Mr. Williams exit the car with a gun in hand. Mr. Pearce testified that when Mr. Williams
returned to the car he confessed to shooting Mr. Durrett. Ms. Smith also testified that Mr.
Williams confessed to her that he killed Mr. Durrett.
Id. at 1257 n.2.
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Williams's counsel was deficient, and that Williams was prejudiced as a
result of his deficient counsel due to the lost opportunity to pursue the
plea offer.5' To remedy the violation of Williams's Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, the OCCA modified his sentence
to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.52 Williams then filed a
habeas corpus 53 petition in federal district court challenging the OCCA's
modified sentence and requesting either reinstatement of the ten-year
plea or a new trial.54 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma denied the petition, and Williams appealed to the
Tenth Circuit.
55
The Tenth Circuit granted a "certificate of appealability, '56 but only
agreed to address whether the OCCA imposed a constitutionally ade-
quate remedy.57 The court held that the modified sentence (life impris-
onment with the possibility of parole) was not an appropriate constitu-
tional remedy. 58 Thus, it reversed and remanded with orders that the dis-
trict court "impose a remedy that comes as close as possible to remedy-
ing the constitutional violation, and is not limited by state law."59
Williams II is part of a larger body of case law in which courts are
struggling with the application of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining.60 In Williams 11, the Tenth
Circuit minimized the fact that its decision not only created a circuit
51. Williams II, 571 F.3d at 1088.
52. Id.
53. The district court has the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus conditionally as "law and
justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). As part of this discretion, a habeas petition may be denied
on the merits despite a failure to exhaust all remedies. Id. § 2254(b)(2). However, in order to grant a
habeas petition, the petitioner must have exhausted all available state remedies, unless an exception
to exhaustion applies. See id. § 2254(b)(1). Although a state may waive exhaustion, it is required that
such a waiver must be express and made through counsel. Id. § 2254(b)(3). In this case, Williams
appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. Williams II, 571 F.3d at 1088. The
Court of Appeals reviews a district court's legal analysis in a habeas proceeding de novo. Id. at 1089.
54. Williams II, 571 F.3d at 1088-89.
55. Id. at 1088.
56. "Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be
taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the deten-
tion complained of arises out of process issued by a State court... " 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l)(A)
(2006). Furthermore, a certificate of appealability may only be issued "if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. § 2253(c)(2).
57. Williams II, 571 F.3d at 1088.
58. See id. at 1090.
59. Id. at 1093-94.
60. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (holding that in the con-
text of Sixth Amendment choice of counsel cases, effective assistance serves the purpose of protect-
ing the right to a fair trial); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59 (1985) (extending the two-prong
test for deficient performance and prejudice to the context of plea bargains); Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing the general rule that a defendant may prevail on an
ineffective assistance claim by demonstrating deficient performance and prejudice); Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1977) (holding that a lost opportunity to pursue a negotiated plea was
of no significance because the defendant was not denied a fair trial); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (holding that federal habeas relief is not available after a guilty plea based on a




split, but was "inarguably in conflict with the decisions of various state
courts ' 6 1 with respect to both constitutional issues underlying a Sixth
Amendment challenge: (1) whether there is a constitutional right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel in the context of plea bargaining when the
petitioner receives a subsequent fair trial; and (2) in the event that there
is a violation of such a constitutional right, What is the appropriate con-
stitutional remedy? Parts II and IV discuss these unanswered questions.
Part III introduces the prosecutorial tool of overcharging and demon-
strates that the constitutional rights and remedies associated with the
right to counsel at plea bargaining can only be thoroughly and absolutely
resolved through consideration of the impact overcharging has on the
pre-trial plea process.
1I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The Strickland test requires a showing of both deficient perform-
ance and prejudice to the petitioner.62 Although deficient performance is
the primary issue in many cases, this Part only briefly discusses the first
prong because it is largely uncontested in the Tenth and Seventh Circuit
cases that reflect the prevailing approaches to claims of ineffectiveness
during plea bargaining.63 Where the defendant received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel at plea bargaining, the circuits are split as to whether a
subsequent fair trial vitiates a claim of ineffectiveness or whether a de-
fendant can be sufficiently prejudiced due to the lost opportunity to ac-
cept a plea bargain. 64 The Tenth Circuit has held that a defendant may
still be prejudiced notwithstanding a subsequent fair trial.65 By contrast,
the Seventh Circuit has held that a subsequent fair trial vitiates any claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining.
66
61. Williams v. Jones (Williams II1), 583 F.3d 1254, 1258 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
62. Supra Part I; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). There is, however,
an exception to the Strickland two-part test, in which prejudice may be presumed on certain occa-
sions. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984). Under the standard discussed in
Cronic, prejudice may be presumed when "circumstances [exist] that are so likely to prejudice the
accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Id. at 658. One
circumstance warranting a presumption of prejudice is if the defendant is completely denied counsel;
that is, when counsel is either altogether absent or in some way prevented from assisting the defen-
dant during a critical stage of the adversarial proceeding. Id. at 659. The exception discussed in
Cronic is not applicable to Williams's case, nor to the discussion presented in this Comment. See
Williams II, 571 F.3d at 1090 (approving the district court's application of the Strickland two-part
test).
63. Because both prongs are necessary elements, however, failure to satisfy either element
will defeat an ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
64. Compare Williams 11, 571 F.3d at 1091, with United States v. Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749
(7th Cir. 1993).
65. Williams 11, 571 F.3d at 1091.
66. See Springs, 988 F.2d at 749.
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A. Strickland's First Prong: Deficient Counsel
In Williams H, it was uncontested that Williams received deficient
counsel during plea bargaining. 67 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
OCCA's finding of deficient performance on the factual basis that coun-
sel insisted that Williams take his case to trial or retain new counsel.68
Williams's attorney testified that:
If he maintained his innocence to me that he were to, in fact, plead
guilty to something that he did not do, that would constitute perjury
and I would be suborning perjury and I was not prepared to, based
upon what he told me had happened regarding the night of the kill-
ing, stand next to him when he perjured himself .... The decision to
go to trial was entirely his, up to and including the day before and
during the trial the decision was his. His other option was if he
wanted to enter a plea, he was going to have to find someone else to
represent him .... 69
The Tenth Circuit found that counsel's performance-proposing an
ultimatum that Williams either reject the plea offer and go to trial, or
accept the plea and retain new counsel-fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and amounted to deficient performance under the first
prong of the Strickland test.7°
B. Strickland's Second Prong: Prejudice
In recent cases, prejudice has been the crux of claims involving in-
effective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining. The majority in Wil-
liams II affirmed the OCCA's holding that Williams satisfied both
prongs of the Strickland test.7' The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Williams
was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance because there was
a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's ineffective assistance,
Williams would have accepted the plea offer for second-degree murder
with a ten-year sentence.72 This point is uncontested by the Williams H
dissent.73 It has been conceded that ineffective assistance of counsel dur-
ing plea bargaining may cause such harm to a defendant's rights in the
adversarial process that he may clearly suffer prejudice.74 The critical
issue is whether a petitioner can demonstrate prejudice even after he re-
ceives a fair and impartial trial. On this point, the circuits are split.
67. Williams 11, 571 F.3d at 1088.
68. Id. at 1091.
69. Williams v. Jones (Williamrs I), No. CIV-03-201-RAW, 2006 WL 2662795, at *10 (E.D.
Okla. Sept. 14, 2006), rev'd, 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original).
70. Williams 11, 571 F.3d at 1090-91.
71. Id. at 1088, 1091.
72. Id.
73. See Williams 11, 571 F.3d at 1096--97 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (Utah 2007) (holding that a subse-
quentfair trial vitiates a Strickland claim for ineffective counsel during plea bargaining).
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This Comment argues that in Williams II, the Tenth Circuit cor-
rectly held that a subsequent fair trial should not vitiate a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining, but that it reached this
conclusion based on faulty reasoning.75 The Tenth Circuit alluded to the
importance of the pre-trial plea process as a part of the adversarial sys-
tem, but failed to give proper weight to the ubiquitous practice of plea
bargaining.76 On the other hand, this Comment argues the Seventh Cir-
cuit came to an incorrect conclusion. By omitting practical considera-
tions of plea bargaining and overcharging, the Seventh Circuit hastily
determined that a petitioner who receives a fair trial after rejecting a plea
due to ineffective counsel cannot demonstrate prejudice under the Sixth
Amendment.77 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the dis-
parate treatment appellate courts accord to whether a fair trial remedies a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. When
the Supreme Court accepted this precise issue for review, however, the
Court failed to remedy the unsettled substantive law because the case
was dismissed on procedural grounds. Thus, questions remain unan-
swered.
1. The Seventh Circuit's Approach: United States v. Springs
In United States v. Springs, the Seventh Circuit held that even if a
petitioner's counsel was deficient, and such performance may have ren-
dered prejudice against the petitioner, a subsequent fair trial nullifies a
claim under the Sixth Amendment. 78 In Springs, the defendant was
charged and convicted of three felonies, including extortion and attempt-
ing to possess illegal narcotics. 79 He was sentenced to 135 months in
prison.8° Prior to his conviction, the prosecution presented a plea bargain
of seventy-two months in exchange for his testimony against other mem-
bers affiliated with the same drug gang. 81 The defendant later brought a
Sixth Amendment claim asserting that his attorney did not sufficiently
insist that he accept the plea bargain prior to his conviction by trial.82 The
petitioner alleged that his counsel ineffectively advised him that a sen-
tence by judge or jury would be substantially less than seventy-two
months, and that he might not have rejected the plea bargain had he been
adequately advised.83
Notwithstanding the possibility of deficient performance, the Sev-
enth Circuit promptly dismissed the Sixth Amendment claim on the
75. Williams II, 571 F.3d at 1091.
76. See id. at 1091-92.
77. Springs, 988 F.2d at 749.
78. Springs, 988 F.2d at 749.
79. Id. at 746.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 747.
82. Id. at 748.
83. Id.
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grounds that the petitioner had no prospect of establishing prejudice un-
der the Strickland test.84 The Seventh Circuit emphasized that "[tihe
guarantee of counsel in the [S]ixth [A]mendment is designed to promote
fair trials leading to accurate determinations of guilt or innocence. '' The
court continued by suggesting that the "Constitution does not ensure that
lawyers will be good negotiators, locking in the best plea bargains avail-
able. 86 The Seventh Circuit grounded its argument on the point that de-
fendants have no substantive or procedural rights to plea bargaining and
that they have no legal entitlement to the plea process as a matter of
87law. As a result, where a fair trial was rendered, any Sixth Amendment
claim challenging pre-trial plea bargaining was necessarily void.88
2. The State Perspective: State v. Greuber89
Several states have also struggled to define the right to effective
counsel during the plea bargaining phase of the criminal process. In State
v. Greuber, the Utah Supreme Court held that "while the Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel generally applies during
the plea process, [the defendant's] rejection of the plea offer in this case
did not result in prejudice because he received a fair trial." 90 In Greuber,
the State offered the defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to murder
84. Id. at 749.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Following this line of reasoning, the dissent in Willians II reasoned that:
Mr. Williams doesn't have, and never did have, a right to the plea offer. Unless we decide
to assume control of the executive prerogatives of the State of Oklahoma and force the
prosecution to keep the offer open, the government would be free to alter or withdraw the
plea offer the moment it is extended-or even after it is accepted-for any reason, or for no
reason. The trial court, too, would be free to reject any plea. All we could guarantee Mr.
Williams at the end of the day is a new trial for first degree murder.
Williams v. Jones (Williams II), 571 F.3d 1086, 1110 (2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
88. Springs, 988 F.2d at 749. Consistent with the Seventh Circuit, the State of Delaware
recently submitted an answering brief in response to an appeal from the Superior Court of Delaware
to address whether the petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficient performance
during plea negotiations. State's Answering Brief at 21, Richardson v. State, No. 86, 2009 (Del.
Sept. 8, 2009), 2009 WL 3005572. The petitioner claimed that his counsel was deficient because he
summarily rejected a plea offer extended by the state. Id. In it's brief, the state emphasized that the
defendant was not present when the plea was offered, and that the petitioner never stated that he
would have accepted the plea were he given the opportunity to do so. Id. at 21-22. Petitioner's
counsel testified that the plea was in fact a mandatory fifty year sentence, making the offer unac-
ceptable not only because counsel believed they had a meritorious defense, but also because either
way the defendant was facing a life sentence. Id. at 22.
Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the State of Delaware hinged its argument on the point that
the petitioner is not entitled to a plea offer as a matter of law. Id. at 24. Even if all facts were in favor
of the petitioner such that he could show deficient performance at plea bargaining, the State of
Delaware argued that the Delaware Supreme Court should still dismiss that claim because the peti-
tioner, "was tried before an impartial jury; he confronted and cross-examined witnesses against him;
he was presented his own evidence; and he had the assistance of counsel. The jury unanimously
determined that Richardson committed the charged offenses .... His conviction was both just and
reliable." Id. at 27. In short, there was arguably no prejudice.
89. 165 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2007).
90. Id. at 1188.
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in exchange for dismissal of an aggravated kidnapping charge. 91 On the
advice of his attorney, the defendant rejected the offer.92 At his subse-
quent trial, the jury convicted the defendant of both murder and aggra-
vated kidnapping.93 On appeal, the petitioner claimed ineffective assis-
tance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to investigate evidence that
would have significantly favored accepting the plea bargain. 94 Affirming
the district court's holding, the Utah Supreme Court determined there
was an indispensable difference between an accepted plea offer and a
rejected plea offer, insofar as the rejected plea does not waive a defen-
dant's right to a fair trial. 95
The conflict between Greuber and Williams II is conspicuous: the
Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot ultimately be preju-
diced if provided a subsequent fair trial, whereas the Tenth Circuit held
that a defendant can still be prejudiced regardless of a subsequent fair
trial.96 As noted by the Tenth Circuit in Williams II, it is necessary to
determine the nature of the alleged violation in order to fashion a consti-
tutionally adequate remedy.97 Such an inquiry necessarily requires the
court to critically analyze every aspect of the criminal process that may
effectively prejudice a petitioner who is asserting a Sixth Amendment
right to ineffective assistance of counsel, including the plea process.
3. U.S. Supreme Court Fails to Resolve Unsettled Case Law
By denying a petition for a rehearing en banc in Williams If, the
Tenth Circuit failed to undertake a critical and judicious analysis with
respect to prejudice under the Strickland test. The Tenth Circuit side-
stepped the fact that there is a conflict among courts as to whether a fair
trial remedies a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea
bargaining, by stating that this particular issue was not within the scope
of the certificate of appealability. 98 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged
"this split in authority contributed to the Supreme Court's previous deci-
sion to grant certiorari to resolve [this specific] question."99 In 2007, in
91. Id. at 1186-87.
92. Id. at 1187.
93. Id.
94. Id. Prior to trial, prosecution made a discovery request for the recordings of Greuber's
phone conversations while he was in prison. Id. The recordings contained incriminating information;
however, Greuber's counsel did not listen to the recordings before trial. Id. Upon realization of the
contents of the recordings, counsel for Greuber made a motion for mistrial, which was denied, and
the jury found Greuber guilty of murder and aggravated kidnapping. Id.
95. Id. at 1188 (citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987)); cf Carmichael v.
People, 206 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2009) (requiring that, in order for petitioner to demonstrate preju-
dice, he must provide corroborating evidence that proves the reasonable probability that the defen-
dant would have accepted the plea offer if not for his deficient counsel).
96. Compare Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1188, with Williams v. Jones (Williams I), 571 F.3d 1086,
1091 (10th Cir. 2009).
97. Williams I, 571 F.3d at 1090, 1092.
98. See Williams III, 583 F.3d at 1255.
99. Id. at 1258.
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Arave v. Hoffman,U°° the Supreme Court directed the parties to brief and
argue the question: "What, if any, remedy should be provided for inef-
fective assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotiations if the de-
fendant was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to a fair trial?"'0' 1
Arguments and briefs were never presented to the Supreme Court for
analysis because the petitioner abandoned his claim that counsel was
ineffective during the plea process and the Court deemed the issue
moot. 102
In Mabry v. Johnson,10 3 and Weatherford v. Bursey, °4 the Supreme
Court held that a plea bargain is executory in nature such that a prosecu-
tor has the discretion to decline to make or withdraw an offer. 10 5 As the
law stands today, "[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitu-
tional significance."'06 This is the principle adhered to by the Seventh
Circuit as well as the Utah Supreme Court.'0 7 It is significant to note,
however, that the decisions in Mabry and Weatherford were rendered in
1984 and 1977 respectively.'0 8 Much has changed in the criminal process
since then, especially the role of plea bargaining1 °9 The view opposing
the Tenth Circuit argues that prejudice can only be found where deficient
performance renders fundamentally unfair results, and this unfairness
results only if counsel's deficiency deprives the defendant of a substan-
tive or procedural right to which he is entitled as a matter of law." 0 As a
determinative substantive and procedural aspect of the contemporary
criminal process, deficient performance during plea bargaining has the
capability of rendering these fundamentally unfair results.
III. THE ROLE OF PLEA BARGAINING IN CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
Plea bargaining is not merely an addendum to contemporary crimi-
nal prosecution; it is contemporary criminal prosecution.'I" In fiscal year
2004, there were an estimated 83,391 federal criminal cases." 2 A total of
100. 552 U.S. 1008 (2007), vacated as moot, 552 U.S. 117, 118 (2008).
101. Arave, 552 U.S. at 1008 (granting certiorari).
102. See Arave, 552 U.S. at 118 (vacating as moot because petitioner abandoned ineffective
assistance of counsel claim).
103. 467 U.S. 504 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1423 (2009).
104. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
105. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507; Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561.
106. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507; see also Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561.
107. United States v. Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993); State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d
1185, 1189-90 (Utah 2007).
108. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 504; Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 545.
109. Infra Part Ill.
110. Springs, 988 F.2d at 749 (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993)).
111. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1912 (1992).
112. UTILIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROIECT, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL




74,782 defendants were convicted. 13 An astonishing ninety-five percent
of all federal convictions were disposed of without a trial through the
entry of guilty pleas.' 14 Despite these statistics, the dissent in Williams H
stated, "The historical happenstance of why Mr. Williams's plea re-
mained executory is neither here nor there."' 15 This blind literalism for
the glory of trial and dismissal of plea negotiations is both the fallacy in
the dissent's opinion and the missing link in the majority's opinion.
In Williams II, the majority correctly held that a subsequent fair trial
does not vitiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context
of plea bargaining pursuant to the Sixth Amendment." 6 Nonetheless, the
majority's argument lacks a key component because it fails to address
the nature and scope of plea bargaining in the contemporary criminal
justice system. In short, the majority fails to articulate why a defendant
may still suffer prejudice even after a fair and impartial trial. An analysis
of the evolution of the plea process, as well as the modem nature of plea
bargaining, will demonstrate that the concept of overcharging is the re-
sidual inequity that has the potential to prejudice a defendant even after a
fair trial.'' 7
In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." '118 This Part
argues that plea bargaining, as a dominating power in the process of
criminal prosecution, has the influence and control to severely undermine
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. As a direct result of
overcharging, a pre-trial plea offer that is rejected as a result of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel may prejudice the defendant even if that de-
fendant receives a subsequent fair and impartial trial.
A. Plea Bargaining and Modern Criminal Prosecution
The structure of United States criminal process facilitates the ubiq-
uitous use of plea bargaining. Although plea bargaining is an indirect and
perhaps discrete power, it has become a prevalent prosecutorial tool in
the criminal justice system as a result of two significant changes in trial
practice. 119 First, an increasing number of defendants began retaining
counsel during the first half of the nineteenth century. 120 The presence of
lawyers in court who were well-versed in the law and trained in the art of
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Williams v. Jones (Williams II), 571 F.3d 1086, 1101 (2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1091 (majority opinion).
117. See infra notes 165-93 and accompanying text.
118. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
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argument elevated the adversarial nature of the criminal process. 2 ' Sec-
ond, during the second half of the nineteenth century, criminal defen-
dants were given the right to testify on their own behalf. 122 Granting de-
fendants the ability to testify in their own defense was almost certainly
for their own benefit. 23 This right to testify is intrinsically linked to the
Fifth Amendment, which guarantees that a defendant will not be forced
to incriminate herself. 24 It follows that a criminal defendant cannot be
forced to accept a guilty plea because accepting such a plea bargain is, in
essence, self-incrimination. 125 Although intended to help defendants, the
ability of defendants to testify on their own behalf-as applied to modem
trial practice-has had a limited benefit because the structure of plea
bargaining allows the prosecutor to inflate charges purely for the purpose
of inducing a guilty plea. 2 6 This overcharging not only convinces defen-
dants "that a good bargain [is] their best hope[,]" it also eliminates de-
fendants' opportunity to testify at trial. 127 Through the use of the over-
charging dynamic in the contemporary criminal process, prosecutors now
have leverage; where increased charges at trial narrow a defendant's
odds of victory, reduced charges in the pre-trial plea offer can convince a
defendant that self-incrimination may be the better option. 128 Thus, a
defendant who rejects a plea and proceeds to trial on multiple and over-
lapping charges (because of ineffective assistance of counsel) is not in
the same position as a defendant from an earlier era who was never of-
fered a plea.
These changes, among many others, have catalyzed the change to a
modern criminal process that greatly accommodates plea bargaining. The
most influential factors in the contemporary criminal process that have
contributed to the ascendance of plea bargaining include: (1) the adver-
sarial nature of the criminal process; 29 (2) the legitimate function plea
bargaining serves for the courts; 30 and (3) the proliferation of innocuous
121. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 92, 100.
122. See id. at 92.
123. See id.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ... ").
125. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (recognizing that a guilty plea
is a "grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment" because the defendant
stands as a witness against himself); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (recognizing
that a defendant cannot be penalized for exercising his Fifth Amendment right, notwithstanding a
guilty plea); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (holding that, because guilty pleas
inevitably implicate a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
plea must be voluntary and without ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements,
subtle or blatant threats).
126. See Ross, supra note 16, at 728.
127. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 92.
128. See id.
129. See Ross, supra note 16, at 717.
130. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 178.
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criminal offenses. 13' As the criminal process has transformed, these fac-
tors have aggregated to enable plea bargaining to flourish in the modern
landscape of criminal law.
1. The Adversarial Nature of the Criminal Process
First, the adversarial nature of the criminal process validates an an-
tagonistic system of competition between two parties.' 32 While it is pre-
sumed that the prosecutor's ultimate goal is the pursuit of justice and not
solely obtaining convictions, the highly combative nature of the criminal
process subsists on expedient results.' 33 In the ideal system, the prosecu-
tor would decide whether to offer a pre-trial plea based on available evi-
dence, the severity of the crime, the defendant's criminal history, and the
justification for punishment.' 34 However, in addition to these underlying
public policy concerns, the adversarial nature of criminal prosecution
demands an efficient approach to the prosecution of defendants. 35 A
full-fledged trial is both costly and time consuming; it requires pre-trial
preparation, discovery, witness interrogation, jury selection, and a multi-
tude of other procedural obligations. Ultimately, the cost of a trial and all
of its due process guarantees has the potential to create a situation in
which a trial may not be an affordable endeavor. Consequently, the de-
mands of trial are significant motivating factors for all parties in the ad-
versarial process to encourage plea bargaining.1
36
A prosecutor is able to use plea bargaining to his advantage not only
by relieving excessive caseloads, but also to increase the productivity of
his office and free up resources to pursue other criminals.'3 7 Similarly,
defense attorneys have a financial incentive not only to reduce their case
load, but also to eliminate the excessive costs of going to trial. 38
Attorneys are not the only actors who stand to gain from the prac-
tice of plea bargaining; judges and defendants also benefit from an effi-
cient approach to plea bargaining. 39 Plea bargains allow judges to man-
age overloaded dockets while saving the court the costs of a full trial. 41
Lastly, defendants, who often have limited resources, are relieved of a
financial burden. They are able to circumvent the cost of a trial by ac-
131. See Mhximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecuto-
rial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 287 (2006).
132. Ross, supra note 16, at 717.
133. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2470-71 (2004).
134. Id. "[P]rosecutors should decide to prosecute based on the likelihood of conviction and the
need to deter, incapacitate, rehabilitate, reform, and inflict retribution." ld.
135. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975
(1992).
136. See Bibas, supra note 133, at 2470-71, 2476.
137. See Easterbrook, supra note 135, at 1975.
138. See Bibas, supra note 133, at 2476.
139. See Covey, supra note 16, at 1246, 1267.
140. Id. at 1267.
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cepting a pre-trial plea offer and get the benefit of a negotiated convic-
tion.14 1 Thus, with financial incentives in favor of plea bargaining, a de-
fendant's acceptance or rejection of a plea sets the price of crime. 142 With
all of the criminal system's power holders now sharing a common inter-
est in plea bargaining, one would expect trials to be exceedingly rare, and
indeed, they have been largely replaced by plea bargains. 1
43
2. Plea Bargaining as a Legitimizing Function
Second, the need for expedient justice and the desire to portray the
appearance of truthful verdicts bolsters the preeminence of plea bargain-
ing and enables it to surpass the practice of trials.'"a The dissent in Wil-
liams II explained that "[t]he American Constitution, our Bill of Rights,
and our common law tradition place faith in the trial as the best means of
protecting a defendant's rights, testing the government's case, and ensur-
ing a reliable result."'' 45 Notwithstanding the foundational and constitu-
tional stronghold of the trial, plea bargaining has become a defining and
critical feature of the criminal law system. 146 In the face of an adversarial
system, plea bargaining serves a legitimizing function: it increases prose-
cutors' conviction rates and reduces judicial reversals, which filters all
but the most controversial cases from the presence of a courtroom. 147
It is a prosecutor's duty to ensure punishment as justice demands.
Prosecutors, however, also have an interest in obtaining convictions.
148
Often, a prosecutor's win-loss record matters much more than the ulti-
mate punishment rendered.' 49 Throughout the plea process, prosecutors
can dictate the presence or absence of a trial in a way that is advanta-
geous for them.' 50 For instance, a prosecutor may chose to offer a plea in
a low-profile case or a case where evidence is scarce in order to secure a
conviction.' 51 Conversely, a prosecutor may not offer a plea to a defen-
dant in a high-profile case in hopes of gaining publicity and marketable
141. See id. at 1246.
142. See Easterbrook, supra note 135, at 1975.
143. FISHER, supra note 119, at 137.
144. Id. at 178.
145. Williams v. Jones (Williams II), 571 F.3d 1086, 1102 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., dis-
senting).
146. Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspec-
tives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1064
(2006).
147. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 179-80.
148. Bibas, supra note 133, at 2471.
149. Id.
150. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL L. REV.
1471, 1489 (1993).
151. See Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases,
Prior Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 257 (1989) (reporting a




experience. 152 The fact remains that a conviction by guilty plea is still a
conviction, and a win for the prosecutor.
153
Judges also have an incentive to pursue and promote plea negotia-
tions. As dockets swell and the demand for convictions surge, the judi-
cial truth-seeking inquiry by trial has been quelled by the presence of the
plea bargain. 54 Within the adversarial process, the primary goal of pros-
ecution is "to give a fair disposition to the case."'' 55 Thus, the judge must
balance the benefits and hindrances of a trial against the benefits and
efficiencies of a negotiated plea. 56 Often, the most efficient and effective
manner to render a fair disposition to a case is through the use of plea
bargaining. Additionally, when a case ends in a plea bargain, "the judge
escapes the danger of being reversed on some point of law."'157 Judges-
who's decisions are scrutinized by both their peers and the public--do
not want to be reversed on appeal for the simple reason that they do not
want to be proven wrong and expose their error to the world at large.
Plea negotiations are "a means to guard their reputations from the scent
of fecklessness or incompetence."'
' 58
3. The Proliferation of Innocuous Criminal Offenses
In response to public concern over high crime rates, the persuasion
of advocacy groups, and high-profile criminal cases, both state and fed-
eral legislation have been passed to create new criminal offenses, incor-
porate layers of criminal offenses, and amend existing criminal defini-
tions to loosen the definition of the offense. 159 The result has been the
proliferation of innocuous criminal offenses. 16° The development of both
152. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 50 (1988); see also Bibas, supra note 133, at 2474.
153. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 106-07 (1968) ("Conviction statistics seem to most prosecutors a tangible measure of their
success. Statistics on sentencing do not."); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resis-
tance to Post-Conviction Claims ofInnocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125, 137 (2004) (reporting practice
in prosecutors's offices of publicly tracking prosecutors's win-loss records or maintaining "batting
averages"); see also FISHER, supra note 119, at 48-49 (noting that plea bargaining inflates convic-
tion statistics).
154. See Covey, supra note 16, at 1267.
155. See Langer, supra note 131, at 226.
156. See FISHER, supra note 119 at 124-29 (discussing the factors that persuade "a principled
judge" to endorse plea negotiations "without first hearing all the information normally supplied by a
trial or sentencing hearing").
157. Id. at 177 (quoting Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 103
(1928) (commenting on judges' attitudes towards plea bargaining in the newly discovered practice of
plea bargaining)).
158. See id. at 178.
159. See Langer, supra note 131, at 287.
160. For example, Illinois, like most other states, has a general criminal offense for property
damage. 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/21-1 (2009). However, legislation has been passed, which has
added special offenses for property damage to library materials, damaging animal facilities, defacing
delivery containers, and even a specific offense for damaging anhydrous ammonia equipment. Paul
H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Them-
selves?, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170 (2003). In addition, the federal criminal code has promul-
gated several broadly defined criminal offenses. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
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finite criminal definitions as well as ambiguous criminal definitions has
helped make plea proposals a very coercive prosecutorial tool. 16' The
array of offenses from which a prosecutor may charge enables the prose-
cutor to bring multiple and overlapping charges, which gives prosecutors
substantial power in sentencing and places pressure on the defendant to
take the guilty plea.' 62 It is this prosecutorial overcharging that creates
the potential prejudice for a defendant who rejects a pre-trial plea offer as
a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.1
63
It seems apparent that "[p]lea bargaining entered the twentieth cen-
tury with all the staying power that comes from serving the interests of
power."' 64 Early guilty pleas were not necessarily uncommon in the late
eighteenth century, but these pleas were not like the plea bargains and
negotiations the United States criminal system has today.' 65 Instead, the
early pleas were seen as a gesture of remorse and perhaps desperation in
hopes to obtain mercy from the justice system.' 66 As the landscape of
criminal proceedings began to change-including an influx of cases, an
increase in the length and cost of trials, the development of a sharp ad-
versarial system, near limitless prosecutorial discretion, and the desire
for the perception of truth and justice-plea-bargaining became an en-
trenched legal institution. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that
plea bargaining:
Leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases;
it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during
pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial;
it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to
continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances
whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they
are ultimately imprisoned. 1
67
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,517 (2001). One such example is its broad definition of mail
and wire fraud that covers a broad spectrum of breaches of fiduciary duties in order to protect "the
intangible right of honest services." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). Additionally, "the federal
criminal code includes 100 separate misrepresentation offenses, some of which criminalize not only
lying but concealing or misleading as well, and many of which do not require that the dishonesty be
about a matter of any importance." Id. (citations omitted). "Taken together, these misrepresentation
crimes cover most lies (and, as just noted, almost-but-not-quite-lies) one might tell during the course
of any financial transaction or transaction involving the government." Id.
161. See Langer, supra note 131, at 286 (noting that "since U.S. criminal jurisdictions moved
from common law, judge-created offenses to legislatively-created statutory offenses, criminal stat-
utes have presented several layers of overlapping criminal offenses incorporated over time, many of
which are loosely defined").
162. Id. at 286-87.
163. Infra Part III.B.
164. FISHER, supra note 119, at 153.
165. Id. at 154.
166. Id.
167. Williams v. Jones (Williams II), 571 F.3d 1086, 1102 (2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,261 (1971)).
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When it comes to the confidence the modern court will repose in the
outcome of criminal proceedings, the landscape of contemporary crimi-
nal procedure makes clear that plea bargaining has become the prominent
practice and standard. Ultimately, "[t]his collective, systemic interest in
plea bargaining promoted the rise of those institutions of criminal proce-
dure that helped plea bargaining and hindered those that stood in its
way.
168
B. The Overcharging Dynamic
As the role of plea bargaining has developed in the criminal justice
system, it has become clear that a defendant who waives a plea bargain
and proceeds to trial as a result of deficient counsel may still be preju-
diced, notwithstanding a subsequent fair trial. This is because the ab-
sence of compulsory prosecution enables prosecutors to exploit their
discretion by charging one criminal act under multiple overlapping crim-
inal statutes for the purpose of inducing a guilty plea.' 69 The current state
of the law does not treat overcharging as constitutionally defective be-
cause, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, "the Executive Branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion" to select its charge.1 70 This
unbridled authority to charge defendants allows a prosecutor to threaten a
defendant with overly broad and weighty charges that would not have
been invoked, but for the possibility of procuring a guilty plea.' 7' This
notion of overcharging is the missing piece in Williams H that both the
majority and dissent failed to recognize: dismissing a plea bargain due to
deficient counsel and subsequently going to trial overcharged is precisely
what prejudices the defendant.
There are two general types of strategic overcharging. 72 The first is
known as horizontal overcharging. 73 Notwithstanding the fact that the
illicit conduct sought to be punished is adequately penalized by a single
count, prosecutors will engage in horizontal overcharging by charging
168. FISHER, supra note 119, at 16.
169. Scott & Stuntz, supra note I 11, at 1962; see also Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under
Many Headings: The Problem of Multiple Punishment, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245, 259 (2002); Ross,
supra note 16, at 728. Compulsory prosecution is largely employed in continental criminal justice
systems and is a constitutional or statutory enactment that obligates the public prosecutor "to initiate
investigations and prosecutions if there is a sufficient basis on which to believe that a crime has been
committed." Zsuzsanna Deen Racsminy, A New Passport to Impunity: Non-Extradition of Natural-
ized Citizens Versus Criminal Justice, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 761, 775 (2004). Principles of compul-
sory prosecution are considered an indispensible check on state power-particularly executive
power-because compulsory prosecution dictates what cases and charges the public prosecutor can
pursue, eliminating prosecutorial discretion altogether. See Jacqueline E. Ross, Impediments to
Transnational Cooperation in Undercover Policing: A Comparative Study of the United States and
Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 569, 608 (2004). This regime does not exist in the United States, where
prosecutors enjoy wide discretion in the criminal cases and charges they may pursue.
170. Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2565 (2008) (quoting United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)).
171. Ross, supra note 16, at 728.
172. See Covey, supra note 16, at 1254.
173. Id. at 1254.
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"nonoverlapping counts of a similar offense type, or ... multiple counts
of the same offense type."' 74 For example, in Leopard v. United States,
175
the prosecutor successfully employed horizontal overcharging by charg-
ing the defendant for "carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking offense"'176 as well as for "being a felon in possession of a
firearm."'177 Both charges stemmed from the defendant's possession of a
.22 caliber firearm. 178 The court determined that under the respective
statutory definitions of each count, there were unique elements of proof
that were required to sustain each separate conviction.'
79
Furthermore, prosecutors wield heightened power when the added
criminal counts carry mandatory minimum sentencing provisions that
must be imposed consecutively. 80 With a colorful pallet of criminal of-
fenses to choose from, horizontal charging gives prosecutors formidable
leverage in the criminal justice system.18 1 Strategic horizontal overcharg-
ing offers prosecutors the opportunity to propose persuasively favorable
pre-trial pleas to defendants by decreasing the original charge. 82
The second type of strategic overcharging is vertical overcharg-
ing.183 Vertical overcharging takes place when a prosecutor charges the
defendant with an offense higher than the accumulation of evidence may
reasonably support.' 84 As long as the prosecutor can make a colorable
argument that the case against the defendant establishes potential for the
prosecutor to convict the defendant of the elevated charge at trial, the
174. Covey, supra note 16, at 1254; see also FISHER, supra note 119, at 22-24. Fisher linked
the triumph of plea bargaining to the practice of horizontal overcharging in liquor cases. Id. In his
study of Middlesex County, Massachusetts, Fisher recognized that prosecutors were able to charge
multiple counts of liquor offenses, and each offense carried a fixed fine of approximately four
pounds. Id. Thus, Fisher's study revealed that the earliest recorded examples of plea bargaining
occurred in these cases where prosecutors invoked horizontal overcharging.
175. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (E.D. Okla. 2001).
176. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
177. Leopard, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1332; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
178. Leopard, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
179. Id. at 1332-33. Not only can prosecutors pursue multiple counts with consecutive terms,
but if recidivist statutes apply in the jurisdiction, prosecutors can charge a defendant under a habit-
ual-offender statute for a single criminal act. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
573 n.19 (1996). Under a habitual defender statute, multiple convictions for a single incident can
constitute a continuing pattern of criminal behavior, which in turn increases the subsequent sen-
tences as a result of prior convictions. See id.
180. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 216.
181. Prosecutors must be very savvy in employing horizontal overcharging so as not to be
defeated by claims of double jeopardy. For example, double jeopardy concerns arise when there is
the threat of multiple convictions and sentences for the same offense. See United States v. Johnson,
130 F.3d 1420, 1424 (10th Cir. 1997). The test to be applied in double jeopardy cases was set forth
by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). "The applicable rule is
that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
182. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 224.
183. See Covey, supra note 16, at 1254.
184. Id.
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charge will likely withstand the court's scrutiny.' 85 Vertical overcharging
places undue pressure on the defendant "to plead guilty to a lesser of-
fense-often to the charge that absent strategic considerations would
have been selected initially-simply to avoid risking conviction on the
higher charge."
86
The overcharging dynamic is exacerbated by the limited institu-
tional capacity of the courts, which in turn significantly increases a de-
fendant's sentencing exposure at trial. The separation of powers prohibits
the judiciary from governing the prosecutor's power to charge because
the prosecutor is an entity of the executive branch. 187 Furthermore, there
is limited judicial oversight of prosecutorial charge discretion because
the court does not have the proper investigative tools to conduct inde-
pendent evaluations of charges.' 88 As the Second Circuit noted, "In the
absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or regu-
latory or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the
task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves to
resolution by the judiciary."'
' 89
The practice of overcharging has enabled unilateral prosecutorial
adjudication; what has become, in a sense, a prosecutorial bluff.' 90 The
resultant effect of overcharging has created a dramatic gap between plea
sentences and trial sentences.91 This is because prosecutors enjoy expan-
sive discretion to threaten the defendant with multiple and overlapping
charges for the same illicit conduct, such that a negotiated pre-trial plea
offer is more often than not the defendant's most favorable option.1
92
Thus, as a defining feature of the plea process and modern criminal pros-
ecution, it is necessary for the court to consider overcharging as an inte-
185. See Alschuler, supra note 153, at 86.
186. Covey, supra note 16, at 1254-55.
187. Id. at 1266.
188. Id. at 1266-67.
189. Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973); see also
Nancy J. King, Regulating Settlement: What is Left of the Rule of Law in the Criminal Process?, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 389, 396 (2007) (recognizing that trial judges are not in a good position to scruti-
nize plea agreements because they "are under more pressure to facilitate deals than to scrutinize
them").
190. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 43 (1983) ("Where there is doubt as to whether
the defendant can be convicted on the original charge, it is often because the prosecutor has 'over-
charged' to gain additional leverage to induce the defendant to plead to the 'real offense."').
191. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652,
653 (1981) (citing a study conducted in New York City by Hans Zeisel finding that sentences ren-
dered after a conviction by trial were 136% longer than sentences proposed by prosecutors as pre-
trial plea offers).
192. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 215. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones (Williams If), 571 F.3d
1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (receiving a post-trial conviction of first-degree murder and life without
parole after rejecting a guilty plea to second degree murder and ten year imprisonment); People v.
Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 135, 136 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (sentencing the defendant to a term of forty to
eighty years at trial after the defendant had rejected a plea offer carrying a prison term of two to six
years).
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gral component in its analysis of a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The driving force behind the dissent in Williams If, as well as the
Seventh Circuit's argument, is that counsel's deficient performance at
plea bargaining cannot render a prejudicial outcome after a subsequent
fair trial because the defendant has no legal entitlement to the plea proc-
ess. 19 3 While it is not necessary and highly implausible to change the
system such that prosecutors are required to offer a plea, it is necessary
to evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the
operational framework of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is a defining
feature of the criminal justice system-a feature that largely circumvents
"the preferred way of resolving criminal cases: a jury trial with full legal
due process."194
In the context of plea bargaining, prosecutors have the luxury to
take risks, while defendants are stuck between a rock and a hard place.'
95
Do defendants waive their right to a trial and accept a "lessened" charge
in exchange for a guilty plea? Or should defendants take their chances at
trial and face the risk of being convicted of the overcharged offenses?
Even worse, what if this choice is taken away altogether? Defendants
accept plea bargains because trials are risky; with elevated charges there
is a viable "threat of much harsher penalties after trial.' 96 In fact, the
Supreme Court recognized that "[w]hile confronting a defendant with the
risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect
on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these
difficult choices [is] an inevitable'-and permissible-'attribute of any
legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of
pleas."", 197 Thus, where plea bargaining is encouraged and overcharging
is an overwhelmingly common practice, in the context of Sixth Amend-
ment claims, if a defendant rejects a plea due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, rejecting that pre-trial plea offer has the potential consequence
of producing a fundamentally unfair result for the defendant. The defen-
dant may still suffer prejudice notwithstanding a subsequent fair trial. In
Williams H, it was the Tenth Circuit's failure to recognize the impact
overcharging has on the pre-trial plea process that debased its interpreta-
tion and definition of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. It is this recognition that must shape the appropriate remedy.
193. See Williams II, 571 F.3d at 1101 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); United States v. Springs, 988
F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993).
194. Brown & Bunnell, supra note 146, at 1064.
195. Cf FISHER, supra note 119, at 91. A defendant's incentive and capacity to plea bargain
"[lie] in the difference between the severe sentence that loomed should the jury convict at trial and
the more lenient sentence promised by the prosecutor or judge in exchange for a plea." Id.
196. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note I I i, at 1912.
197. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (second alteration in original) (quoting




"It is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when with-
held, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress."' 98 The
second substantial inquiry that arises from a discussion regarding a Sixth
Amendment challenge to effective assistance of counsel is the appropri-
ate constitutional remedy. This portion of the discussion assumes that a
petitioner bringing a Sixth Amendment claim has demonstrated deficient
performance of counsel during plea bargaining, has established prejudice
as a result of that deficient performance, and has received a subsequent
fair trial.' 99 In Williams 11, having determined that the defendant Wil-
liams received ineffective assistance of counsel and was subsequently
prejudiced as a result of such deficient performance, the Tenth Circuit
was presented with the question of whether the lower court had "fash-
ioned a constitutionally permissible remedy. ' ' 2°° Neither the Supreme
Court nor any governing body of law has made clear what the scope and
parameters of a constitutionally acceptable remedy specific to this situa-
tion should be. The indeterminate nature of binding authority on this
issue has resulted in a deluge of various remedies imposed by the circuit
courts.
In Williams II, the jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder
and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role.20' On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA")
found that Williams's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel had been violated.20 2 The OCCA attempted to remedy the viola-
tion of Williams's constitutional right by instating a modified sentence of
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, which was the lowest
punishment for first-degree murder in Oklahoma. °3
The Tenth Circuit upheld the OCCA's finding of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel during plea bargaining, but reversed the imposed rem-
edy and remanded the case for the district court to render a remedy com-
parable to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation, and one
not limited by state law.2°4 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit ordered that
"the remedy 'should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitu-
tional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing in-
terests.' 20 5 This language, which comes directly from the Supreme
Court in United States v. Morrison,206 has been the guiding principle in
198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803).
199. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (outlining the applicable legal
standard for a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).





205. Id. at 1090 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
206. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
20101
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
fashioning a constitutionally permissible remedy. 207 Following this nebu-
lous precedent, the Tenth Circuit held that the OCCA's remedy was ob-
jectively unreasonable.20 8 In so holding, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that it
is axiomatic that any remedy for a constitutional violation must be con-
sistent with federal law and not limited by state law.209 However, given
the lack of guidance in this area of law, even the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that it is unclear what remedy the OCCA should have imposed." °
The OCCA was faced with the challenge of balancing valid and
competing claims between the State's efficiency interest in upholding a
modified sentence from a fair trial with the petitioner's interest in rein-
stating the plea offer to obtain justice where he has been prejudiced.11
Despite the highly controversial nature of these competing claims, the
Tenth Circuit remanded with scant instructions on how to adopt a rem-
edy that comes closest to restoring the original positions of both par-
ties.212 What's more, the OCCA will find little guidance from other cir-
cuit courts as this juxtaposition of competing interests manifests a land-
scape ripe with inconsistencies.
2 1
3
The Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Gordon2 14 illus-
trates the lack of clarity in this area of law. In an attempt to reconcile the
competing interests of the state and the petitioner, the Gordon court held
that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating [the defen-
dant's] convictions and granting him a new trial. 215 The court reasoned
that to judiciously weigh these competing interests and render the appro-
priate remedy, the court must consider "the necessity for preserving soci-
ety's interest in the administration of criminal justice. 21 6 Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit recognized that the trial court had virtually uncondi-
tional discretion to accord different remedies in similar situations217 by
citing to the Third Circuit's holding in United States v. Day.2t 8 In Day,
207. See, e.g., Williams H1, 571 F.3d at 1090; United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 381 (2d
Cir. 1998); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 47 (3d Cir. 1992).
208. Williams 1I, 571 F.3d at 1090.
209. Id. at 1090, 1092.
210. See id. at 1092-93.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 1093-94. The Tenth Circuit has considered a claim for specific performance of a
plea agreement, but rejected it based on an inadequate showing of deficient performance and preju-
dice. See United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1997).
213. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 942 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining that the
proper remedy is reinstatement of plea offer), vacated in part, 552 U.S. 117 (2008); Satterlee v.
Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362, 368-69 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant should be given an
opportunity to accept the original offer); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that granting a new trial was an appropriate remedy); Jiminez v. State, 144 P.3d 903, 907
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that the appropriate remedy is to modify the sentencing to con-
form to terms in plea agreement).
214. 156 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 1998).
215. Id. at 382.
216. Id. at 381 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
217. See Gordon, 156 F.3d at 38 1.
218. 969 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1992).
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the Third Circuit held that "a second opportunity to accept a plea agree-
ment ought not be automatic, but it does not follow that the relief of
'specific performance' of a plea bargain is never appropriate." 2 19 As evi-
denced by the continuing circuit split, the definition of a permissible con-
stitutional remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation when a defendant
has received a subsequent fair trial is indeterminate.
As the Tenth Circuit concedes, "In the end, no remedy may restore
completely the parties' original positions." 220 Implicit in this statement is
the Tenth Circuit's recognition of the right-remedy gap that plagues con-
stitutional law. 221 In the context of plea bargaining, a Sixth Amendment
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel exacerbates the right-remedy
gap. The inevitable limitations between "declaring a right and imple-
menting a remedy' 222 demand that we diverge from the strict contours of
the Marbury maxim 223 and render a remedy that gets as close as possible
to redressing the injury, but more importantly, is "adequate to keep gov-
ernment within the bounds of law. 224
In a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at
plea bargaining, the Strickland test requires the petitioner to show that
his counsel was deficient during the plea process and that he was preju-
diced as a result of counsel's deficient performance. 225 If a petitioner is
successful in his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at plea bar-
gaining, his constitutional injury must be adequately redressed. As dis-
cussed in Section I.B, the nature of the plea process produces an over-
charging dynamic, which in turn has the potential to render a fundamen-
tally unfair result for the petitioner and prejudice him even if his trial was
procedurally fair.226 Thus, the goal is to put the petitioner in the same
position he was in prior to suffering prejudice. Under Hill v. Lockhart, a
petitioner asserting a Sixth Amendment claim challenging a guilty plea is
prejudiced if he can show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. 227 In this context, reinstatement of the original
plea offer would be the remedy that would be as close as possible to re-
dressing the injury and is nonetheless "adequate to keep government
within the bounds of law. 22 8 Reinstatement of the original plea is not
only the most judicious means of redressing a petitioner's injury, but it is
219. Id. at 47.
220. Williams v. Jones (Williams 1H), 571 F.3d 1086, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009).
221. See Jeffries, supra note 11; see also supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
222. Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 587.
223. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803) ("It is a settled and invariable principle,
that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.").
224. See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 88 (quoting Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1736).
225. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
226. See supra Part III.B.
227. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
228. See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 88 (quoting Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1736).
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also the most efficient; a plea agreement is expedient in so far as it saves
time as well as the cost of another trial.
An attempt to remedy the constitutional injury by ordering a new
trial would be fruitless because the petitioner would likely still face mul-
tiple and overlapping charges, and he would therefore still suffer preju-
229dice. In addition, a modified sentence would also be inadequate to
remedy a petitioner's Sixth Amendment injury. A modified sentence
attempts to mitigate the harm done to the petitioner by rendering a rem-
edy that is somewhere between maintaining the status quo and reinstating
the original plea offer, but it is arbitrarily chosen because it is not re-
dressing the actual injury. 30 Where the constitutional violation occurred
during the pre-trial plea process, the modified sentencing approach mere-
ly reduces the sentence resulting from a post-trial conviction. Thus:
Where... a defendant receives a greater sentence than one contained
in a plea offer that he would have accepted if not for the ineffective
assistance of counsel, the properly tailored remedy is to give the de-
fendant the opportunity to accept the offer, because simply retrying
the petitioner without making the plea offer would not remedy the
constitutional violation that led to the issuance of the writ.
231
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit in Williams II sought to downplay that its deci-
sion to deny a rehearing en banc did not implicate or exacerbate a circuit
split.232 However, not only is there a circuit split, 233 there is also conflict
among state courts on the issue of whether a fair trial negates the possi-
bility of prejudice under a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel at plea bargaining.2 34 There can be little doubt that these
splits in authority contributed to the Supreme Court's recent grant of
certiorari in Arave v. Hoffman to specifically resolve this question.235
229. See supra Part IlI.B. If a new trial were granted, the court would not enjoin the prosecu-
tion from bringing the same charges brought in the first trial; all that could be guaranteed to the
petitioner at the end of the day would be a new trial on the same charges. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones
(Williams II), 571 F.3d 1086, 1110 (2009) (Gorsuch, I., dissenting). Thus, at the second trial, the
petitioner would still be facing increased charges without an opportunity to engage in a plea bargain.
230. In modifying William's sentence from life without parole to life with parole, the OCCA
only considered the scope and limitations of sentencing granted by state law given a guilty verdict to
first-degree murder. See Williams H1, 571 F.3d at 1088. This was an arbitrary modification because
the OCCA simply selected a statutory sentence without considering that William's constitutional
injury occurred during the plea process, prior to conviction.
231. Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362, 370 (6th Cir. 2006); see Turner v. Tennessee,
858 F.2d 1201, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) ("IT]he only way to neutralize the constitutional deprivation
suffered ... would seem to be to provide [the petitioner] with an opportunity to consider the State's
two-year plea offer with the effective assistance of counsel."), vacated, 492 U.S. 902 (1989); see
also Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003).
232. See Williams v. Jones (Williams III), 583 F.3d 1254, 1258 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting).
233. See United States v. Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993).
234. See State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2007).
235. Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 1008, 1008 (2007).
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The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari is clear evidence that the Court
is aware of the indeterminate authority and absence of clearly established
federal law directing state and federal courts in an analysis of a Sixth
Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining.
Unfortunately, the petitioner in Arave abandoned his appeal, which
leaves us with questions unanswered.236
The law is unclear. There is an analytical void between the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining
and the appropriate remedy. This void is neither theoretical nor constitu-
tional; it is practical. If a defendant rejects a pre-trial plea due to deficient
counsel and is subsequently convicted of multiple and overlapping
charges at trial, that defendant suffers prejudice and satisfies his Sixth
Amendment claim. A thorough and comprehensive analysis of a Sixth
Amendment claim challenging a pre-trial plea requires a recognition of
plea bargaining as it actually functions in the criminal system-
reflecting the dominating presence of plea negotiations as well as the
practice of overcharging-in order to safeguard a defendant's constitu-
tional rights and fashion an appropriate remedy. The Tenth Circuit in
Williams H should have accounted for this reality; failure to do so weak-
ened the majority's opinion, rendered an incomplete decision, and en-
trenched unsettled case law.
Ana Maria Gutijrrez*
236. See Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 117, 118-19 (2008) (vacating as moot because petitioner
abandoned the ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Rebecca Aviel for her valuable insight and guidance in developing this Comment. I would
also like to extend a sincere thank you to the Denver University Law Review Board of Editors and
staff for their assistance and revisions. And to my family for their unqualified love and support.
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WILDERNESS SOCIETY V. KANE COUNTY, UTAH: A WELCOME
CHANGE FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
GROUPS
INTRODUCTION
In an August 2009 decision siding with two environmental groups,
the Tenth Circuit confronted the contentious issue of Revised Statute
2477 ("R.S. 2477"). The statute, which consisted of a single clause in
the Lode Mining Act of 1866, granted "right of way for the construction
of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses."2 The Fed-
eral Land Policy Management Act ("FLPMA") repealed R.S. 2477 in
1976, but R.S. 2477 rights-of-way perfected prior to FLPMA's enact-
ment remain "valid existing rights."3
Conflicts over R.S. 2477 typically arise between local governments,
which assert legal title to public rights-of-way, and the federal govern-
ment, which manages the federal lands on which the roads are situated.
The most contentious of these conflicts involve local efforts to open new
public routes-or expand existing routes-in sensitive or protected areas.
Such was the case when Kane County officials removed thirty federal
signs which prohibited off-road vehicle use on certain Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") lands in Utah, replacing them with 268 signs that
purported to open sixty-three new routes to public off-road vehicle use.
In support of its actions, Kane County subsequently enacted Ordinance
2005-03 which purported to give authority to the County to open roads to
off-road vehicles and to "post signs" opening these routes which were
otherwise closed under federal land management plans.4
Two environmental groups 5 challenged the County's actions in fed-
eral court, setting the stage for the Tenth Circuit to revisit the decades-
old R.S. 2477 debate. Underlying the specific conflict between Kane
County and the environmental groups is the growing tension between
conflicting uses of federal lands at the local level. Generally, advocates
of local control favor motorized access and expansion of public uses
while proponents of federal management prefer limited use that favors
environmental preservation over further development. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's 2-1 decision in favor of the environmental groups marked a shift
1. Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed
1976)).
3. Id. § 701 (h), 90 Stat. at 2786.
4. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1207.
5. The Wilderness Society and the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.
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in the Tenth Circuit's position to one that favors federal and environ-
mental interests over those of state and local governments.6 In February
2010, the Tenth Circuit decided to revisit the issue by granting en banc
review of the decision.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of R.S. 2477 and de-
scribes the current state of R.S. 2477 law. Part II discusses the compli-
cated questions that underlie R.S. 2477 determinations. Part III explores
the attempts by each of the three branches of government to resolve the
R.S. 2477 conflict, in addition to an explanation of the Tenth Circuit's
most recent commentary on R.S. 2477 in Wilderness Society. Finally,
Part IV analyzes the potential impact of Wilderness Society on the future
of R.S. 2477 conflicts and provides an appeal for a permanent, legislative
solution to this seemingly intractable problem.
I. THE COMPLICATED FRAMEWORK OF R.S. 2477
One of the greatest federal lands controversies in the Western Unit-
ed States today is the debate over roads created pursuant to R.S. 2477. 7
Consisting of a single clause in the Lode Mining Act of 1866, R.S. 2477
simply states: "[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over
public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted. 8 The stat-
ute "was passed during a period in our history when the federal govern-
ment was aggressively promoting settlement of the West."9 R.S. 2477
effectively vested American pioneers with the license to construct roads
across unreserved public lands in support of economic development and
progress. 10
In 1976, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act repealed
R.S. 2477." This repeal was subject to valid existing rights; thus, exist-
ing roads became "grandfathered" property rights. 2 From 1976 forward,
however, the repeal prevented establishment of new rights of way. Even
6. See Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1219-26.
7. DAVID G. HAVLICK, No PLACE DISTANT: ROADS AND MOTORIZED RECREATION ON
AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 71 (2002).
8. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed
1976)).
9. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON R.S. 2477: THE HISTORY AND
MANAGEMENT OF R.S. 2477 RIGHTS-OF-WAY CLAIMS ON FEDERAL AND OTHER LANDS 1 (1993)
[hereinafter R.S. 2477 REPORT].
10. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir.
2005) ("If someone wished to traverse unappropriated public land, he could do so, with or without
an R.S. 2477 fight of way, and given the federal government's pre-1976 policy of opening and
developing the public lands, federal land managers generally had no reason to question use of the
land for travel. Roads were deemed a good thing.").
II. "Effective on and after the date of approval of this Act, R.S. 2477 (43 U.S.C. 932) is
repealed in its entirety and the following statutes or parts of statutes are repealed insofar as they
apply to the issuance of fights-of-way over, upon, under, and through the public lands and lands in
the National Forest System." Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793.
12. HAVLICK, supra note 7, at 7 1.
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so, it is unknown how many valid, pre-1976 rights-of-way exist in Utah.
Commentators estimate that "Utah counties have filed perhaps 10,000 to
15,000 R.S. 2477 right-of-way claims through national parks, national
monuments, and wilderness study areas, in addition to multiple-use pub-
lic lands."' 3 State laws exhibit little consensus among the states regarding
the best approach for managing claims that seek to establish local title to
such roads. 14 State laws differ as to the quantum of proof or the period of
public use required to establish a public right-of-way pursuant to R.S.
2477.15 Despite these inconsistencies, the lack of federal guidance on the
issue leaves courts with no option but to look to state laws to determine
what is required for the perfection of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.1
6
II. THE PROBLEM: QUESTIONS CENTRAL TO THE R.S. 2477 DEBATE
At the heart of the R.S. 2477 debate lies a dispute over definitions
and terminology. The drafters of R.S. 2477 provided no guidance for
interpretation of the statute, leaving many questions unsettled. 17 Unset-
tled questions include: (1) should state or federal law define the statutes
ambiguous terms, thereby determining the scope of R.S. 2477 grants
state-by-state; (2) what constitutes a "highway"; (3) what constitutes
"construction"; and finally, (4) what lands qualify as "public lands, not
reserved for public uses"?
Two opposing positions frame the R.S. 2477 debate. Along with
state and local governments, lobbyists seeking to maintain off-road vehi-
cle access support broad definitions of the terms "highway" and "con-
struction," and argue that a very specific reservation is required to re-
move federal land from the category of "public lands, not reserved for
public uses."' 8 Groups that support this "access" approach often urge
their members to "take back" the roads to maintain broad public access
to federal lands.19 Advocates of the second, preservation-oriented ap-
proach argue that a stricter interpretation of R.S. 2477 terminology
should apply; that establishment of a right-of-way requires more than a
13. HOwARD G. WILSHIRE ET AL., THE AMERICAN WEST AT RISK: SCIENCE, MYTHS, AND
POLITICS OF LAND ABUSE AND RECOVERY 152 (2008).
14. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
15. Utah state law, for example, requires ten years of continuous public use. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 72-5-104(1) (2009).
16. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 762 (10th Cir.
2005).
17. See Bret C. Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibil-
ity for Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 537 (2005) ("Despite spo-
radic litigation in recent years, legal questions persist about the exact showing necessary to validate a
claim, the scope of any valid right-of-way, and the role of state law in interpreting R.S. 2477.").
18. See, e.g., § 72-5-104.
19. See Official RS 2477 Rights-of-Way Homepage, http://www.rs2477roads.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2009).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mere footpath. 20 These groups promote federal legislation to limit the
scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way to mechanically constructed roadways
that existed prior to R.S. 2477's repeal in 1976. Environmental groups
advocate this approach because limits on the use of roads through federal
lands can minimize erosion, protect native species, and preserve unde-
veloped areas.21
A. State or Federal "Law"?
"The most fundamental and controversial [R.S. 2477] issue is the
proper role of state law in validating the establishment of R.S. 2477
rights-of-way. 22 This threshold determination necessarily affects the
scope of the right. The federal government has inconsistently interpreted
the statute over time.2 3 This inconsistency springs from the reliance on
state laws-in the absence of federal guidance-to determine what con-
stitutes an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.24
B. What Is a "Highway"?
Black's Law Dictionary defines a highway as "any main route on
land, on water, or in the air" and a "main public road connecting towns
or cities. 25 In its 1993 Report to Congress, the United States Department
of the Interior ("DOI") explained the "highway" dilemma at base as a
conflict between an expansive definition of "highway" on one hand and a
more specific definition on the other. 6 One approach would define a
highway as any type of thoroughfare, be it a footpath, road, or primitive
trail which is open to the public. Under this definition, mere use is suffi-
cient to manifest public acceptance of the highway.27 Alternatively, many
environmental groups-and, at times, the federal government-contend
that a highway is only a vehicular road which connects "towns or cities."
Quoting a 1993 report written by the Congressional Research Service,
DOI noted that "the most likely interpretation of [R.S. 2477] is that a
highway was intended to mean a significant type of road, that is: 'one
that was open for public passage, received a significant amount of public
20. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Revised Statute 2477 (RS 2477): Highway Rob-
bery Seeks to Swipe Scenic Lands from America's Wilderness Bank,
http://www.suwa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=workrs2477 (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
21. James R. Rasband, Questioning the Rule of Capture Metaphor for Nineteenth Century
Public Land Law: A Look at R.S. 2477,35 ENVTL. L. 1005, 1019-20 (2005).
22. PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIGHWAY RIGHTS OF WAY ON PUBLIC
LANDS: R.S. 2477 AND DISCLAIMERS OF INTEREST 41 (2003),
http://assets.opencrs.comlrpts/RL32142_20031107.pdf [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
23. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 759-62 (10th
Cir. 2005) (describing the inconsistencies in federal agency interpretation of R.S. 2477 and deter-
mining that it was appropriate for "federal law [to] look[] to state law to flesh out details of interpre-
tation").
24. See, e.g., id. at 762-63.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431-32 (8th ed. 2004).
26. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-12.
27. CRS REPORT, supra note 22, at 38-40.
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use, had some degree of construction or improvement, and that con-
nected cities, towns, or other significant places, rather than simply two
places."'
28
C. What Constitutes "Construction"?
Similar to the opposing views of the definition of "highway," the
debate over the definition of "construction" can be summarized as a con-
flict between the broad and narrow meanings of the term. Proponents of
the broad definition view "construction" as continuous use over a period
of time that establishes the equivalent of a beaten path. Advocates of the
narrow definition argue that affirmative road-building steps should be
required. As discussed in more detail below, the DOI approach to "con-
struction" has often fluctuated; while "consistently maintain[ing] that
some construction must have taken place," the DOI has also at times
"construed 'construction' broadly. 29
The Tenth Circuit's 2005 decision in Southern Utah Wilderness Al-
liance v. Bureau of Land Management30 ("SUWA") largely resolved the
definition of "construction" for Tenth Circuit litigants by determining
that "mechanical construction" could serve as evidence of public use, but
was not required to prove a R.S. 2477 right-of-way. 31 The court con-
cluded that:
[T]he common law standard of use[], which takes evidence of con-
struction into consideration along with other evidence of use by the
general public, seems better calculated to distinguish between rights
of way genuinely accepted through continual public use over a leng-
thy period of time, and routes which . . . served limited purposes for
limited periods of time, and never formed part of the public transpor-
tation system.
32
D. What Are "Public Lands, Not Reserved for Public Uses"?
Because there are a variety of purposes for federal land grants, the
definition of "public lands, not reserved for public uses" also generates
controversy. 33 Proponents of one approach argue that a federal land res-
ervation must be particularized and explicit to exempt it from the R.S.
2477 grant. For example, the establishment of a grazing district would
not be classified as land that is reserved for public uses. Rather, "re-
served lands are those that have been withdrawn or dedicated for a more
particular purpose, such as a National Park or Indian Reservation."
34
28. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
29. CRS REPORT, supra note 22, at 50.
30. 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005).
31. Id. at 778.
32. Id. at 782.
33. See R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 12 (explaining the disparities in definition for
"public lands, not reserved for public uses").
34. Id.
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Alternatively, environmental groups arguing for a more restrictive R.S.
2477 standard maintain that any lands set aside for any specific public
purpose by the federal government should be exempt from R.S. 2477
claims.
35
III. THE ELUSIVE ANSWER: EACH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
(UNSUCCESSFULLY) AT'TEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE R.S. 2477 DEBATE
Since the repeal of R.S. 2477, Congress, DOI, and courts have all
attempted to resolve the conflict between federal land management re-
gimes and local government property rights over R.S. 2477 roads. 36 Be-
cause of the complicated nuances of the issue, and with the control over
potential rights-of-way across public lands at stake, all attempts have
fallen short of a permanent solution.
A. Congressional Attempts to Resolve the Issue
Congress's inability to come to a consensus regarding R.S. 2477-
whether they are weighing the scope of the R.S. 2477 grant, time limits
for filing R.S. 2477 claims, or the question of whether state or federal
laws govern these issues-has fueled the controversy surrounding the
statute. Congress attempted to address R.S. 2477 roads in 1991 by pass-
ing H.R. 1096, which would have imposed a cutoff date for filing new
R.S. 2477 claims. 37 While the bill passed the House of Representatives,
"[t]he Senate adjourned without acting on H.R. 1096. ",38 Again in 1993,
lawmakers unsuccessfully attempted to pass a House appropriations bill
that would have imposed a moratorium on processing R.S. 2477 claims
until federal legislation addressed the issue.
39
Even the most recent congressional efforts have failed. In 2003,0
and then again in 2005,4 Colorado Representative Mark Udall proposed
House bills which narrowly constrained R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. The
bills defined construction as "an intentional physical act ... using me-
chanical tools" and imposed a four year time limit for the filing of R.S.
2477 claims.42 In the latest unsuccessful attempts to legislate on this is-
sue, New Mexico Representative Steve Pearce introduced House bills in
35. Id. More information about the large area of unreserved lands managed by the BLM is
available at the BLM's Land Resources and Information Homepage,
http://www.blm.gov/publicjland statistics/resources.htm.
36. R.S. 2477 fights-of-way can also exist on National Forest System Lands, managed by the
United States Department of Agriculture, to the extent that the fights-of-way were perfected prior to
the date of reservation of the lands comprising the relevant national forest.
37. See H.R. 1096, 102d Cong. (1991).
38. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
39. H.R. 5503, 102d Cong. (2d Sess. 1992).
40. H.R. 1639, 108th Cong. (2003). The 2003 bill was cosponsored by 59 democrats and no
republicans, and never came to a vote in the House.
41. H.R. 3447, 109th Cong. (2005). The 2005 bill also never came to a vote in the House.
42. Id.; H.R. 1639.
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200643 and again in 200744 that favored state and local governments. The
bills would have applied state laws to R.S. 2477 questions, perpetuating
existing uncertainties.45
B. DOI's Attempts to Resolve the Issue
1. Formal Rulemaking
Prior to the repeal of R.S. 2477, the Department of Interior provided
very little guidance with respect to the meaning of the statute, and gener-
ally took a hands-off approach to R.S. 2477.46 The Secretary of the Inte-
rior applied state law to R.S. 2477 with a "federal law reasonableness
limit on the scope" of a road grant.47 In 1938, the Secretary published a
regulation instructing that the R.S. 2477 "grant becomes effective upon
the construction or establishing of highways, in accordance with state
laws, over public lands not reserved for public uses. ' 48 This position was
largely maintained by DOI until FLPMA repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976.49
After the repeal, changes in agency policy generally corresponded
with changes in political control of the executive branch. 50 Starting in the
early 1980's during the Carter administration, Deputy Solicitor Frederick
Ferguson announced that R.S. 2477 was a question of federal law, and
that the plain meaning of "construction" for the purpose of interpreting
R.S. 2477 was mechanical construction, 5' which required such activities
as "grading, paving, placing culverts, etc."52 In 1989, Ronald Reagan's
Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel issued a new R.S. 2477 policy
43. H.R. 6298, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
44. H.R. 308, 110th Cong. (2007).
45. H.R. 6298 § 5 reads, in its entirety:
(5) The applicable laws of each State govern the resolution of issues relating to the valid-
ity and scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, including-
(A) what constitutes a highway and its essential characteristics;
(B) what actions are required to establish a public highway;
(C) the length of time of public use, if any, necessary to establish a public highway and
resulting R.S. 2477 right-of-way;
(D) the necessity of mechanical construction to establish a pubic highway and resulting
R.S. 2477 right-of-way; and
(E) the sufficiency of public construction alone without proof of a certain number of
years of continuous public use to establish a public highway and resulting R.S. 2477
ight-of-way.
H.R. 6298 § 5 (emphasis added).
46. See R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 20.
47. Rasband, supra note 21, at 1026-27.
48. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 43
C.F.R. pt. 244.55 (1938)); id. app. 11, exhibit C (providing full-text of regulation).
49. See id. at 20.
50. See Rasband, supra note 21, at 1039.
51. Under the Ferguson-era policy, construction required more than "mere use." Letter from
Frederick N. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor, to James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney Gen. 5 (Apr.
28, 1980), in R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, app. II, exhibit J [hereinafter Ferguson Letter]. "If
actual use were the only criterion, innumerable jeep trails, wagon roads and other access ways-
some of them ancient ... might qualify as public highways under R.S. 2477." Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 8; see also Rasband, supra note 21, at 1029.
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statement in response to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v.
Hodel.5 3 Known as the "Hodel Policy," it proclaimed that the scope of a
right-of-way was a question of state law and propounded a long-term use
standard for determining the validity of a right-of-way, meaning that
maintaining a road for many years was tantamount to construction. 54 The
Hodel policy, in stark contrast to the Ferguson policy, established public
highways as any public route open to vehicular, pedestrian, or pack ani-
mal traffic.55
In 1994, during the Clinton administration, DOI proposed new R.S.
2477 regulations that would have implemented the suggestions made by
DOI's 1993 R.S. 2477 Report to Congress 56 by creating a comprehensive
federal policy for resolving R.S. 2477 claims. 57 The proposed rules were
"intended to clarify the meaning of [R.S. 2477] and provide a workable
administrative process and standards for recognizing valid claims, '58 and
imposed a two-year time limit on the filing of R.S. 2477 claims, which
were to be resolved based on federal law. 59 However, the rules were de-
railed by another change in the Congressional majority, 60 and marked a
final end to formal R.S. 2477 rulemaking by enacting a permanent mora-
torium on agency R.S. 2477 rulemaking without Congressional authori-
zation.
6 1
2. Agency Policy Interpretations
In 2003, the United States Department of Interior ("DOI") signed a
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with the State of Utah in an
effort to resolve Utah's R.S. 2477 controversies.6 2 The MOU acknowl-
edged "publicly traveled and regularly maintained roads" in Utah that
were "unquestionably part of the State's transportation infrastructure"
and were not part of national parks, refuges, and wilderness areas. 63 En-
vironmental groups contended that the MOU was insufficiently protec-
tive of Utah's wilderness areas because it incorporated an expansive de-
53. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1083 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding that state law
should control the scope of the right-of-way).
54. Memorandum from Susan Recce, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, to
Donald Paul Hodel, Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior 2 (Mar. 8, 1989), in R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note
9, app. 11, exhibit K.
55. Id.
56. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 55.
57. Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (Aug. 1, 1994).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 39,222.
60. Rasband, supra note 21, at 1031-32.
61. H.R. 3610, 104th Cong., 110 Stat. 3009 (2d Sess. 1996) (enacted).
62. Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Utah and the Dep't of the Interior
on State & County Rd. Acknowledgment (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://doi.gov/archive/news03_News Releaseslmours2477.htm.
63. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, Memorandum of Understanding: Dep't of the Interior
& State of Utah: Resolution of R.S. 2477 Right-of-Way Claims, available at
http://www.interior.gov/news03-News-Releases/moutalkingpoints.htm.
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finition of "highway." 64 Despite lingering doubts, Secretary of the Inte-
rior Gale Norton announced that the R.S. 2477 issues in Utah were, at
long last, resolved: "[B]y working collaboratively with the state of Utah,
we are able to resolve a long-disputed issue that may otherwise have lead
[sic] to costly and lengthy litigation." 65 The litigation, however, per-
sisted.
On March 22, 2006, following the Tenth Circuit's SUWA decision,
Secretary Norton sent an instructional memorandum ("IM") to DOI's
departments, directing a change in R.S. 2477 policy to ensure consis-
tency with the SUWA decision. 66 More specifically, the IM instructed
that the validity of R.S. 2477 claims were to be determined pursuant to
state law and that mechanical construction of a road was not necessary to
establish an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. Further, "the scope of an R.S. 2477
right of way [was] limited by the established usage of the route as of the
date of repeal of [R.S. 2477]. "67 Under the guidelines set forth in the IM,
which represent the most recent expression of DOI policy related to R.S.
2477, local governments are permitted to maintain R.S. 2477 roads pro-
vided that the maintenance "preserves the status quo."
68
C. The Tenth Circuit Attempts to Resolve the Issue
1. The SUWA Case
69
The Tenth Circuit's decision in SUWA significantly affected the
R.S. 2477 debate. In this landmark 2005 case, Judge McConnell ruled on
several important R.S. 2477 issues.70 SUWA was an action brought by
environmental groups to oppose the grading of sixteen roads or trails on
BLM land by three Southern Utah counties. 71 The plaintiffs claimed that
"the Counties had engaged in unlawful road construction activities" 72 and
64. Press Release, The Wilderness Society & Earthjustice, R.S. 2477 Spin vs. Reality: Dep't
of Interior & State of Utah April 9, 2003 Memorandum of Understanding on "Resolution of R.S.
2477 Right of Way Claims" (Apr. 10, 2003) (on file with author).
65. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, Interior and State of Utah Reach Landmark Agree-
ment on R.S. 2477 Rights of Way Issue (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.doi.gov/archivelnews/O3-News-Releases/O30409a.htm.
66. Memorandum from Gale A. Norton, See'y, Dep't of the Interior, Departmental Implemen-
tation of S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005);
Revocation of Jan. 22, 1997, Interim Policy; Revocation of Dec. 7, 1988, Policy (Mar. 22, 2006),
available at http://www.doi.gov/archive/news/06_NewsReleases/Norton_3-22-06.pdf [hereinafter
Norton Memorandum].
67. Guidelines for Implementation of SUWA v. BLM Principles, in Norton Memorandum,
supra note 66, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 747 (10th Cir. 2005)) [hereinafter Guidelines for SUWA].
68. Guidelines for SUWA, supra note 67, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 756 (10th Cir. 2005)).
69. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (SUWA), 425 F.3d 735 (1Oth Cir.
2005).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 742.
72. Id.
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that BLM, by not taking action, had violated its duties under a number of
federal statutes.73
The Tenth Circuit first concluded that BLM did not have the "au-
thority to make binding determinations on the validity of the rights of
way granted [under R.S. 2477]." 74 The court went on to hold that state
law applied to R.S. 2477 conflicts. While the DOI's proposed 1994 rules
would have allowed BLM to regulate R.S. 2477 rights of way, the 1996
congressional moratorium on formal R.S. 2477 rulemaking by DOI and
its subdivisions (including the BLM) explicitly deprived the BLM of any
regulation authority over R.S. 2477 claims. 75 Additionally, the court
found that the policy was not entitled to Chevron deference because it
had shown evidence of inconsistency since 1976.76 Thus, "where Con-
gress has taken action to prevent implementation of agency rules, and
those rules have never been adopted by formal agency action, we do not
think it appropriate for a court to defer to those rules in the interpretation
of a federal statute."
77
The SUWA court upheld the district court's determination that the
burden of proof for establishing a valid right-of-way fell on the R.S.
2477 claimant.78 However, the court rejected the argument advanced by
SUWA and the BLM that "mechanical construction" was required to
perfect an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.79 Instead, the court held that a right-
of-way can be established by "continued use of the road by the public for
such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate
an intention on the part of the public to accept the grant." 80 Next, the
court held that, for the purpose of R.S. 2477, a "highway" must be a
route with continuous public use. Notably, however, the Tenth Circuit
remanded to the district court to determine whether a route which did not
lead to an "identifiable destination[]" may nonetheless constitute a high-
way. 8' Finally, the court adopted a relatively formal public use require-
ment by holding that land withdrawn by the federal government under
the 1910 Coal Withdrawal was not a reservation for public use.82 In sum,
the SUWA decision, which exhibited the characteristics of the traditional
73. See id. ("SUWA ... allege[d] that the Counties had engaged in unlawful road construc-
tion activities and that the BLM had violated its duties under FLPMA, the Antiquities Act, and the
National Environmental Policy Act, by not taking action [to stop the road construction]." (citations
omitted)).
74. Id. at 757.
75. See id. at 756-57; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 108, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-18 (1996).
76. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 760.
77. Id. at 761.
78. Id. at 768.
79. Id. at 782.
80. Id. at 781 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah 1929)).
81. Id. at 783-84.
82. Id. at 784-85.
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state law approach to the R.S. 2477 issue, became the foremost authority
on R.S. 2477 in the Tenth Circuit.
83
2. Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah84
In August 2009, a Tenth Circuit court divided 2-1 declined to ex-
tend the reasoning relied on for nearly five years after SUWA. In a deci-
sion for the plaintiff environmental groups, the Tenth Circuit's holding in
Wilderness Society has the potential to impact the next generation of R.S.
2477 litigants.
a. Facts
Beginning in the summer of 2003, representatives of Kane County,
Utah ("the County") 85 removed BLM and National Park Service signs
that restricted motor vehicle access in four federally-managed and ecol-
ogically-sensitive areas. 86 In all, the County removed thirty-one signs
from purported R.S. 2477 roads throughout the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument, Glen Canyon National Recreation Area,
Paria Canyon-Vermillion Cliffs Wilderness Area, and Moquith Mountain
Wilderness Study Area.87
Just over a year after taking down the signs, the County erected its
own signage, in some places replacing the federal signage that it had
removed the previous year. At least sixty-three of the new County signs
opened routes to motor vehicles that were previously closed to motorized
travel under the federal management plans. 88 Shortly thereafter, the BLM
sent a letter to the County requesting that it discontinue the removal and
replacement of federal signs.
In seeming defiance of the BLM request, the County enacted the
"Ordinance to Designate and Regulate the Use of Off-Highway Vehi-
cles," or Ordinance 2005-03 ("the Ordinance"), in August 2005. The
Ordinance purported to authorize the County to "post signs" designating
roads as open to motor vehicle use.89 In October 2005, plaintiffs Wilder-
83. Norton Memorandum, supra note 66, at 4. But see SUWA, 425 F.3d at 787 (departing
from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent on the coal withdrawal issue).
84. 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
85. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that those responsible for the removal of the signs
were Kane County Commissioner Mark Habbeshaw and Sheriff Lamont Smith. Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 15, Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 470 F. Supp. 2d
1300 (D. Utah 2006) (No. 2:05-CV-854 TC), 2005 WL 3197808 [hereinafter Wilderness Soc'y
Compl.].
86. Wilderness Soc 'y, 581 F.3d at 1205-06.
87. Here, the majority of the public lands in question were in Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument: "Nearly 1.3 million of the 1.6 million acres of federal public land in Kane
County lie within Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument." Id. at 1205. Grand Staircase,
created in 1996 by President Clinton, is managed by the BLM, rather than the National Parks Ser-
vice. VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE: EXAMINING UTAH'S NEWEST NATIONAL
MONUMENT, at xiii (Robert B. Keiter et al. eds., 1998).
88. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1206-07.
89. Id. at 1207.
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ness Society and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (collectively,
"TWS") filed a complaint in federal district court.90 TWS claimed that
both the County's removal of federal signs and the enactment of the
county Ordinance conflicted with existing federal land management
plans, which designated the routes in question as closed to motor vehicle
use.9 1 TWS based its argument on the theory that the federal plans pre-
empted County actions under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.92
In response, the County repealed the Ordinance during December
200693 and filed a motion to dismiss in which it alleged that the Suprem-
acy Clause did not preempt the County's actions because, pursuant to
R.S. 2477, the County possessed valid rights-of-way to the roads in ques-
tion.94 The County also challenged the federal court's jurisdiction, argu-
ing that TWS lacked standing and that the court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the controversy.
b. The District Court Decision
The District Court disagreed with the County, and exercised its ju-
risdiction to rule on TWS's claims in August 2006.95 In May 2008, the
court granted TWS's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Kane
County's failure to prove its R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in a previous quiet
title action prevented the County from using its purported property rights
to contravene federal land management policies.96 Because the County
had not clearly established property rights along the roadways, the court
held that the County's decisions to remove federal signage and expand
trail use to include off-road vehicles were preempted by federal law un-
der the Supremacy Clause.97
90. Id. For their specific injuries-in-fact, Plaintiffs submitted declarations of their members
"alleg[ing] harms to their health, recreational, scientific, spiritual, educational, aesthetic, and other
interests." Id. at 1210. The declarations specifically stated that members of TWS often use "areas
adjacent to" some of the roads in question, that they "seek[] out and prefer[] to use those federal
public land[s] that are . . . not burdened by [off-road vehicle] use," and that their "interests are di-
rectly affected and harmed by Kane County's actions in erecting signs and adopting [the]
[O]rdinance." Id. at 1210-11 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
declarations from plaintiffs' group members).
91. Of the public lands in Kane County, BLM "manages about 1.6 million acres.., and the
National Park Service about 400,000 acres." Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 470 F. Supp.
2d 1300, 1303 (D. Utah 2006).
92. See Wilderness Soc 'y Compl., supra note 85, at 18-19.
93. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1208.
94. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at I, Wilderness Soc'y, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (No.
2:05-CV-854 TC), 2006 WL 5986753; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4, Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (No. 2:05-CV-854 TC), 2006 WL 813473.
95. Wilderness Soc 'y, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
96. Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1165-66 (D. Utah 2008).
97. See id. at 165.
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c. The Tenth Circuit Affirms the District Court
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit narrowed the issues to be decided,98
stating that the only issues before the court included (1) whether federal
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims was proper, and (2) whether a
county may "exercise management authority over federal lands in a
manner that conflicts with the federal management regime without prov-
ing that it possesses valid R.S. 2477 rights of way."99 Although the case
involved hotly-debated R.S. 2477 rights, the Tenth Circuit made it clear
that it was not deciding "the validity of [Kane County's] purported R.S.
2477 rights of way over federal land." 1°°
i. Federal Jurisdiction
The Tenth Circuit held in favor of the plaintiffs TWS on all jurisdic-
tional issues, including standing, mootness, and joinder. To establish
standing, TWS was required to satisfy the constitutional standing re-
quirements of Article IH, including: (1) injury in fact; (2) a causal link
between the TWS's injury and the County's actions; and (3) that a favor-
able resolution by the court would redress the injury. °1 The majority
opinion reasoned that "[i]n the environmental context, a plaintiff who has
repeatedly visited a particular site, has imminent plans to do so again,
and whose interests are harmed by a defendant's conduct has suffered
injury in fact."'' 0 2 The court reasoned that declarations from members of
the plaintiff organizations adequately established injury in fact.'0 3 Simi-
larly, the court found that the County's actions caused the harm alleged
by the TWS because there was a "substantial likelihood" that the Coun-
ty's replacement of federal signs increased off-highway vehicle usage on
98. In its opening brief, Kane County named five issues for review:
1. Whether the District Court erred in finding that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way do not exist
unless and until adjudicated in court.
2. Whether the District Court erred in finding it had subject matter jurisdiction of TWS's
constitutional claims.
3. Whether the District Court erred in deciding that the State of Utah was not a necessary
party and in failing to address whether the United States was a necessary and indispensi-
ble party.
4. Whether the District Court erred in denying Kane County's motion to dismiss on
grounds of constitutional and prudential mootness.
5. Whether the District Court erred in denying Kane County's motions to strike and re-
quest for attorneys' fees by merely deciding it would not consider the improper materials.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 3, Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-4090), 2008 WL 4212652.
99. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1205.
100. Id. at 1219.
101. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
102. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1210 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142,
1149 (2009)). Declarants in Wilderness Society alleged harms to their "health, recreational, scien-
tific, spiritual, educational, aesthetic, and other interests" arising from increased off-road vehicle
routes on the BLM lands in question. Id.
103. While this Comment does not address in detail the interesting standing issue presented in
Wilderness Society, the history of the standing doctrine, especially in the environmental context, is
"one of pendulum shifts: first toward generous standing, then back toward more restrictive standing,
then back again toward a more generous approach." Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of
Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1508 (2008).
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the roads.' 04 Finally, the plaintiffs' complaint satisfied the redressability
requirement because an injunction requiring Kane County to remove its
signs and prohibiting the County from taking similar actions in the future
"would likely dissuade at least one person from driving an [off-road ve-
hicle] on a disputed route."'
0 5
The court also determined that TWS's claim satisfied the require-
ments for prudential standing.' °6 The court reasoned TWS's complaint
was not a generalized grievance, "but rather one that particularly impacts
their members."' 0 7 Furthermore, the court noted that "[i]f the zone of
interest test applies in a preemption case, it is clear that the environ-
mental plaintiffs fall within the zone of interest protected by the Suprem-
acy Clause."'08
In considering mootness, the Tenth Circuit found that the case was
not mooted by Defendant's removal of some of the signs permitting mo-
tor vehicle use on the routes in question or by the County's repeal of
Ordinance 2005-03 in the wake of TWS's complaint. The court recog-
nized that the County only rescinded the Ordinance to "secure the most
successful legal resolution," and that the County Commissioner himself
hinted at his intention to reenact the ordinance after the resolution of the
litigation.1°9
Finally, because the court was "not passing on the validity of any al-
leged R.S. 2477 rights of way," the court determined neither the State of
Utah nor the United States was a necessary party. 10 The majority noted
that it would have been improper to adjudicate the R.S. 2477 claims be-
cause the United States was not a party and because the County had not
filed a Quiet Title Act claim.
ii. Preemption
In a rather unique and controversial step, the Tenth Circuit found
that the Supremacy Clause, even without an associated statutory right of
action, was a valid cause of action."' As a result, TWS's preemption
claims succeeded on the merits. The Tenth Circuit stated that, where the
County's actions conflict with federal land management plans, the Coun-
104. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1213.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (explaining that
the requirements for judicially-imposed prudential standing include "the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))).
107. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1217.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1214 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kane County Comm'n).
110. Id. at 1218.
Ill. Id. at 1216.
[Vol. 87:3
2010] WILDERNESS SOCIETY V. KANE COUNTY, UTAH 739
ty may not exercise management authority over purported R.S. 2477
roads without first proving the existence of valid rights-of-way in
court."12 The court refused to allow Kane County to "defend [this] pre-
emption suit by simply alleging the existence of R.S. 2477 rights of
way."'113
To determine whether state law was, in fact conflicting with or ob-
structing federal law, the court evaluated each of the federal lands' re-
spective management plans. While the management plans stipulate that
the managing agency "may not encroach upon 'valid existing rights,"'
the court denied the existence of valid existing rights because Kane
County had yet to establish the R.S. 2477 routes in court."14 The majority
concluded by noting that the County's "claimed rights may well have
been created and vested decades ago, but until it proves ... those rights,
we agree with the district court that its regulations on federal lands that
otherwise conflict with federal law are preempted."
' 15
d. Judge McConnell's Dissent
In his dissent, Judge McConnell-the author of the landmark SUWA
decision-took issue with the majority's treatment of preemption as a
valid constitutional cause of action."16 McConnell argued that the "plain-
tiffs assert no legal claim upon which relief may be granted" because
"[t]he Supremacy Clause is not an independent source of rights but a rule
of priority that determines who wins when state and federal law con-
flict." 17 Judge McConnell attacked the merits of the plaintiffs' case, ar-
guing that the provision in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Mo-
nument Management Plan preserving "valid existing rights" precluded a
preemption claim, thereby removing any conflict between federal policy
and local laws. Moreover, Judge McConnell reasoned that "even if there
were a conflict between county law and federal law, [the court] cannot
112. This portion of the Tenth Circuit's holding conformed to their earlier conclusion in the
related case of Kane County, Utah v. Salazar. 562 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the BLM
has no duty to determine the validity of all potential R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in preparing a travel
management plan designating routes for public motor vehicle travel in the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument).
113. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1221.
114. Id. at 1220.
115. Id. at 1221.
116. While Judge McConnell admits that preemption can be used "as a defense to the enforce-
ment against [a partyl of state regulations that conflicted with federal law," he did not agree with the
majority that a "third party [could] bring a freestanding preemption claim to enforce compliance
with federal law." Id. at 1233 (McConnell, J., dissenting). Judge McConnell also disagreed that the
environmental groups had standing to bring the suit, alleging that the groups were just "interested
outsiders," id. at 123 1, without a "legally protected interest," id. at 1229.
117. Id. at 1234 (citing Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1975)) (arguing that
FLPMA does not contain citizen enforcement provisions and the Supremacy Clause is a "fundamen-
tal structural principle of federalism" not an "independent source of rights").
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determine which prevails without adjudicating the County's claimed
rights-of-way."' 8
IV. ANALYSIS
Both the district court and Tenth Circuit emphasized that Wilder-
ness Society is not about the adjudication of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way
between Kane County and the federal government. However, by attempt-
ing to resolve the apparent discrepancy between the presumption favor-
ing the federal government property owner and the widely-held view that
the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way are recognized without administrative for-
malities, Wilderness Society could signal a Tenth Circuit shift towards a
more "environmentally friendly" resolution of R.S. 2477 disputes.
A. The Significance of Wilderness Society
The SUWA rule recognizing rights-of-way without formal adjudica-
tion has proven itself to be unworkable in the cases where a local gov-
ernment is attempting to open new routes or expand seldom-used routes.
Of the roads throughout the West today, thousands are unproven R.S.
2477 rights-of-way. The majority of these rights-of-way do not give rise
to conflict, however, because they have been used continuously for many
years, are well-established, and do not traverse sensitive areas. In these
cases, formal adjudication is impractical and unnecessary. Conflicts
arise, however, when counties stretch the application of R.S. 2477 to
open new roads, re-establish rarely used trails, or continue to use unim-
proved roads in recently-designated federal wilderness areas. Such
"highways" often do not look like roads at all, and often cross environ-
mentally sensitive areas. For these types of cases, recognition of a right-
of-way without a formal process or adjudication inevitably leads to liti-
gation.
By rejecting Kane County's argument that the routes in question
were "valid existing rights," and by requiring that the rights-of-way be
proven in court before being asserted as a defense, the Tenth Circuit in
effect adopted a more straightforward rule governing county manage-
ment of routes on public lands. While Wilderness Society does not ex-
pressly overturn SUWA,"1 9 the Tenth Circuit sends a strong message:
state and local governments must prove R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in court
before exercising unilateral management authority over roads on federal
lands. While not a permanent solution to the R.S. 2477 dispute, the ma-
jority's rule adds some certainty to the treatment of alleged R.S. 2477
118. Id. at 1239 (alterations omitted).
119. Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing & Request for Rehearing en Banc at 15, Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 581 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-4090). In fact, the County argued that TWS broke new ground on
the R.S. 2477 issue and that "the [Tenth Circuit] panel effectively overrules SUWA 'by implica-
tion."' Id.
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rights-of-way and offers the promise of minimizing county actions on
federal lands that foster R.S. 2477 disputes.
Importantly, the Tenth Circuit's decision to grant standing to the
environmental plaintiffs promotes transparency and certainty. The Wil-
derness Society decision suggests that all regular users of federal lands
will likely have standing to sue state and local governments that take
actions on federal lands in contravention of federal management plans.
Furthermore, the concept established in Wilderness Society-that local
governments must prove the existence of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way before
those rights will be recognized as a defense-adds a substantial caveat to
the traditional view that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way may be established
without "administrative formalities." While state and local governments
may continue to maintain the "status quo" of purported R.S. 2477 roads
without formally proving their rights through a quiet title action, 20 they
may not rely on unproven R.S. 2477 rights-of-way to defend uses of such
roads that are inconsistent with federal land management policy.' 2' In the
several decades of Tenth Circuit jurisprudence related to R.S. 2477, 
22
Wilderness Society represents the first occasion in which the court favors
the interests of the federal government-not to mention those of an envi-
ronmental plaintiff-over the interests of a local government. The impli-
cations of this decision could be wide-reaching: because of the West's
expertise on R.S. 2477, DOI and other circuit courts have historically
deferred to the decisions of both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 
23
B. An Appeal for a Preservation-Oriented Approach
To lend certainty and closure to the R.S. 2477 debate while concur-
rently protecting states' rights and the environment, the federal approach
to R.S. 2477 must reach three objectives: (1) impose a time limit for fil-
ing of claims; (2) define ambiguous terminology from the R.S. 2477 sta-
tute; and (3) provide for an administrative process to resolve claims in a
timely and efficient manner. This approach would mirror the Department
of Interior's 1994 proposal,124 and be very similar to the Udall proposals
of 2003 and 2005.125
"The uncertainty attending [the] issue [of R.S. 2477] makes plan-
ning and development difficult, compromises an agency's mission, and
undermines the relationship between federal officials and the people they
120. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (SUWA), 425 F.3d 735, 756 (10th
Cir. 2005).
121. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1219-21.
122. See, e.g., SUWA, 425 F.3d at 785; Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1074 (10th Cir.
1988).
123. See, e.g., Norton Memorandum, supra note 66 (adopting the Tenth Circuit's approach in
SUWA as a DOI policy).
124. Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216, 39,216-17 (Aug. 1, 1994).
125. H.R. 3447, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1639, 108th Cong. (2003).
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serve."1 26 The authority of federal agencies to manage access to federal
lands is critical. 27 As demonstrated in Wilderness Society, the federal
government's ability to protect and manage its land resources is severely
undermined by state and local government actions that expand access to
R.S. 2477 roads. 28 The economic planning and development goals of
state and local governments are also compromised by the indeterminate
state of R.S. 2477.129
As populations grow and open spaces disappear, it becomes ever
more important to protect the lands set aside by the federal government
as wilderness areas, national monuments, or for other public enjoyment
purposes. 130 Because "[w]ilderness areas and Wilderness Study Areas
(WSAs) are roadless by definition,"' 3' the continued influx of R.S. 2477
claims compromises the federal government's ability to set aside wilder-
ness areas in the future.' 32 The DOI has recognized the "potential to mis-
use [R.S. 2477] greatly in a way that would destroy so much important
wildlife and recreational lands and corresponding local and regional
economies."' 33 The comprehensive approach advocated in this Comment
provides superior protection to environmental interests by making it
more difficult for local governments to claim continuously-used trails as
R.S. 2477 roads.
The federal government's failure to finally resolve the R.S. 2477 is-
sue is troublesome. Nearly 35 years after the statute's repeal, disputes
persist. While imposing a time limit for the filing of R.S. 2477 claims
would not relieve the tension inherent in the debate, it would ensure that
the process does not become even more contentious in the future. The
longer Congress waits to impose a time limit for filing claims, the more
uncertain the R.S. 2477 issue will become.134 Confusion over which
routes were established prior to 1976 is pervasive: as early as 1993, DOI
noted that "[i)ncomplete records and confusion over the law and its ap-
126. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 33.
127. See Birdsong, supra note 17, at 533 (describing the problems that R.S. 2477's uncertain-
ties present for both federal land managers and state and local governments).
128. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216-17.
129. Birdsong, supra note 17, at 533 ("State and local governments also need to plan for the
development of road networks within their jurisdiction. The lack of certainty over whether various
roads over public lands are valid rights-of-way impedes their ability to plan for economic growth
and to provide road safety.").
130. Because of the burdensome effects that roads have on the environment, it is ever more
important to adopt a hard line when it comes to opening the purported right of ways. See Rasband,
supra note 24, at 1019-20.
131. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 38.
132. "If primitive access routes are recognized as R.S. 2477 highways, large areas of public
land in some areas currently proposed for wilderness designation by various public-interest groups
may be disqualified." Id.; see also Rasband, supra note 21, at 1019.
133. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 39.
134. See Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216, 39,222 (Aug. I, 1994).
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plication make it difficult to inventory, thus assess, impacts of potential
R.S. 2477 claims."
' 135
Finally, because of the ubiquitous presence of R.S. 2477 roads in
the United States, federal legislation is preferable to the current ad hoc
system that relies on inconsistent state laws. "While existing rights pur-
suant to R.S. 2477 were not terminated [by FLPMA], their preservation
did not provide prospective, unrestricted authority to create or improve
highways without regard for the purposes of [federal] land management
systems, or other environmental and resource protection laws."'136 Ac-
cordingly, federal lands should not be "'at the mercy of [future] state
legislation' and [changes in] state common law."' 137 A federal law that
establishes universal definitions applicable to R.S. 2477 would foster
uniform application and drastically reduce conflicts in some states, like
Utah, 138 which do not have a clear approach for resolving R.S. 2477 con-flicts. 139
In sum, Congress should enact a comprehensive federal policy for
determining the validity of purported R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. A legisla-
tive solution would provide much-needed clarity, uniformity, and finality
to the R.S. 2477 debate, effectively curbing the mounting costs of litiga-
tion for the state, local, and federal government.
C. Next Steps
While Wilderness Society provides a more straightforward rule that
removes several uncertainties surrounding R.S. 2477 disputes, it also
demonstrates the limitations of the judicial branch to devise a permanent,
national R.S. 2477 solution.14° Similarly, the Congressional moratorium
on formal R.S. 2477 rulemaking has rendered federal agencies powerless
to promote a national solution. Therefore, the resolution of this contro-
versy must come in the form of long-overdue Congressional legislation.
However, with its history of failed attempts, Congress may be reticent to
promote comprehensive R.S. 2477 legislation.
Even so, the proposed approach, which assigns succinct definitions
to R.S. 2477 terminology and places a time limit on filing claims, is more
135. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 39.
136. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,218.
137. Matthew L. Squires, Note, Federal Regulation of R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way, 63 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 547, 596-97 (2008) (quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S.
389, 405 (1917); Canfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897)).
138. "Utah state law . . . has established very broad criteria for the acceptance of a public
highway. No formal acceptance of a highway is necessary, public use is accepted, and no specific
road standards are necessary to establish a highway." R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 3 1.
139. CRS REPORT, supra note 22, at 45.
140. See Birdsong, supra note 17, at 546, 553 (arguing that the "courts have proven to be an
ineffective institution" for resolving R.S. 2477 disputes because of a "series of arguably inconsistent
rulings that contribute to, rather than resolve, legal uncertainty").
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attainable now than ever. While historically this has been unrealistic, 41
the Democratic Party's current control of both the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the United States government presents a realistic oppor-
tunity for meaningful change.
Growing evidence in the local media suggests that state and local
governments, as well as their citizens, are growing weary of R.S. 2477
litigation. 14 While counties continue to file and prosecute R.S. 2477
claims, the fact remains that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way claim can take
years to resolve, all at the expense of the taxpayer. Yet Wilderness Soci-
ety opened the door for environmental groups and other interested parties
to litigate questionable county management of purported R.S. 2477
routes, increasing the probability of future litigation. Citing a recent in-
terview with the president of the Kane County Taxpayer's Association,
the Salt Lake Tribune referenced Kane County's mounting legal bills:
"Kane County has not succeeded in claiming even one RS 2477 road,
and yet taxpayers have had to foot the bill for what appears to be $1 mil-
lion in expenses related to this failed attempt to own roads on public
land." 143 In the interview, the president of the taxpayer's association also
noted that the property taxes for Kane County residents have doubled in
recent years due to the mounting costs of litigation. 44 Such a burden may
convince advocates of a state law approach to consider the permanent,
environmentally-friendly solution that they have rejected so often in the
past.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Wilderness Society shifted the
enormous controversy inherent in the R.S. 2477 debate. The decision
marked a success for environmental groups who established standing and
the proposition that a County could not use an R.S. 2477 right-of-way as
a defense to preemption claims without first establishing its rights in
court. Wilderness Society signals a more restrictive approach to R.S.
2477 jurisprudence in the Tenth Circuit, which could have broader im-
plications nationally. Still, courts have difficulty resolving R.S. 2477
conflicts largely because of the inherent ambiguity of the statute, which
has caused an insurmountable lack of consensus among courts, lawmak-
ers, and constituents.
141. Tova Wolking, Note, From Blazing Trails to Building Highways: SUWA v. BLM &
Ancient Easements over Federal Public Lands, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1067, 1105 (2007) ("[A] strict
federal standard that imposes a time limitation paired with an evidentiary burden borne solely by
states will be strongly opposed by Utah and other states that could stand to lose thousands of miles
of access routes.").
142. See, e.g., Mark Havnes, Kane and BLM to Take a Road Much Traveled Today, SALT
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To date, the federal approach to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way has been
unclear. The law is effectively at an impasse, with courts devising fact-
specific solutions to each conflict that arises. Going forward, Congress
must address the R.S. 2477 issue in a manner that defines the key terms
of the statute, provides an efficient manner for state and local govern-
ments to file claims, and, crucially, imposes a time limit for the filing of
R.S. 2477 claims. A comprehensive solution is not only essential for
judicial and economic efficiency, but also to ensure that the future of
public lands is secure and protected from further development.
Lindsay Houseal*
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PROPPING UP THE ILLUSION OF COMPUTER PRIVACY IN
UNITED STATES V. BURGESS
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that, like many Americans, you bring your laptop to and
from the office every day. On it you have sensitive work information,
perhaps personal photos and correspondences, and your browsing his-
tory. Imagine also that on your drive to work you get pulled over and the
police have probable cause to search your vehicle. Can they flip open
your laptop and begin browsing your work files? Your personal files?
Your browsing history? Can they restore your deleted files and search
those?
Now imagine they are looking for evidence of drug trafficking. Is
there a limit to the types of files they may open? Can they open only
spreadsheets or files with suspicious names, such as "heroinpro-
ceeds.xls?" Can they look at your personal photos, or your browsing
history? And, if they find evidence of a different crime, can they use it
against you?
Those are some of the questions faced by David Burgess and the au-
thorities that searched two hard drives found in his motor home during a
traffic stop. When the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Bur-
gess's case, it attempted to answer two specific questions: First, do com-
puters qualify as containers, along with all the implications to a search
that conclusion brings; second, if computers are containers, do any dis-
cernible concepts limit law enforcement access to personal computer
files?
Part I of this Comment summarizes the Tenth Circuit's analysis of
these issues in United States v. Burgess,' the court's most recent foray
into the world of computer privacy. Part II examines the implications of
treating a computer like a container, concluding that in several instances
such a treatment will result in a greater number of searches of computers.
Part III considers whether other Fourth Amendment doctrines will in-
crease or decrease the privacy right associated with a computer and its
contents. In Part IV, this Comment examines the difficulties involved in
limiting the scope of computer searches. Finally, Part V concludes that
the privacy protections applied in Burgess were wholly illusory, and ar-
gues that the court should have either rejected additional safeguards for
computer privacy, or applied real-not illusory--computer privacy pro-
I. 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009).
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tections by following the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.
2
I. UNITED STATES V. BURGESS
A. Facts
At a restaurant parking lot in Evanston, Wyoming, State Trooper
Matt Arnell spotted a motor home known to be associated with the Hell's
Angels motorcycle club bearing Nevada license plates and towing a trai-
ler with expired Wyoming license plates. 3 Arnell followed the vehicle
onto Interstate 80; after calling the dispatcher to request the assistance of
a canine drug unit, he pulled over the motor home in order to cite the
owner for the expired plates.4 As the driver, Shayne Waldron, exited the
motor home, Arnell smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from
the vehicle.5 While Arnell spoke with Waldron, David Burgess-the
owner of the motor home-joined the conversation. 6 Before Arnell fin-
ished writing the citation, Deputy David Homar arrived with his police
dog, Blitz, who alerted to the motor home's doors.7
Arnell informed Burgess of his intent to search the motor home.
8
Burgess requested that Arnell obtain a warrant.9 Based on the marijuana
odor and Blitz's alert, however, Arnell proceeded to search the motor
home without a warrant.'0 Arnell found marijuana, a pipe, and fourteen
grams of cocaine in the motor home." Burgess admitted that the mai-
juana belonged to him.' 2 Arnell continued the search, locating a laptop
computer and a Seagate hard drive. 13 Arnell seized the vehicle, which
was towed to a Wyoming Department of Transportation facility for addi-
tional inspection.'
4
Arnell and Agent Russell Schmidt of the Green River police de-
partment offered a sworn affidavit and requested a warrant to search the
hard drives.' 5 Agent Schmidt stated in the affidavit that drug traffickers
often keep photos of drugs and their co-conspirators in their vehicles.'
6
The county judge approved the warrant, authorizing a search of the hard
2. 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).









12. Id. at 1083.
13. Id. The first search took less than thirty minutes. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Agent Hughes described these as "trophy photos." Id. at 1084 (defining "trophy pho-
tos" as "pictures of 'a person holding the controlled substance in front of a stack of money').
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drives for records, "pay-owe sheets," and "items of personal property
which would tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs."'
' 7
Agent Scott Hughes of the Internet Crimes Against Children Divi-
sion was assigned to search the seized hard drives.' 8 Following protocol,
Hughes used the "EnCase" computer program to duplicate the contents
of the hard drives seized from Burgess's motor home.' 9 The EnCase pro-
gram allows an investigator to preview files as they are being copied.2°
The previewed files are displayed in a "gallery view" at a reduced size,
many to a page.2' Hughes used this feature to look for photos of con-
trolled substances while the drive was being copied.22 Hughes had
viewed 200 to 300 digital images while the files were transferring when
he discovered an image depicting child sexual exploitation.23 Pursuant to
a DCI staff attorney's instructions, Hughes then stopped his search and
requested a new warrant authorizing a search for evidence of child sexual
exploitation. 24 Searching under the auspices of the new warrant, Hughes
found numerous images of child pornography on both the hard drives
seized from Burgess's motor home.
A grand jury indicted Burgess under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1),
which prohibits the knowing transportation of child pornography across
state lines, and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), which prohibits
the knowing possession of child pornography transported in interstate
commerce. 26 Prior to trial, Burgess moved to suppress the evidence
found on the hard drive that was the basis for his indictment on both
counts.27 Burgess claimed the initial search of the hard drive, which
sought to uncover evidence of drug trafficking, violated the Fourth
17. Id. at 1083. The warrant described:
"The property and premises of a white, 1999, Freightliner Motorhome . . .[for] certain
property and evidence to show the transportation and delivery of controlled substances,
which may include but not limit[ed] to, cash, or proceeds from the sale of controlled sub-
stances, Marijuana, Cocaine, Methamphetamine, or other illegal controlled substances,
along with associated paraphernalia to include but not limited to pipes, bongs, syringes,
packaging material, computer records, scales, laboratory dishes, flasks, beakers, tubes,
pie tins, electrical timers, containers to be used for storing, manufacturing and selling,
chemicals used in the creation of illegal narcotics as well as their diluting agents, items of
personal property which would tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs, including pay-owe
sheets, address books, rolodexes, pagers, firearms and monies."
Id. (alterations in original).
18. Id. The warrant allowed the agents to search Burgess's laptop, the Seagate external hard
drive, and a second hard drive manufactured by Maxtor. Id. However, the warrant's scope was
limited to searching for evidence related to controlled substances. Id. Agent Hughes was instructed
by a DCI staff attorney to obtain a new warrant should he find evidence of other crimes. Id.
19. Id. at 1083-84.




24. Id. at 1083-84.
25. Id. at 1084. Although he stopped counting at 1,300 images, Hughes estimated the total
number of images of child pornography contained on the two hard drives was over 70,000. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Burgess filed additional motions outside the scope of this Comment. Id.
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Amendment requirement that search warrants describe items sought by
the government with sufficient particularity.28 The government countered
by asserting that even if the warrant was deficient, the search was still
permissible under the automobile exception. 29 Rather than rely solely on
the automobile exception to uphold the search, the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming found that the warrant contained suf-
ficient particularity with respect to the items to be seized. 30 A jury con-
victed Burgess on both counts, and he appealed the denial of his motion
to suppress.
31
B. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
Examining Burgess's case, the Tenth Circuit considered two meth-
ods of applying Fourth Amendment protections to computers. First, the
court considered whether a computer is a container and therefore subject
to search under the automobile exception.32 Second, the court considered
whether it was possible to fashion a rule that would adequately limit the
scope of computer searches without precluding such searches altogether.
Although the Tenth Circuit expressed concern about the potential abuse
of computer searches, it ultimately failed to devise a rule that would pro-
tect citizens from "file-by-file" rummaging without significantly interfer-
ing with legitimate law enforcement interests.
1. Are computers containers?
Under the automobile exception announced in Carroll v. United
33States, an officer may perform a warrantless search of a vehicle, pro-
vided probable cause exists. 34 In California v. Acevedo, 31 the Supreme
Court held that the automobile exception applies uniformly to the interior
of a vehicle, including any containers that are present.36 Because the
Tenth Circuit had previously analogized a computer to a suitcase,37 it
would be a small step for the court to hold that the automobile exception
allows officers to search a laptop computer without a warrant when the
28. Id.; see also Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (No. 08-
8053), 2009 WL 1258555 ("The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant describe the
things to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a general exploratory rummaging in a
person's belongings." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Campos, 221
F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000))). See generally United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362
(10th Cir. 1997) ("A warrant's description of things to be seized is sufficiently particular ifit allows
the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.").
29. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1084.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1086-87. Burgess' other arguments on appeal are outside the scope of this Com-
ment.
32. Id. at 1087-88.
33. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
34. Id. at 155-56.
35. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
36. See id. at 580.
37. See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom.
Andrus v. United States, 552 U.S. 1297 (2008).
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computer is found pursuant to a vehicle search supported by probable
cause.38 The Burgess court reinforced this possibility by referencing the
language of Acevedo, which "interpret[ed] Carroll as providing one rule
to govern all automobile searches., 39 This "one rule" language could
foreclose the possibility of treating a computer differently than a con-
tainer, if the Tenth Circuit correctly interpreted Acevedo as compelling
the equal treatment of all objects capable of containing evidence in an
automobile. As the court stated, "Nothing in Acevedo suggests [a com-
puter search]... would be impermissible without a warrant....,,4
The court also discussed an alternative4' to treating a computer as a
container: treating it as a "virtual home. 42 Because computers are capa-
ble of storing vast amounts of personal information, they may deserve
the enhanced Fourth Amendment protections the Supreme Court has so
far reserved only for homes.4 3 Indeed, the Burgess court cited a Tenth
Circuit precedent cautioning that "the sheer range and volume of per-
sonal information the computer may contain" argues for treating a com-
puter differently than a simple container.4a
The Tenth Circuit found no case law that directly addressed the is-
sue, and ultimately declined to resolve it.45 The court skirted the "one
rule" language presented by Acevedo, stating the truism, "[S]eemingly
well-settled matters are subject to change, ' ,46 and referencing the Su-
preme Court's recent change to Fourth Amendment automobile excep-
tion jurisprudence in Arizona v. Gant.47 The Tenth Circuit explained:
38. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1087-88.
39. Id. at 1089 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579).
40. Id. at 1090.
41. The court also implies a third way of treating a laptop, suggesting that its United States v.
Carey decision created different rules for seizure than for searching a laptop. See id.; United States
v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999). Under Carey, a laptop may be seized and secured
while a warrant is obtained. 172 F.3d at 1275. This begs a comparison with the Supreme Court's
treatment of automobiles. In Chambers v. Maroney, the Court suggested that a vehicle could either
be searched pursuant to the automobile exception, or could be seized and secured until a warrant is
issued. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970). Yet in that very same case, the Court upheld a warrantless search of
a vehicle in custody. Id. This treatment also raises the question of what level of suspicion should be
required of an officer seizing a digital storage device. With the prevalence of laptops, cell phones,
iPods and Blackberry devices, the likelihood of a person encountering law enforcement having such
a device in their vehicle is high. A low standard for seizure of these devices may incentivize law
enforcement to seize them routinely without individualized suspicion. On the other hand, a high
standard of seizure may not be reconcilable with Acevedo's ruling that no individualized suspicion is
required to search containers within a permissibly searched automobile.
42. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1088.
43. Id. at 1088-89.
44. Id. at 1088 (citing United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009)).
45. Id. ("[Tihe parties have cited no case law which either allows or prohibits computer
equipment searches under the automobile exception and our research has failed to uncover such
authority.").
46. Id. at 1090.
47. Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (2009); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 (1981)).
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In spite of clear language in Acevedo, one might speculate whether
the Supreme Court would treat laptop computers, hard drives, flash
drives or even cell phones as it has a briefcase or give those types of
devices preferred status because of their unique ability to hold vast
amounts of diverse personal information.48
Despite its extensive discussion of the manner of application of the
Fourth Amendment to computers found during valid automobile
searches, the Burgess court avoided the issue by simply affirming the
District Court's holding that the warrant issued to search Burgess's mo-
tor home was valid.49
2. Scope of a computer search
Although the Burgess court failed to grant preferential Fourth
Amendment protections to laptop computers in automobiles, it neverthe-
less considered ways to limit the scope of permissive computer
searches.5° Specifically, the court asked whether there was anything
Agent Hughes was compelled to do to protect Burgess's privacy rights
associated with his computers. The court concluded, however, that there
is no good way to limit the scope of a computer search, and that such
searches will always amount to general searches of the computer's con-
tents. "[I]n the end," the court explained, "there may be no practical sub-
stitute for actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes
at the documents contained within those folders, and that is true whether
the search is of computer files or physical files.'
At first blush, this holding appears to run contrary to two prior deci-
sions issued by the court. First, in United States v. Carey,52 the court said
in a dictum that computer searches should be limited to the information
specified in the warrant through methods such as "observing files types
53
and titles listed on the directory, doing a key word search for relevant
terms, or reading portions of each file stored in the memory." 54 Second,
in United States v. Walser,55 the Tenth Circuit held that a computer
search must be conducted in a manner that "avoids searching files of
types not identified in the warrant.',
56
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1088, 1091. Because the laptop in an Acevedo search issue was presented by the
Government as an alternative method of finding the search of Burgess's computers valid, the up-
holding of the warrant's validity rendered that issue moot. See id. at 1091-92.
50. Id. at 1092-93.
51. Id. at 1094.
52. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
53. File types are often identified by a string of alpha-numeric characters appended to the file
name known as "file name extensions." See, e.g., Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1093 & n.16.
54. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.
55. 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001).
56. Id. at 986 (finding that agent used a clear search methodology, only searching records
where evidence might logically be found).
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The court explained its divergence from the Carey dictum by ex-
plaining that because the scope of a computer search can never be less
than the subject matter described in the warrant and affidavit, the limita-
tions suggested in Carey cannot effectively restrict a computer search.5 7
The objects of the government search can be hidden using misleading
directory or file names 58 or disguised by false file extensions. 59 Keyword
searches cannot confine a computer search because keyword searches are
based on file names, which may be unreliable or inaccurate. 60 Even the
file directory structure can be manipulated so as to obfuscate investiga-
tors, and the directory itself may simply be too confusing to provide a
means of restricting the scope of a search.6'
The court explained how its decision in Burgess was not inconsis-
tent with Walser by explaining that even the most well-intentioned
search protocol may eventually degenerate into general file-by-file rum-
maging. 62 The court stated, "[1]t is folly for a search warrant to attempt to
structure the mechanics of the search, 63 but asserted that this will not
always be the case, admonishing that privacy rights require "an officer
executing a search warrant to first look in the most obvious places and as
it becomes necessary to progressively move from the obvious to the ob-
scure." 64 The flaw in this statement became immediately apparent to the
court: if an officer is to conduct a thorough search, and all of the limits
identified in Carey may conceal legitimate search objects, then no search
will be thorough unless it degenerates into a file-by-file general rummag-
ing.65 Thus, the court concluded, "in general a structured approach may
provide only the illusion of protecting privacy interests."
66
Despite concluding that "[t]he preview technique may be problem-
atic in other contexts," the Tenth Circuit upheld the search.67 First, the
court praised Agent Hughes's decision to terminate his search as soon as
he found evidence of criminal wrongdoing not specified by the warrant,
and to secure a warrant with greater scope.68 Part of Carey's holding
57. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092-93.
58. Id. at 1093-94 & n.18 ("While file or directory names may sometimes alert one to the
contents (e.g., 'Russian Lolitas,' 'meth stuff,' or 'reagents'), illegal activity may not be advertised
even in the privacy of one's personal computer-it could well be coded or otherwise disguised.").
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1093.
61. Id. ("The directory structure might give hints as to an effective search strategy, but could
just as well be misleading and most often could not effectively, or even reasonably, be described or
limited in a warrant.").
62. See id. at 1094.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. (explaining that investigators may be required to search all computer folders and
even preview files to ensure complete searches).
66. Id. at 1095.
67. Id. at 1094.
68. Id. at 1094-95.
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mandated this restriction on computer searches.69 However, the court
recognized that the only distinction between Carey's requirement (to
await a new warrant upon finding evidence outside the scope of the exist-
ing warrant) and no requirement at all, is that the files "would be discov-
ered later, rather than earlier., 70 Second, the court reasoned that Agent
Schmidt's affidavit included images of drugs as part of the search pa-
rameters, allowing Agent Hughes to look at image files.71 Because
Hughes began the search by looking at digital image files, the search
conformed to the court's requirement that agents "first look in the most
obvious places. 72 Third, because Hughes was allowed to search for pho-
tographs, he would inevitably have found the child pornography.73 Fi-
nally, and tellingly, the court pointed out that Burgess 74 was unable to
proffer a suitable alternative rule.
75
II. THE COMPUTER-CONTAINER ANALOGY EXPANDS COMPUTER
SEARCHES
The Burgess court discussed, in part, whether a computer may be
directly analogized to a container.7 6 Part H of this Comment examines
the implications of a strict computer-container analogy, and argues that
such treatment would significantly expand the ability of law enforcement
to search a computer.77
A. The Automobile Exception
The Tenth Circuit discussed the automobile exception at consider-
able length in Burgess. Generally, people enjoy less privacy expectations
in their cars than they do in their homes.78 As the Supreme Court stated,
"The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle."
79
69. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999).
70. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1095. Essentially, Hughes could have kept searching for photos of
drugs and inadvertently discovered each and every instance of child pornography. Id.
71. Id. at 1083-84, 1095.
72. Id. at 1094. Although the court does not address it, some concern may be warranted over
an agent trained in ferreting out child pornography immediately searching for evidence of drug
distribution by looking at digital image files.
73. Id. at 1095.
74. This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit could not come up with any good alternative
either. See infra Part IV.
75. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1095.
76. Id. at 1087-90.
77. If the implications of a strict analogy of computers and containers are disturbing, the
treatment of computer as a "virtual home" is untenable. In California v. Carney, the Supreme Court
upheld a search of a vehicle under the automobile exception that served as the defendant's actual
home. 471 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1985). Clearly in Carney, the amount of personal information stored
within the defendant's motor home equated with that of an actual home. However, the Court applied
not the enhanced protections associated with a home, but reduced protections associated with an
automobile. If Carney's motor home did not deserve the heightened Fourth Amendment protection
that the Court typically extends to homes, the idea that the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to extend
heightened protection to Burgess's laptop computer should be utterly unremarkable.
78. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
79. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004).
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The automobile exception permits an officer to search a vehicle without
a warrant when that officer has probable cause to believe evidence or
contraband may be found in the vehicle. 0
Under United States v. Ross,81 an officer with probable cause to
search a vehicle could only extend the warrantless search to a container
within the vehicle if the officer had probable cause to believe that the
container "may conceal the object of the search. 8 2 The Supreme Court
weakened that requirement in California v. Acevedo, 3 however, by al-
lowing a warrantless search of a vehicle under the automobile exception
to extend to containers within that vehicle regardless of whether probable
cause exists for each individual container. s4 In Wyoming v. Houghton 
the Court clarified that an officer who has probable cause to search a
vehicle may conduct a warrantless search of any container within the
vehicle capable of concealing the sought items.86 This rule extends to all
containers found in a vehicle, regardless of the ownership of the con-
87tainer.
As Burgess contemplates, a strict computer-container analogy
would allow a warrantless search of any computer found in an automo-
bile so long as the police have probable cause to search the vehicle itself.
Under Houghton, the law would not distinguish between a computer
owned by a passenger and one owned by the vehicle's owner. Thus, any
digital storage device-regardless of its ownership--is subject to imme-
diate, warrantless search by an officer who finds the device while execut-
ing a valid vehicle search, provided that the device is capable of conceal-
ing the items sought by the officer.
B. Search Incident to Arrest
In addition to expanding searches pursuant to the automobile excep-
tion, a strict computer-container analogy would likely to increase the
number of computer searches incident to arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court
explained the search incident to arrest doctrine in Chimel v. California,88
where it established that an officer without a warrant may search the area
within the arrestee's immediate control in order to protect officer safety
and to prevent the destruction of evidence. 89 Under New York v. Belton,90
80. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 388.
81. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
82. See id. at 825.
83. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
84. See id. at 574.
85. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
86. See id. at 307.
87. Id.
88. 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
89. Id. at 763.
90. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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a Chimel search extends to an automobile if the arrestee is driving.91
Therefore, under the rule in Chimel-and assuming a strict container-
computer analogy regime-an officer's search of a laptop or digital stor-
age device in the possession of a lawfully arrested person could be un-
dertaken without a warrant.
The Supreme Court established a new rule for searches incident to
arrest in Arizona v. Gant.92 Under the Gant rule, a warrantless search
incident to arrest of an automobile occupant is permissible when either
the search is for evidence of the arresting offense or when the officer
cannot secure the arrestees.93 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
left open the possibility that either search might be justified in contexts
outside of a roadside vehicle stop.94
Because Ross allows an officer to search any container capable of
containing the object of the search provided the container is found during
a valid vehicle search,95 the combination of Ross and Gant broaden the
ability of police to search containers following an arrest. Taken together,
the two cases allow an officer, after a lawful arrest for an evidence-based
crime, to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of that crime
throughout the arrestee's vehicle and in any container in that vehicle, so
long those containers are capable of hiding the sought evidence. If Jus-
tice Steven's suggestion-that Gant may be the rule for any search inci-
dent to arrest-is correct, a container within the control of an arrestee is
automatically subject to warrantless search so long as it could contain
evidence of the arresting offense.
Extending the Gant-Ross rule to the digital evidence context, a
computer must be capable of containing pertinent evidence of the crime
before an officer is allowed to search it without a warrant. However, in
this multimedia age, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a com-
puter is incapable of containing evidence-such as photographs-of a
crime. While it may be far-fetched to assert that a defendant or his pas-
senger had taken digital photographs of a minor infraction such as a traf-
fic violation, certainly such photographs are capable of existing on a
computer.
IH. PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS ON YOUR COMPUTER
While search doctrines that embrace the computer-container anal-
ogy will likely lead to a greater number of computer searches, police
may access personal computer information in some instances without
91. Id. at 460. The occasions which would trigger an automobile's search incident to arrest
and the extent of that search has been limited by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant, but the
principle remains the same. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
92. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
93. Id. at 1718-19.
94. Id. at 1721.
95. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
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ever implicating the Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States,96 Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence defined a search as a violation of a legitimate
expectation of privacy.97 The question then, is when does a person have a
legitimate expectation of privacy on their computer? Courts have gener-
ally held that a personal computer, in most circumstances, is not accessi-
ble by the public at large, and therefore subject to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.98 However, in some situations that expectation is strong-er, and in some cases no legitimate expectation exists whatsoever.
A. File Sharing
It is axiomatic that public places are not subject to the same expec-
tations of privacy as private places. 99 When a person uses file sharing
software, they grant public access to the private content on their com-
puter. In essence, a person using a program such as Napster or LimeWire
to share files with the public may also be destroying a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in their computer. That was exactly the situation pre-
sented to the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Stults.'0° In Stults, the
court held that the government's inspection of the defendant's downloads
folder did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant's
decision to use and install a file sharing program rendered that folder
open to the public. 01 Conceivably, after Stults, a court would uphold a
federal agent's suspicionless and warrantless search of any computer
folder that is accessible by a file sharing program.
B. Deleted Files
The Supreme Court has also held that a warrantless search of items
that a person has abandoned does not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment. '0 2 In California v. Greenwood, the Court held that a warrantless
police search of sealed, opaque garbage bags left on the street did not rise
to the level of a "search," in the meaning of Katz, because a person aban-
dons any reasonable expectation of privacy by making items or informa-
tion available to the general public.'03 Deleted computer files are not set
out on the curb or otherwise available for public inspection. Nor are de-
leted computer files handed over to a third party for destruction. How-
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
97. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J. concurring).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (M.D. Pa. 2008); United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936
(W.D. Tex. 1998).
99. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) (holding search of garbage
left on public streets warranted no legitimate expectation of privacy and did not implicate Fourth
Amendment).
100. 575 F.3d 834, 843 (8th Cir. 2009).
101. Id. Interestingly, the defendant claimed he did not know that the program opened his
computer to the public, yet the court still found that the defendant "opened his download folder to
the world." Id.
102. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41-42.
103. Id. at 40-42.
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ever, computers do have virtual trashcans, and the deleted items that oc-
cupy them are arguably abandoned. So, if the government conducts a
search of a Windows Recycle Bin or a restoration and search of deleted
files, is the Fourth Amendment implicated? According to the First Cir-
cuit, it is. In United States v. Upham,'°4 the court found enough of a dis-
tinction between deleted computer files and trash bags left on the street
to state that a computer user continued to have an expectation of privacy
in deleted computer files. 0 5 Unlike garbage left on the street, where,
conceivably, anyone may rifle through it, deleted computer files are not
exposed to the public at-large.' 06
C. Password Protection and Encryption
Files protected by passwords or encryption are entitled to a greater
level of privacy than those without such safeguards.' 0 7 In Trulock v.
Freeh, the Fourth Circuit held that protecting a computer with a pass-
word is an expression of intent to remain private, akin to placing a lock
on a footlocker.' 08 The Tenth Circuit has adopted this analogy.' 09
However, one commentator has suggested that there is no basis for
granting heightened privacy rights to electronic information protected by
encryption."0 Professor Kerr analogizes encryption to the shredding of
files or to speaking in foreign languages, both being scenarios in which
no heightened level of privacy was granted."' Simply because individu-
als express their desire to hide their computer files behind encryption or
their physical files by shredding does not mean that such a privacy ex-
pectation is legitimate enough for the government to be bound to ac-
knowledge it.
IV. ELUSIVE LIMITS FOR COMPUTER SEARCHES
When the Fourth Amendment is implicated, a search must be con-
ducted under the auspices of a warrant or pursuant to one of the excep-
104. 168 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Upham v. United States, 527 U.S.
1011 (1999).
105. Id. at 537 n.3.
106. Id. ("We reject the government's suggestion that, by deleting the images, Upham 'aban-
doned' them and surrendered his right of privacy. Analogy is a hallowed tool of legal reasoning; but
to compare deletion to putting one's trash on the street where it can be searched by every passer-by
is to reason by false analogy." (citations omitted)).
107. See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391,403 (4th Cir. 2001).
108. Id.
109. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Because intimate informa-
tion is commonly stored on computers, it seems natural that computers should fall into the same
category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal items that 'command[] a high degree of pri-
vacy"' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir.
1992))).
110. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a "Reason-
able Expectation of Privacy?," 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 505 (2001).
Ill. Id. at 513-18 (citing United States v. Longoria 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999)
(foreign languages); United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir. 1992) (shredding)).
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tions to the warrant requirement. When the government conducts a
search of computer files in the context of a validly issued search warrant,
the scope of the search must be limited to those things particularly de-
scribed by the warrant. However, as Burgess recognizes, narrowing the
scope of a lawful search of a computer becomes difficult, if not impossi-
ble. This section examines the problem of scope and generality in com-
puter searches.
A. The Plain View Doctrine
Under the plain-view doctrine, if an officer conducting a lawful
search uncovers an item that is obviously contraband or evidence, the
officer may seize that item. 12 However, as the Burgess court empha-
sized, the owner of a computer may have masked the location or nature
of contraband through creative use of file names, extensions, and direc-
tory structure. Accordingly, a search of a computer ultimately must be
conducted in a manner which renders the entire contents of a hard drive
in "plain view."' 1 3 As Professor Kerr has stated, the plain view exception
"does not impose a real limit on searches for electronic evidence ....
Because electronic evidence can be located anywhere on a hard drive, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to say that a physical search was objec-
tively unjustifiable."' 
14
B. File names and Extensions
One limitation on searches for digital evidence could be file names.
Often file or folder names speak to their contents. For example, the Sixth
Circuit found that an informant's tip that a defendant had a folder on his
computer titled "child kiddie" provided, in part, the basis for probable
cause for a warrant to search that computer. 15 However, Burgess rejects
the converse proposition: that a search can be restricted to files with sus-
picious names."1 6 The Tenth Circuit argues that file names can easily be
changed to disguise their contents.
17
Another limitation could be file extensions. File extensions are
"tags" appended to file names that indicate to the computer and the user
what type the file is. Presumably, a search could be restricted to files that
exhibit specific file extensions. For instance, a search for child pornogra-
phy could be limited to image files with extension types such as .gif,
.jpeg, and so on.
112. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,464-66 (1971).
113. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1095 (1 0th Cir. 2009).
114. Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
279, 305 (2005).
115. United States v. McNally, 327 F. App'x 554, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2009).
116. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092-94.
117. Id. at 1093.
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The Burgess court rejected this limitation as well. 1 8 Like file
names, it reasoned, file extensions can be manipulated to conceal a file's
true nature, and a wide variety of file extensions can hold the type of
information sought by authorities." 9 This argument was also advanced
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in
United States v. Gray.2 ° There, the court asserted, as did the Burgess
court, that file names and extensions cannot limit the scope of a proper
search of a computer.121
C. Restrictions of Search Methodology
Professor Kerr has suggested that one means of limiting the scope
of computer searches is to require police to have their search methodol-
ogy pre-approved by a magistrate.' 22 However, Burgess explains that any
search protocol for a computer will ultimately degrade into a general
search.1 23 At first blush, keyword searches may seem like an acceptable
method of restraining a computer search. But, as the Burgess court ex-
pressed, such searches are often based on file names, 124 and if file names
may be modified to conceal legitimate objectives of a search, keyword
searches are just as unreliable. 25 Similarly, requiring officers to search a
computer based on the manner in which the files are organized does
nothing to eliminate the possibility that pertinent evidence could be con-
cealed in an unintuitive location on the drive; as a result, authorities can
present a colorable argument of the necessity to search everywhere on
the drive. 16 Indeed, Professor Kerr asserts, "The physical-world rules do
not prevent a general rummaging through electronic evidence.
'1 27
But even the Burgess court fell into the trap of trusting prescribed
methodologies to limit computer searches. The court stated:
A warrant may permit only the search of particularly described
places and only particularly described things may be seized. As the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999).
121. Id.
122. See Kerr, supra note 114, at 316 (citing In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp.
2d 953 (N.D. Ill. 2004)).
123. See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094.
124. While forensic search engines such as dtSearch look for keywords inside of text-based
documents giving some clue as to their genuine contents, this is not the case in digital photographs
where no or limited text is associated with the file's contents. See Beryl A. Howell, Digital Foren-
sics: Sleuthing on Hard Drives and Networks, VT. B.J., Fall 2005, at 39, 42-43.
125. See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1093-94. See generally Susan W. Brenner & Barbara A. Frede-
riksen, Computer Searches and Seizures: Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 39, 60-61 (2002) (examining the limitations of automated searches on computers).
126. The Burgess court mocks this notion, stating: "One would not ordinarily expect a warrant
to search filing cabinets for evidence of drug activity to prospectively restrict the search to 'file
cabinets in the basement' or to file folders labeled 'Meth Lab' or 'Customers.' And there is no
reason to so limit computer searches." Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094.
127. Kerr, supra note 114, at 305.
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description of such places and things becomes more general, the me-
thod by which the search is executed become[s] more important-the
search method must be tailored to meet allowed ends.
128
However, the court's suggestion of a limiting principle is simply to
look in obvious places first and less obvious places second, which is tru-
ly no limit at all. 129 Instead, such methodology is a means of expedit-
ing-rather than limiting-searches. As the court conceded, "a structured
approach may provide only the illusion of protecting privacy inter-
ests."
, 130
D. Generality and Heterogeneity
The holdings of Burgess and Gray create a scenario where the per-
missible search of a computer for any one file automatically permits law
enforcement to search all files on the computer, effectively turning a
particularized warrant-where one exists-into a general warrant when-
ever a computer file is specified.' 31 This problem exists, in part, because
computers contain many heterogeneous files, most of which will not be
responsive to any given search.
This problem of heterogeneous records is not new to computers.
The Supreme Court has considered it in the context of searches of file
cabinets. In Andresen v. Maryland, the Supreme Court stated:
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers that are
not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical
objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In searches for
papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be exam-
ined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact,
among those papers authorized to be seized. Similar dangers, of
course, are present in executing a warrant for the "seizure" of tele-
phone conversations. In both kinds of searches, responsible officials,
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are
conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon
privacy.' 
32
Like papers and phone records, searches of computer records inevi-
tably cause non-responsive documents to be swept up with responsive
128. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1095 (emphasis added).
131. This generality problem is exacerbated by the Upham decision. See supra Part I1I.B. The
Upham court held that a warrant authorizing a search of defendant's computer implicitly authorized
federal agents to restore and search deleted files on the computer. United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d
532, 537 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Upham v. United States, 527 U.S. 1011 (1999).
Any method of "extract[ing]" the information sought, said the court, was permissible. Id. at 536.
Putting Burgess and Upham together, a search of any computer for a single file authorizes a search
of every file including those deleted files, which may be-by any means-recovered.
132. 427 U.S. 463,482 n.l I (1976).
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files. The Court permits files to be examined so investigators may deter-
mine whether those files are authorized for seizure-indeed, this is what
occurred in Burgess.'33 However, the Court's admonition that this search
be "conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon
privacy"' 34 must not be ignored. Searching a computer by peering into
the contents of every folder and every file is perhaps the method that
least minimizes "unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." In fact, the
Court's language in Andresen may preclude investigators from conduct-
ing the type of search performed in Burgess and Gray so long as there
are less intrusive methods available. Furthermore, purporting to limit a
general search by requiring it to start at the most obvious location but
ultimately allowing it to wander through the entire contents of a hard
drive cannot be seen as meeting Andresen's minimization requirement
because the privacy violation, in the end, is identical to that of a general
search of the hard drive. The sanctioning of this approach exemplifies the
type of illusory protection employed by the Burgess court.
Aside from asking the investigators to begin their search in the most
obvious location, the Tenth Circuit provided a second-and equally illu-
sory-protection. When Agent Hughes found the first image of child
sexual exploitation on David Burgess's hard drive he stopped searching
and obtained an expanded warrant that included permission to search for
additional child pornography. 35 Hughes' original search was constrained
by the scope of the first warrant; which was designed to adhere to the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Carey. In Carey, the court held that in order
to utilize the plain view doctrine in searches of electronic records, an
officer must obtain an additional warrant upon discovering contraband
not particularly described in the original warrant. 136 The Carey court
found that an officer conducting a warranted computer search for drug
evidence violated the Fourth Amendment when he exceeded the scope of
the warrant by extending his search to look for additional child pornog-
raphy after identifying an initial image. 37 In contrast, the Burgess court
commended Agent Hughes for securing additional authority to search for
child pornography, but admitted that Hughes could have gone on search-
ing as long as he was still searching for photos of drugs or anything else
within the scope of the original warrant. 3 8 In other words, Hughes could
have searched so long as his subjective intention was to find pictures of




135. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1084.
136. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 1271, 1276.
138. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1095.
139. See id. Looking at the subjective intent of an officer conducting a search is an oddity in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
(holding that an officer's subjective reasons for a vehicle stop are irrelevant).
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While the Burgess court's response to the Carey rule is tepid,' 40
from a privacy standpoint there is even less reason to celebrate such a
rule. To begin with, if officers can search until they find contraband out-
side the scope of their warrant, but can use that contraband to retroac-
tively secure an expanded warrant and continue searching for similar
contraband, it is unclear what additional limit that places on an electronic
search. Second, Burgess stands for the proposition that an officer search-
ing a computer for tax records who finds photos of drugs has merely to
state that they are still searching for tax records as they systematically
(and inadvertently, of course) stumble across every photo of drugs on the
hard drive.' 4' Last, an officer who complies with the Carey rule and stops
searching after finding the first instance of contraband not covered by the
warrant will inevitably discover all contraband on the computer after
securing an additional warrant. Thus, even if officers fail to stop and
secure a warrant, modem rules of criminal procedure would prevent any
evidence so obtained from being excluded from evidence in a later tri-
al.' 42 Accordingly, the requirement to stop an ongoing search upon dis-
covering unexpected contraband to secure an expanded warrant is a
wholly illusory protection, ultimately granting no greater limitation on
the scope of a computer search than having no requirements at all.
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROVIDES A SOLUTION: THIRD PARTY REVIEW
On one hand, courts reject general warrants and general searches.
143
However, cases like Gray and Burgess stand for the proposition that-by
necessity-a search of a computer for any one thing can easily degener-
ate into a general search of the computer's contents. Andresen states that
this is permissible so long as no alternative exists that would generate
fewer privacy invasions. But is there truly no alternative to allowing offi-
cers free reign whenever they have cause to search a computer?
In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 144 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals created such an alternative. Comprehensive
Drug Testing outlined a new rule requiring third-party review and redac-
tion of computer files, which restricts, while not crippling, law enforce-
ment's access to personal computer files.
45
140. See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092 ("[lit is tempting ... to over read Carey. But the Carey
holding was limited.").
141. See id. This subjective standard creates a perverse incentive for officers to lie about what
their intentions are while searching a computer.
142. According to the so-called inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, this
type of evidence could be introduced to trial. See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)
(holding that exclusion of evidence initially obtained illegally, but which would have been inevitably
discovered, is contrary to purpose of exclusionary rule).
143. See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
144. 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
145. Id. at 1006.
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A. Background
Guided by suspicions that Bay Area Lab Cooperative ("BALCO")
had supplied controlled steroids to professional baseball players, the fed-
eral government launched an investigation into the lab in 2002.146 That
same year, Major League Baseball ("MLB") entered into an agreement
with the Major League Baseball Player's Association to conduct random,
suspicionless drug testing of players. 147 According to the agreement,
urine samples were collected and tested for banned substances, and the
results would remain anonymous and confidential.148 MLB employed
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. ("CDT") to independently administer
the testing program. 1
49
Federal investigators learned of ten players that had tested positive
in the CDT program. 15 The government obtained a subpoena for all drug
testing records and specimens pertaining to MLB in CDT's possession.'
51
In response, CDT and the players moved to quash the subpoena. 52 Sub-
sequently, federal authorities obtained a warrant authorizing the search of
CDT's facilities for evidence relating to the ten players suspected by
federal investigators of steroid use.153 However, the government, con-
ducting the search, promptly seized and searched all of the drug testing
records, including the test results of hundreds of MLB players and of "a
great many other people."'
5 4
In response, CDT and the players moved for return of the drug test-
155 156ing records. 55 The players prevailed at the District Court level. Athree-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part
146. Id. at 993.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. CDT, in turn, hired Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest") to conduct blind testing wherein
CDT retained the names of the players and the sample results, while Quest did the actual testing,






155. Id. The players invoked Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) which provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation
of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district
where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue nec-
essary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to
the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and
its use in later proceedings.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (g).
156. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 993-94. Judge Cooper in the Central District of
California granted the motion, stating that federal authorities had failed to comply with the terms of
the original warrant, and ordered the return of the records (the "Cooper Order"). Id. CDT and the
players also obtained a similar order from Judge Mahan in the District of Nevada relating to the
records and samples seized under warrants issued by that court (the "Mahan Order"). Id. at 994.
CDT and the players moved to quash the subpoenas, and Judge llston in the Northern District of
California quashed the subpoenas (the "Illston Quashal"). Id.
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and reversed in part. 157 The Ninth Circuit then voted to hear the case en
banc.1
58
B. The Ninth Circuit Faces the Scope of a Computer Search Problem
Similar to the Burgess court, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with
the problem of a search for a single document or group of documents on
a computer degenerating into a general search of the computer's hard
drive. The Ninth Circuit had dealt with heterogeneous searches before in
United States v. Tamura.159 In that case, the court permitted the govern-
ment to seize a number of boxes of paper files in order to sort through
and segregate the pertinent evidence. 16° Tamura can be analogized with
Carey: in both cases, procedural requirements were imposed on a search
of heterogeneous records and in both cases the government ultimately
obtained total access to all documents.' 6' However, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that Tamura was never intended to be applied to digital evi-
dence cases.' 62 The court emphasized that digital evidence cases, unlike
Tamura, do not merely "involve[] a few dozen boxes," but rather "mil-
lions of pages of information. ' 63 Further, Tamura was anticipated to be
the rare exception, yet with the increasing prevalence and importance of
digital evidence, heterogeneous searches can hardly be considered rare
exceptions. 64 With the understanding that the Tamura exception would
fast swallow the rule, the court updated its heterogeneous searches juris-
prudence, recognizing "the daunting realities of electronic searches."'
' 65
In considering this change, the court attempted to balance two inter-
ests. On one hand the court recognized that because computer records are
heterogeneous, government searches of computers will inevitably sweep
up large amounts of nonresponsive personal information. 166 As the court
stated, "over-seizing is an inherent part of the electronic search proc-
ess."' 167 Furthermore, as the Burgess court identified, legitimate objec-
tives of searches may be concealed based on file names, directory struc-
ture, or file extension, requiring a diligent officer to expand her search to
the entirety of the digital storage device.
68
157. Id. The panel upheld the Cooper Order on the grounds the appeal was untimely. Id.
158. Id.
159. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 595.
161. See Donald Resseguie, Note, Computer Searches and Seizure, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185,
209-10 (2000) (critiquing Tamura's failure to restrict the scope of a computer search).
162. See Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 996 ("Tamura, decided in 1982, just pre-
ceded the dawn of the information age ... .
163. Id. at 1004.
164. Id. at 1006.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1004, 1006.
167. Id. at 1006.
168. See id. at 1004.
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On the other hand, computers contain vast amounts of personal in-
formation about their owners, and-in many cases, such as email serv-
ers-of many other people.' 69 Modem Americans, said the Ninth Circuit,
have no choice but to have personal information on the computers of
others.170 Subjecting these servers to the type of limitless computer
search endorsed by Burgess could result in the violation of the privacy of
millions of other potentially innocent people.'
7'
Balancing these two interests, the court created five requirements to
restrict the scope of computer searches' 72 : (1) the government should
waive the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases; (2) seized files
must be segregated and redacted by specialized or independent personnel
in such a way that the government does not have free access to the mate-
rials; (3) warrants and subpoenas must include the government's history
of seeking that information as well as the actual risk that the information
will be destroyed; (4) the government must tailor its search in order to
uncover only that information for which it has probable cause; and (5)
the government may not keep non-responsive data, and must keep the
magistrate informed as to what it does and does not keep. 1
73
Comprehensive Drug Testing's second requirement requires the
government to hire a third party or specialized computer personnel to
review and redact nonresponsive information from the search. 174 In either
case, the personnel may not divulge any nonresponsive information to
law enforcement. 75 This requirement provides real-not illusory-
privacy protections. The third party will have the ability to perform the
general search that the Burgess court finds inescapable, but the informa-
tion exhumed by such a search can only be used by law enforcement if it
meets the particulars of a warrant. Arguably, this standard is onerous,
depriving law enforcement of important evidence that may not be other-
wise obtainable. Indeed, two circuits have recently made that argument.
C.Comprehensive Drug Testing's Impact on Subsequent Cases
1. The Seventh Circuit: United States v. Mann
76
After Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals grappled with digital evidence in United States v. Mann. In
Mann, police discovered child pornography while searching Mann's
computer pursuant to a warrant for digital evidence of voyeurism, and
proceeded to search the entire computer without a grant of additional
169. Id. at 1004-05.
170. Id. at 1005.
171. See id.




176. 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010).
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authority. 77 The court distinguished Carey by noting that the searching
officer in Mann, despite finding child pornography, never stopped look-
ing for evidence of voyeurism. 178 In effect, the Seventh Circuit thus ap-
plies Carey only in cases where the officer subjectively intended to ex-
ceed the scope of the warrant. This rule fails to provide substantive com-
puter privacy protections for three reasons. First, the rule opens up com-
puter searches to ex-postfacto justifications by officers. Second, the Su-
preme Court has long held that subjective motivations by officers are
irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.' 79 Finally, even if the officer is
required to comply with Carey by securing additional search authoriza-
tion, this rule, as discussed supra, does little to limit the scope of a com-
puter search. 80
The Mann court also rejected the Comprehensive Drug Testing rule,
reaffirming the plain view doctrine's role in digital evidence cases. 
81
However, the court signaled its displeasure at the state of digital evidence
jurisprudence, disagreeing with the substance of the Comprehensive
Drug Testing rule but not its purpose.182 To the Mann court, the Compre-
hensive Drug Testing rule was "efficient but overbroad" and instead sug-
gested that less severe rules would develop incrementally "through the
normal course of fact-based case adjudication."' 83 However, the Burgess
court, by failing to build on the electronic search limitations established
in Carey and Walser, demonstrates the problems an incremental ap-
proach presents. As Professor Kerr has argued, physical-world rules of
criminal procedure cannot simply be built up-incrementally or other-
wise-to create meaningful protections of digital privacy.184
2. The Fourth Circuit: United States v. Williams'
85
In Williams, the Fourth Circuit took a different approach. Digital
searches, the court held, are not distinguishable from other searches.
186
Accordingly, the court rejected even the illusory protections of Carey.'87
Under the Williams rule, a search of digital evidence pursuant to a valid
warrant is no different than any other search. 88 To the Fourth Circuit,
digital evidence presents no different a situation than the mixed records
177. Id. at 781.
178. Id. at 784.
179. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816-17 (1996).
180. See supra Part I.B.2.
181. Mann, 592 F.3d at 785-86.
182. See id.
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Callahan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
184. See Kerr, supra note 114, at 280.
185. 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010).
186. Id. at 523-24.
187. Id. at 523.
188. See id. at 524.
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problems that cases like Tamura were tailored to address.'89 While this
understanding avoids propping up illusory protections, it does so by pro-
viding little-if any-in the way of computer privacy protections.
The approaches of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits fail to resolve
the problem that frustrated the Burgess court. On one hand, the Fourth
Circuit appears satisfied that no additional safeguards are necessary to
protect computer privacy, a position that at least does not create the illu-
sion of computer privacy where none exists. On the other hand, the Tenth
and Seventh Circuits both agree that digital evidence requires additional
privacy protections, yet those courts either cannot find a way to imple-
ment meaningful protections or decline to do so. If courts claim to be-
lieve that privacy protections are needed for digital evidence cases, those
courts should reject illusory and incremental approaches and adopt sub-
stantive protections; to date, only the Ninth Circuit has done so.
Like the Tenth Circuit's rules in Carey, Burgess, and Walser, the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Tamura imposed only illusory privacy protec-
tions, ultimately permitting a general search of a heterogeneous record.190
The Ninth Circuit recognized in Comprehensive that an outdated ap-
proach that assumes heterogeneous records are the exception, and not the
norm, cannot be justified in a modern context. 191 The Supreme Court's
dictum in Andresen, which directs officers to "minimize[] unwarranted
intrusions upon privacy" when searching files may mean that the rules
stated by the Ninth Circuit--or some lesser version thereof-are consti-
tutionally mandated.192 The Ninth Circuit's Comprehensive Drug Testing
decision requires the government to waive the plain view doctrine.
193
While the Seventh Circuit criticizes this approach as "efficient, but over-
broad," 94 the Ninth Circuit's rule at least provides meaningful protec-
tions to computer privacy. If the Tenth Circuit cannot justify any mean-
ingful protections, then it should-as the Fourth Circuit has-openly
admit this. On the other hand, if digital privacy is important to the Tenth
Circuit, the court should look to the Ninth Circuit for an example of how
to create meaningful protections.
CONCLUSION
As long as courts such as the Tenth Circuit decline to confront the
unique Fourth Amendment implications of computers and electronic
evidence, lower courts are likely to suffer the same pitfalls as the Bur-
189. See id.
190. See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Resseguie,
supra note 161, at 209-10.
191. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1004-05 (9th Cir.
2009) (en bane).
192. Andresen v Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. I I(1976).
193. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1006.
194. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2010).
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gess court. This result will have troubling consequences for our increas-
ingly electronic society. Treating a computer as a container will ulti-
mately result in more warrantless searches of computers. This considera-
tion is exacerbated by the difficulty of providing meaningful limits to
legitimate searches of digital evidence as discussed in Burgess. Indeed, if
police are allowed to access computers in the same manner as any other
container, and their access to electronic files cannot be meaningfully
limited, an individual's most personal digital files will be increasingly
exposed to law enforcement. Accordingly, an individual's personal com-
puter files are now subject to a low threshold for discovery by lawful
search or accident. Rather than admit that an individual can expect their
private files to often get swept up with legitimate digital search objec-
tives, however, the Tenth Circuit indefensibly relies on the illusion of
privacy protection in computers.
The Ninth Circuit advanced a substantive protection of computer
privacy in Comprehensive Drug Testing. Third party review and redac-
tion allows police to access information for which they have probable
cause, without giving law enforcement carte blanche to examine nonre-
sponsive or irrelevant private computer files. The expanding role of com-
puters in modern life, the Andresen dictum requiring the minimization of
privacy infringements, and the example of the Ninth Circuit should push
other courts, including the Tenth Circuit, to update their decade-old het-
erogeneous search rules to address these realities-or, at the very least,
assert their rejection of computer privacy in plain terms.
Darren Kaflca*
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Justin Marceau for his invaluable encouragement and advice. I would also like to thank
David Frommell and the rest of the staff and editors of the Denver University Law Review for their
tremendous efforts in improving this comment. I want to recognize the many years of support, love




THE EFFECT OF BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCE
MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS: How THE TENTH CIRCUIT
GOT IT RIGHT IN RHODES
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Rhodes," the Tenth Circuit was tasked with de-
ciding whether sentence modification proceedings would be governed by
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker.2 The Booker
Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional
when binding on federal judges. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Rhodes
determined whether the Guidelines would be binding on federal judges in
sentence modification proceedings-rather than initial sentencings-or
whether judicial discretion to craft lower sentences was authorized.
In Booker, the Supreme Court was silent on how its decision af-
fected sentence modification proceedings. The Ninth Circuit addressed
this unanswered question in 2007, and held that Booker applies to modi-
fication proceedings.4 In Rhodes, the Tenth Circuit broke from the Ninth
and held that Booker does not apply to sentence modification proceed-
ings.5 Thus, according to Rhodes, federal sentencing judges must strictly
adhere to the Guidelines when imposing sentence modifications.
The key to the Rhodes decision is the Tenth Circuit's willingness to
distinguish between original sentencing proceedings and sentence modi-
fication proceedings. Booker applies to original sentencing proceedings,
and therefore, the court differentiated sentence modification proceedings
in order to preserve the mandatory nature of the Guidelines in modifica-
tion actions. The Tenth Circuit distinguished the proceedings on two
bases: (1) separate statutes authorize the respective proceedings; and (2)
the two statutes contain substantively different language.6 Sentence mod-
ification proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).7 This provi-
sion allows for a sentence to be adjusted if the Sentencing Commission
lowers relevant guidelines.8 Modification is not available to increase an
already imposed sentence.9 Sentence modification is a strictly optional
proceeding, granted at the discretion of the court, which may decrease an
I. 549 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008).
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. See id. at 244.
4. United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1169 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007).
5. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 840 (10th Cir. 2008).
6. Id. at 840.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006).
8. Id. § 3582(c)(2).
9. See id. § 3582(c).
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individual's period of incarceration or probation. 0 The majority of courts
have held that a proceeding under this statute is not a full resentencing of
the defendant.'
Original sentencing proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by
18 U.S.C. § 3553. Amongst other provisions, the statutory language in
§ 3553 sets forth the factors the judge will weigh in making a sentencing
decision.' 3 Based on interpretation of these factors, the judge must im-
pose a sentence that is reasonable given the facts and circumstances of
the conviction. This process is more expansive than the narrower sen-
tence modification proceeding because judges are often called upon to
make additional findings of fact in an original sentencing proceeding.
4
These findings affect the length or severity of the sentence a judge im-
poses, permitting either an increase or decrease in the recommended base
sentence. 15 Sentence modification proceedings are substantively differ-
ent, because they only allow for a downward departure from the original
sentence.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit came to the correct de-
cision in holding that Booker does not apply to sentence modification
proceedings--effectively eliminating any discretion for federal sentenc-
ing judges to impose a sentence that departs from the Guidelines in mod-
ification proceedings. Part I of this comment outlines the history of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to provide an appropriate background to
analyze the subsequent cases. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's se-
minal decision in United States v. Booker. Part I discusses the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Hicks and the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ions in United States v. Rhodes and United States v. Pedrazza. These
cases illuminate the distinct approaches taken by the two circuits as to
whether the Supreme Court's decision in Booker does or does not apply
to sentence modification proceedings. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of the Ninth and Tenth Circuit's differing ap-
proaches. Part IV concludes that the Tenth Circuit's holding more accu-
rately captures the intent of Congress and the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion when promulgating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, while also
refraining from infringing on defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
10. See id.
11. United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that "[a] motion
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) 'is not a do-over of an original sentencing proceeding'); United States v.
Cothran, 106 F.3d 1560, 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (holding that "§ 3582(c)(2) ... doles] not contem-
plate a full de novo resentencing"); see also United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 615 (3rd Cir.
2002) (holding that § 3582(c)(2) does not constitute a full resentencing).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
13. Id. § 3553(a).
14. See United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 840 (10th Cir. 2008).
15. See id.
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I. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
In order to understand the implications of the decision in Rhodes
and the preceding decision in Booker, a cursory understanding of the
history of the Guidelines and the role they have played in criminal sen-
tencing is necessary. The Guidelines were created in 1987, and shortly
after their introduction, they became a mandatory and binding set of rules
for federal judges. 16 Throughout the history of American jurisprudence,
however, the concept of a mandatory sentencing scheme was never a de
facto assumption. In fact, the opposite was true. Prior to 1987, judges
were granted wide discretion in determining individual sentences be-
cause the philosophical underpinnings of punishment focused on the
rehabilitation of offenders. 17 As a result, courts focused on individually
tailored sentences designed to best assist each prisoner's rehabilitation.'
8
When the ideologies surrounding the purposes of punishment
changed, however, a change in the nature of sentencing soon followed. 9
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") in an at-
tempt to check the discretion of federal judges in sentencing proce-
dures.20 The SRA established the United States Sentencing Commission,
which in turn was charged with developing the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 2' The Guidelines were passed in an effort "to enhance the
ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effec-
tive, fair sentencing system. ' ,22 Three specific goals of implementation
were: "(1) 'honesty in sentencing'; (2) 'uniformity in sentencing by nar-
rowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal
courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders'; and (3) 'pro-
portionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately
different sentences for criminal conduct of different severity.' ' 23 Other
provisions within the SRA effectively instituted the mandatory nature of
the Guidelines.24
The Guidelines were designed to be structured and formulaic.25
These characteristics are pertinent to the SRA's goals of honesty, uni-
formity, and proportionality, and they enable even-handed and methodi-
16. Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Under-
standings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 118 (2008).
17. Daniel M. Levy, Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause's Lack of Control Over
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2630 (2009).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2630-31.
20. Exum, supra note 16, at 118.
21. Levy, supra note 17, at 2630-31.
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I AI.1 (2007).
23. Exum, supra note 16, at 118 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAI.1
(2007)).
24. Levy, supra note 17, at 2632; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.1 (2007).
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cal application of the rules to rein in judicial discretion.26 When applying
the federal sentencing rules, judges must follow a nine-step process in
determining the appropriate sentence. 27 This process consists of: (1) de-
termining the offense guideline applicable to the convicted offense; (2)
determining the base offense level; (3) adjusting the base offense level
by taking into account, among other considerations, the defendant's role
in the offense or obstruction of justice; (4) repeating the previous steps
for each convicted offense; (5) adjusting the base offense level for accep-
tance of responsibility; (6) determining the defendant's criminal history
category; (7) determining the applicable guideline range that corresponds
to both criminal history category and base offense level; (8) determining
what options are available as regards probation, imprisonment, fines,
supervision condition, and restitution for the applicable guideline range;
and (9) consulting any policy statements, commentary, or language with-
28in the Guidelines that might influence the sentence to be given.
Shortly after their introduction, the Guidelines had the "force of
law." 29 However, this notion proved to be transitory, as the mandatory
Guidelines would ultimately be declared unconstitutional in 2005 by the
Supreme Court's decision in Booker.
30
H. THE ROAD FROM BOOKER TO RHODES
The United States Supreme Court declared the Guidelines were ad-
visory-not mandatory-in United States v. Booker.31 This decision was
the impetus for the question presented in the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Rhodes, and will be discussed below at length. Following an explanation
of the precedent established in Booker, this Comment discusses the dif-
fering approaches to applying Booker to sentence modification proceed-
ings taken in United States v. Hicks,32 United States v. Rhodes,3 3 and
United States v. Pedraza.34 The Comment concludes with an analysis of
the two disparate methods, and argues the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
Rhodes is more sound.
A. Booker Background
Appearing in the Western District of Wisconsin, Booker was
charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack-cocaine. 35 The
26. See Exum, supra note 16, at 118.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1. 1 (a)-(i) (2007).
28. Id.
29. Levy, supra note 17, at 2632.
30. Exum, supra note 16, at 119-20.
31. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
32. 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007).
33. 549 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008).
34. 550 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2008);
35. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
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jury found him guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 36 after hearing
evidence that he was in possession of 92.5 grams of crack-cocaine stored
in a duffel bag.37 At sentencing, the judge was required to take into con-
sideration the policies and mandates of the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion.38 The judge determined that Booker's sentencing range fell between
210 and 262 months in prison, based on calculations that took into ac-
count the quantity of drugs the defendant was convicted of possessing
and the defendant's prior criminal history.39 In an act that would serve as
the impetus for the appeal, the judge made additional findings of fact by
a preponderance of the evidence, which enabled him to increase the de-
fendant's sentencing range.4° Under the new calculation, the judge de-
termined that the defendant's sentencing range now fell between 360
months and life imprisonment. The judge sentenced Booker to thirty
years (360 months) in prison, and Booker appealed.4'
B. The Booker Majority Opinions
The threshold question presented in Booker was whether the manda-
tory application of the Guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment fight to "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. ''42 In an-
swering this inquiry, the Supreme Court first looked to its holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey.43 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."44 Based on this precedent, the Booker Court held that, because
the district court judge increased Booker's sentence based upon findings
not submitted to a jury nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the sen-
tence violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.45
The Court briefly discussed the history and theory behind sentenc-
ing policy, noting that explicit and definitive sentencing procedures had
long been criticized-generally with pleas for broad judicial discretion.
46
Pursuant to the Federal Guidelines, judges were now called upon to im-
36. The statutory language: "(a) Unlawful acts: Except as authorized by this subchapter, it
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally- (I) to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
37. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c)(4) & 4AI.1 (2003).
40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. The judge individually determined in the post-trial hearing that
the defendant Booker was guilty of distributing 566 grams of crack-cocaine (instead of the 92.5
grams determined by the jury) and obstructing justice. Id.
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Booker, 543 U.S. at 229 n.l.
43. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
44. Id. at 490. The statutory maximum is defined as the "maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
45. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
46. Id. at 236.
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pose sentence enhancements upon statutory minimums with judicial find-
ings that analyzed the defendant's conduct.47 Provisions for individual-
ized enhancement and tailoring of sentencing ranges "reflected growing
... legislative concern about the proliferation and variety of drug
crimes.""8 Yet, in Booker, the Court expressed its concern that this de-
velopment was increasingly taking the power away from the jury, and in
turn placing that power in the hands of individual public servants-
federal judges.49
The Booker Court penned a total of five opinions in its decision, in-
cluding two majority opinions each receiving a 5-4 vote. Delivering the
opinion of the Court in part, Justice Stevens wrote that the Guidelines are
subject to the jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 50 Building
on the holding in Apprendi, Justice Stevens amplified the Court's posi-
tion that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to
support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts estab-
lished by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defen-
dant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 5' As a result of this
holding, the prior practice of increasing a defendant's sentence beyond
the standard range, based upon independent judicial findings, was
deemed unconstitutional.52
Justice Breyer delivered the remedial majority opinion and was
forced to reconcile several competing interests: the Guidelines' institu-
tional hold on the bench and bar, congressional and judicial desire to
maintain uniformity and fairness in sentencing, and the newly unconsti-
tutional status of a mandatory Guideline system.53 Justice Breyer focused
on congressional intent and asked what "Congress would have intended
in light of the Court's constitutional holding., 54 The majority elected to
sever and excise two provisions of the 1984 Sentencing Act because
"engraft[ing] the Court's constitutional requirement onto the sentencing
statutes . . . would destroy the system. 55 Eliminating provisions 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and § 3742(e) eradicates the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines in original sentencing, but still requires judges to consider the
Guidelines and other sentencing goals contained within the 1984 Sen-
tencing Act.56 As a result, the Guidelines continue to provide some uni-
formity and predictability in sentencing, but at the same time, they equip
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 237.
50. Exum, supra note 16, at 120.
5. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
52. Id. at 245.
53. Id. at 244-45.
54. Id. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 252.
56. Id. at 259; see also 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2003).
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judges with the discretion to impose an increased sentence within the
statutory range.
Booker solidifies a defendant's constitutional right to have a jury es-
tablish, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that serves to increase a sen-
tence. However, Justice Breyer's proposed remedy creates a paradox in
itself. By excising the two provisions, federal sentencing judges are no
longer required to impose a sentence dictated by the Guidelines, yet they
are not prohibited from making additional findings of fact without the
aid of the jury when sentencing defendants. Justice Stevens's majority
opinion states that the constitutional issue raised would have been
avoided if the Guidelines were advisory.58 The problem confronted in
Booker was whether the judicial fact-finding that served to increase a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum was unconstitu-
tional, but the remedy is simply more judicial discretion. "[W]hen a trial
judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a de-
fined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the
facts that the judge deems relevant., 59 Judges continue to make findings
that serve to increase a defendant's sentence, so long as that discretion
and fact finding effects a term within the customary range.
III. DOES BOOKER APPLY TO SENTENCE MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS?
While the Booker Court made clear that mandatory sentencing
guidelines were unconstitutional in original sentencing proceedings, the
decision did not reach sentence modification proceedings. The Ninth
Circuit was the first court to address the effect of Booker on sentence
modification proceedings. The Tenth Circuit was next in line to address
the issue and came to an opposite conclusion, creating a split with its
sister circuit. Since that time, eight of the nine remaining circuit courts
have confronted the issue, and all have followed the rationale put forth
by the Tenth Circuit. These decisions strengthen the Tenth Circuit's jus-
tification for creating a split with the Ninth Circuit, but the divergent
view of the Ninth still remains unreconciled with the majority.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation in United States v. Hicks
1. Hicks Background
In a matter of first impression, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Hicks overturned the district court's decision and held that Booker ap-
plied to sentence modification proceeding under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). 60 The facts in Hicks are very similar to those in Booker.
The defendant was convicted for conspiring to distribute crack-cocaine,
57. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
58. Id. at 233.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
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enabling drug trafficking, and carrying a firearm in connection with the
underlying crimes. 61 The court analyzed the offenses under the Guide-
lines and imposed a sentence of 420 months in prison.
62
However, this sentence was not the final word for Hicks. On No-
vember 1, 2000, the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated Amend-
ment 599, which eliminated any sentence enhancement for possessing,
brandishing, using, or discharging an explosive or firearm in conjunction
with the underlying offense.63 This amendment applied directly to
Hicks's case, because the judge had considered Hicks's use of a firearm
in connection with the underlying offenses to increase his sentence over
the statutory maximum. 64 Under the new amendment, Hicks's two-point
enhancement for possession of a firearm while trafficking drugs was no
longer valid.65
Interestingly, Hicks moved to modify his sentence based on
Amendment 599 after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Book-
er. 6 6 The defendant argued that the court should apply Booker to
§ 3582(c)(2) resentencing proceedings, which would allow judicial dis-
cretion to impose a sentence below the range set forth in the Federal
Guidelines.67 The district court rejected this argument, but that ruling
would change on appeal.68
2. Hicks and the Applicability of Booker to § 3582(c)( 2 ) in the
Ninth Circuit
Modification of a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) allows for a
downward adjustment if the Federal Sentencing Commission alters rele-
vant Guidelines. 69 The question that naturally followed was whether the
modified range adopted by the Sentencing Commission is mandatory or
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2000) ("If a sentence under this guide-
line is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific
offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm when
determining the sentence for the underlying offense. A sentence under this guideline accounts for
any explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such
enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is accountable under
§ I B 1.3"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.4, cmt. n.2 (2000).
64. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1168.
65. Id. at 1169.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1168-69.
69. Id. at 1170. Pertinent statutory language:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that
... (2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant ... the court
may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with appli-
cable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
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advisory in Booker's wake. In Hicks, the Ninth Circuit held that Booker
rendered the Guidelines advisory in every context, which by default
would include sentence modification proceedings.7°
After finding that the factors specified in § 3553(a) justify a modifi-
cation of the sentence, 71 a court must also ensure a modification would
be consistent with any applicable policies of the Federal Sentencing
Commission.72 However, as the Booker holding is a constitutional rule,
the court clarified that the applicability of the Booker holding to sentence
modification would ultimately trump any policy statement should an
inconsistency arise between the tWo. 7 3 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit
continued its policy analysis to see if it could find common ground be-
tween the two.
The policy set forth in § 1B1.10(b) of the Guidelines reads: "In de-
termining . . . a reduction in the term of imprisonment . . . the court
should consider the term of imprisonment that it would have imposed
had the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) been in
effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." 7 The Ninth Circuit's
decision reconciles this language with its ultimate conclusion that Booker
applies to modification proceedings through its interpretation of the word
"should." As the language of § 1B1.10(b) is not mandatory, the court
reasoned that in a sentence modification proceeding the judge is not
bound by the sentence he would have imposed had the amendment been
in effect at the time, but should feel free to go below the applicable
guideline.75
B. The Tenth Circuit Weighs in with United States v. Rhodes
1. Rhodes Background
On December 5, 2008, the Tenth Circuit weighed in with its inter-
pretation of whether Booker applied to sentence modification proceed-
70. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1172.
71. The pertinent statutory language reads:
(a) Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider (I) the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-
tence imposed ... ; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range established ... ; (5) any pertinent policy statement ... ; (6) the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any vic-
tims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2006).
72. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1172.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
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ings pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).76 The posture of the case was similar to
both Booker and Hicks in that the appeal came before the court for a
modified sentence after the Sentencing Commission amended the Guide-
lines.77 Here, the defendant Theomas Rhodes was convicted and sen-
78tenced for his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute crack-cocaine.
Similar to Hicks, this sentence modification occurred in the new post-
Booker ambit of sentencing, and therefore the defendant requested that
the sentencing judge consider the new modified sentencing range as ad-
visory, rather than mandatory.
79
When determining the initial sentence, the district court analyzed
the various metrics and ranges imposed by the Guidelines (pre-Booker)
and found Rhodes's sentencing range to fall between 210 to 262 months,
finally sentencing him to 210 months in prison.80 However, just as the
defendant in Hicks requested a sentence modification based on Amend-
ment 599, Rhodes sought a § 3582(c)(2) modification pursuant to
Amendments 706, 712, and 713. 8' Amendment 706 granted a two-level
reduction from the base offense for crack-cocaine offenses, and 712 and
713 allowed the 706 Amendment to apply retroactively.82 The combina-
tion of these amendments resulted in a potential lowering of Rhodes's
sentence. 83 In a pro se motion, Rhodes asked the judge to impose a sen-
tence at the low end of the new range, which was lowered by amendment
706, because his original sentence had been at the low end of the sen-
tencing range imposed before the amendment. 84 However, after the court
appointed counsel for Rhodes, the motion was modified.85 Rhodes then
asked that the court impose a sentence of 168 months or less, with 168
months being the lowest minimum sentence available under the modified
sentencing guidelines. 86 The defendant based this request on considera-
tion of his exemplary post-conviction behavior and personal initiative to
obtain an education while incarcerated.87 Ultimately the judge sentenced
Rhodes to 168 months in prison, which was the lowest possible sentence
that remained within the Federal Guidelines' range.
88
76. United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 834.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 836.





85. Id. at 836.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 837.
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2. The Rhodes Appeal
In rendering the sentence, the judge indicated that he was required
to "go back to what [he] would have given him, had [the current sentenc-
ing guidelines] been in effect then," indicating that post-conviction be-
havior was irrelevant to the process.89 On appeal, Rhodes questioned the
validity of this ruling.90 He also appealed the district court's holding that
"it lacked the authority to impose a sentence below the amended guide-
line range.
9 1
In analyzing the question presented, the Tenth Circuit looked to the
policy statement in § I B 1.10 issued by the Sentencing Commission-just
as the Ninth Circuit had done in Hicks-because any sentence modifica-
tion pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) must satisfy both the § 3553(a) factors and
applicable policy statements. 92 However, in the interim between the deci-
sion in Hicks and the appeal in Rhodes, the Sentencing Commission al-
tered some of the language of § 1B1.10, limiting judicial discretion on
sentence modification proceedings.93 In pertinent part, policy statement
§ IBI.10 reads as follows:
(2) Limitations and Prohibition on Extent of Reduction.
(A) In General.
Except as provided in subdivision (B), the court shall not reduce the
defendant's term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
this policy statement to a term that is less than the minimum of the
amended guideline range determined under subdivision (1) of this
subsection.
94
On appeal, Rhodes argued § lBI.10 construed the Guidelines as
mandatory, an outcome that would conflict with the holding in Booker.
95
The Court quickly dismissed this argument, finding that proceedings
pursuant to § 3852 do not constitute full resentencings. 96 Thus, the Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's antecedent analysis in Hicks.97
The Tenth Circuit's argument can be broken down into two steps.
First, Booker only applies to original sentencing proceedings, because
the Sixth Amendment concerns that rendered the Guidelines advisory are
not implicated in situations involving sentence modification.98 Second,
89. Id. at 836.
90. Id. at 834.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 840.
93. United States v. Pedraza, 550 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008).
94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB 1.10(b)(2)(A) (2008).
95. Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 839.
96. Id. at 839-40.
97. Id. at 841.
98. Id. at 839-40.
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sentence modification proceedings are distinguished from original sen-
tence proceedings because different statutes govern them.99
Original sentencing proceedings are guided by 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
and require the court to make numerous determinations based on the
parameters set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines.' °° However, a modifi-
cation proceeding is "a different animal," as it is much more limited in
scope.' 0' In a sentence modification pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), if a court
decides to revise a sentence, the only permissible action is a decrease in
term. 0 2 A judge has no authority to increase the sentence after it has
been imposed. 0 3 The judge does not make additional findings of fact to
increase the defendant's sentence, which was the main Sixth Amendment
concern rectified by the Booker decision.1' 4 In Booker, the Court only
excised the part of the statute that made the Guidelines mandatory in
original sentencing proceedings-the Supreme Court was silent on how
the Federal Guidelines would apply to sentence modifications.10 5 Ulti-
mately, Rhodes reinforced the continuing mandatory nature of the Guide-
lines when conducting a sentence modification proceeding in the Tenth
Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit Remains Consistent in Pedraza
1. Pedraza Background
Less than one month after Rhodes, the Tenth Circuit was presented
with a similar situation in the case of defendant Enrique Pedraza.' °6 Pe-
draza was convicted and sentenced in a drug smuggling conspiracy in-
volving transportation of 700 kilograms of cocaine from Columbia to the
United States. 107 Under the Guidelines, Pedraza's baseline offense level
was 40, resulting in an initial sentence of 384 months.10 8 Approximately
two and a half years after Pedraza was sentenced, the Sentencing Com-
mission passed Amendment 505, which limited the upper level for all
drug sentences to 38 (applied retroactively via Amendment 536). 1°9 This
new Amendment would decrease Pedraza's sentence from a range of 360
months to life, to 292 months to 365 months."0 The district court judge
99. Id. at 840.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Torres, 99 F.3d 360, 362 (10th Cir. 1996).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)-(c) (2006).
103. See id.
104. Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 840.
105. Id.
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imposed a sentence of 292 months, the lowest sentence possible under
the guidelines."''
2. Pedraza Majority
Like Rhodes, Pedraza appealed his sentence. Pedraza claimed that
the Guidelines were only advisory after Booker, and the judge had dis-
cretion to further decrease the sentence." 12 The court rejected this argu-
ment, citing its holding in Rhodes and explaining that Booker does not
apply to sentence modification proceedings pursuant to § 3582(c)(2)
because sentence modifications are a separate process, distinct from ini-
tial sentencing.
113
The court was also required to determine if § 3582(c)(2), in and of
itself, vested judges with the discretion to grant variances below the rec-
ommended guideline range on sentence modifications. Although the
court definitively held that Booker was inapplicable in sentence modifi-
cations, it recognized that a "judge's resentencing authority is a creation
of statute."' 14 Therefore, if § 3582(c)(2) authorized a judge's discretion
to impose below Guidelines modifications, it would be valid. 1 5 The Sen-
tencing Commission is the entity that determines the scope of a judge's
authority under § 3582(c)(2)-a power vested in the Commission by
statute.1 6 To determine the extent of the judge's power in sentence modi-
fications, the court needed to analyze the Commission's applicable pol-
icy statement § IBI.10.117
Although Rhodes's appeal was decided first, Pedraza's initial resen-
tencing proceeding occurred eight months before Rhodes's initial resen-
tencing." 8 In the interim between these two hearings, the Sentencing
Commission changed the policy language of § IB1.10.119 In pertinent
part, the policy as applied to Pedraza, stated that "the court should con-
sider the term of imprisonment that it would have imposed had the
amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) been in effect at
the time the defendant was sentenced."'120 This language does not indicate
that a sentence modification should be treated in the same manner as an
initial sentencing.' 21 Therefore, the majority found the amended language
to be consistent with its holding in Rhodes and followed its precedent






117. Id. at 1221.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.10(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
121. Pedraza, 550 F.3d at 1221.
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holding that Booker did not apply to sentence modification proceedings
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).
22
3. Pedraza Dissent
In an opinion that afforded the court's "learned colleagues on the
Ninth Circuit" a great amount of deference, the dissent focused on the
change in policy language of § I B 1.10(b)(2) between Pedraza and Rho-
des.123 Although § 1B1.10 did not specifically articulate that a sentence
modification was equivalent to an initial sentencing, the dissenting judge
preferred to invoke the "rule of lenity" in Pedraza's situation. 24 This rule
of judicial construction provides that when ambiguity exists in a criminal
statute relating to prohibition and penalties, such ambiguities are re-
solved in favor of the defendant when not contrary to legislative intent. 125
Because § 1B 1.10 does not explicitly address the question presented, the
dissent would choose to allow for modification below the recommended
guidelines and follow the precedent of the Ninth Circuit by applying the
rule of lenity.
26
IV. WHY THE TENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
A. Weaknesses of the Ninth Circuit Interpretation in Hicks
In justifying its holding in Hicks, the Ninth Circuit asserted that
"Booker abolished the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines in all contexts."'' 27 This oversimplifies the issue. The catalyst behind
the Booker decision was the Sixth Amendment concern that arose when
federal judges increased sentences beyond the standard range based upon
judicial fact finding. 28 Although this was common practice in sentencing
procedures at the time, Booker held the practice to be unconstitutional.
29
These same concerns do not arise in the context of a sentence modi-
fication proceeding. First and foremost, a sentence modification proceed-
ing can only lower an individual's sentence; it cannot enhance a sen-
tence. In Apprendi, and consequently in Booker, the United States Su-
preme Court was concerned only with a "fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum," as the Sixth
Amendment requires such facts must be submitted to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.130 The individual protections contained with-
in the Sixth Amendment do not apply to situations where the government
122. Id. at 1222.
123. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 3 59 (8 ed. 2004).
126. Pedraza, 550 F.3d at 1223 (McKay, J., dissenting).
127. United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).
128. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 229 n.1 (2005).
129. See id. at 244.
130. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added).
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does not erode an individual's liberty, but in fact only decreases a per-
son's sentencing exposure, as is the case in sentence modification pro-
ceedings.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit construes sentence modification pro-
cedures to be the equivalent of an initial sentencing procedure. 3' Yet,
even as it advanced this argument the court recognized that a sentence
modification truly is a different procedure, by conceding that a resen-
tencing is "limited in certain respects."' 32 The most critical difference is
that a modification does not call into question the Sixth Amendment
concern that was the underpinning of the Booker decision. It is impossi-
ble in such a proceeding for judicial fact finding to increase a defendant's
sentence.
Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission with the intent
that the Commission would create a set of guidelines to regulate sentenc-
ing procedures to ensure consistency and fairness in sentencing.133
Throughout the decision in Booker, the Supreme Court consistently reit-
erated that Congress intended to create a mandatory sentencing scheme,
despite the ultimate holding that federal district judges are no longer
bound by the ranges prescribed by the guidelines in original sentencing
proceedings. 1
34
To determine the Commission's intent, the Hicks court looked to the
policy language set forth in § 1B1.10 because § 3582(c)(2) allows for a
sentence modification only after consulting the § 3553(a) factors and
complying with existing policy statements.' 35 The court reasoned the
policy statements do not address the threshold question of whether the
Booker holding is applicable to sentence modification proceedings,
which is foreseeable as the statements were published before the Court
decided Booker.'36 The Ninth Circuit concluded the language of the pol-
icy statement does not prohibit the application of the Guidelines in sen-
tence modifications in an advisory manner.'
37
It is true that the policy language is not explicit on this point, failing
to give either an affirmative or negative answer. However, considering
the totality of the circumstances, it seems evident that Congress and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission intended to create a mandatory and binding
set of guidelines.' 38 It is clear that this is no longer possible in the context
of initial sentencing, but in a modification procedure, where the Booker
Sixth Amendment concern is not present, courts would do well to look
131. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1171.
132. Id.
133. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I A 1.3 (2000).
134. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 passim (2005).
135. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1172.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I A 1.3 (2000).
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back to the original purpose and legislative intent underlying the Guide-
lines. Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Booker concludes that Con-
gress and the Commission would have desired that the Guidelines be
stripped of their mandatory nature in the least invasive way possible. 39 If
the mandatory nature of the Guidelines fails to raise any constitutional
concerns in the context of modification, there is no reason to render them
advisory.
B. The Tenth Circuit Breaks Rank in Rhodes
First in Rhodes and then in Pedraza, the Tenth Circuit had two dis-
tinct opportunities to decide whether the Guidelines were mandatory or
advisory as applied to sentence modification proceedings. The Tenth
Circuit was fortunate to decide Rhodes prior to Pedraza. This sequencing
proved fortuitous because the U.S Sentencing Commission revised its
policy language in the wake of the Hicks decision in order to directly
address the issue presented in that case. 14° Now, § IB1.10 specifically
states that the court shall not reduce the defendant's term of imprison-
ment, pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), to a length that is less than the minimum
of the amended guideline range. 14 Originally, the Ninth Circuit relied on
the textual ambiguity to reconcile the text with the seemingly inconsis-
tent holding that Booker applied to sentence modification. The change in
§ 1Bl.10's policy language evidenced the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion's intent to maintain mandatory guidelines during sentence modifica-
tion. The Tenth Circuit correctly retained the binding nature of the
Guidelines in sentence modification proceedings by concluding that
Booker does not apply in the modification context and thus complying
with newly amended policy language.
Soon after the decision in Rhodes, the court decided Pedraza. 142 Pe-
draza's resentencing occurred before the change in policy language that
was discussed in Rhodes. As a result, the same § 1 B 1.10 policy language
that applied in Hicks governed Pedraza's sentencing modification.143 The
Tenth Circuit, however, did not retreat to the rationale of the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Rather, the Court looked at § 1 B 1. 1 O's application notes, the Guide-
lines as a whole, and the legislature's intent in creating guidelines, to
conclude that § 3582(c)(2) and the "applicable commentary strongly
suggest that the resentencing judge's discretion extends to substituting
the new guideline range for the old guideline range but goes no fur-
ther."' 4
139. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265.
140. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.1 0(b)(I) (2008).
141. Id. § IB1.10(b)(2)(A).
142. United States v. Pedraza, 550 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2008).
143. Id. at 1221.
144. Id.
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Sentence modifications can only lower a defendant's sentence. The
concerns giving rise to Booker's constitutional rule are not present in
modification proceedings. Furthermore, the Commission's change in
policy language solidifies its intent that § 3582(c)(2), in and of itself,
does not authorize an advisory Guideline scheme in the context of modi-
fication. Rather, the Guidelines should retain their mandatory status.
In the time since the Tenth Circuit decided Rhodes and Pedraza,
eight circuits-the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth
and Eleventh-have addressed the issue of whether Booker applies to
sentence modification proceedings.145 In all instances, the circuit courts
correctly held that Booker does not affect § 3582(c)(2) modification pro-
ceedings. 146 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hicks remains at
odds with the decisions in other circuits, the current trend clearly sup-
ports the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Rhodes and Pedraza. Although the
Guidelines lost some of their bite after Booker, the decision in Rhodes
reinstates their importance in maintaining a system of federal criminal
sentencing that is fair, consistent, and uniformly applied.
CONCLUSION
While the merits of greater judicial discretion or bright line sentenc-
ing rules can be debated, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, authorized by
Congress, has determined that mandatory guidelines are preferable. Al-
though no longer mandatory in initial proceedings, the Guidelines con-
tinue to exert significant influence on initial sentencing and have proven
to retain their binding authority in the majority of Circuits addressing the
Guidelines' role in sentence modification proceedings. Even if applied in
an advisory manner, the Guidelines will continue to influence federal
judges in sentencing procedures, but will do so without infringing on
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
While the Tenth Circuit was the first court to create a split with the
Ninth Circuit on this issue, recent decisions in other circuits have coa-
lesced behind the rationale of Rhodes.147 Whether the Supreme Court
will grant certiorari to unify the circuits remains to be seen. As it stands
now, however, the circuit split directly undermines the Sentencing
Commission's goals of consistency, honesty, and fairness in sentencing,
as the Guidelines are not being applied uniformly across the circuits.
145. See United States v. Fanfan, 558 F.3d 105, 106 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Savoy,
567 F.3d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 250 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 238
(5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Starks, 551 F.3d 839, 840-41 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190, 1190 (11 th
Cir. 2009).
146. See Fanfan, 558 F.3d at 106; Savoy, 567 F.3d at 73; Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 314; Dunphy, 551
F.3d at 252; Doublin, 572 F.3d at 238; Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 709; Starks, 551 F.3d at 842-43;
Melvin, 556 F.3d at 1190.
147. See, e.g., Starks, 551 F.3d at 842-43; Dunphy, 551 F.3d at 252.
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Whether through Supreme Court action or through a change in the Ninth
Circuit's position on the issue, one thing remains clear: the resulting in-
consistency in sentence modifications requires prompt resolution.
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UNITED STATES V. POE: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO
REEVALUATE BOUNTY HUNTERS' SYMBIOTIC ROLE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Every year, bounty hunters apprehend over thirty thousand fugitives
who fail to show up for court proceedings without spending a single cent
of taxpayer money.' Defendants released on surety to bondsmen are
twenty-eight percent less likely to miss a court appearance and fifty-three
percent less likely to remain at large for long periods of time than those
2defendants released on their own recognizance. Bondsmen, and the
bounty hunters they hire, have gradually developed into an inextricable
part of the criminal justice system, and states heavily rely on the industry
3to detain, search for, and recapture fugitives in a cost-effective manner.
Some have gone as far to say that the American criminal justice system
"needs" bounty hunters,4 and that bounty hunters are "indispensable ac-
tors in the state's program of pretrial detention.",
5
Despite their deeply rooted role in the modern legal system, bounty
hunters are not considered state actors in a majority of jurisdictions.
6
This result is troublesome because it allows bounty hunters to exercise
broader powers of search and arrest than police officers. 7 Because bounty
hunters are not usually considered state actors, they are not constrained
by the constitutional and regulatory safeguards that law enforcement
officers must adhere to.8 In United States v. Poe,9 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals considered, as a matter of first impression, whether bounty
hunters should be classified as state actors for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.'0 In a short-sighted decision with troubling implications,
the Poe court ignored the realities of the modem bond industry and ap-
I. John A. Chamberlin, Bounty Hunters: Can the Criminal Justice System Live Without
Them?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1195 (1998).
2. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private
Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93, 118 (2004).
3. See Chamberlin, supra note 1, at 1195-97; Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man:
The Rights and Duties of Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOUS. L.
REV. 731, 757-64 (1996) (discussing the increasing reliance of states on bounty hunters).
4. Chamberlin, supra note 1, at 1195.
5. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 784.
6. See, e.g., Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1996); Ouzts v.
Md. Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1974). But see Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426,
429-30 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that bounty hunters are classifiable as state actors).
7. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366,372 (1872).
8. See Chamberlin, supra note 1, at 1184-85; Drimmer, supra note 3, at 733-34; Rebecca B.
Fisher, The History of American Bounty Hunting as a Study in Stunted Legal Growth, 33 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199,204-206 (2009).
9. 556 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2009).
10. Id. at 1117.
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plied precedent founded on outdated rationale to hold that bounty hunters
are not state actors." In Poe, the court flatly dismissed the defendant's
arguments founded on the dissenting opinions from the Ninth Circuit and
an analysis accepted in the Fourth Circuit, and instead applied a test for
determining state action that narrows Supreme Court precedent.
12
This Comment argues the Tenth Circuit missed an opportunity to
rule in favor of classifying bounty hunters as state actors, a decision that
would have introduced constitutional and civil rights protections to an
industry greatly in need of a balance of authority. Part I begins by tracing
the U.S. bond system from its early English common law roots to its
current role in American jurisprudence. Part II continues by outlining the
tests used to determine when courts will impose state actor status on a
private party. Part III outlines the federal circuit court decisions that have
addressed the issue of bounty hunters as state actors. Part IV then argues
the law governing the bond industry is no longer sufficient to provide the
safeguards citizens expect from their government, and suggests adopting
an analysis which would allow both the continued function of the states'
existing systems of pretrial detention and curb the wanton violations to
civil and constitutional liberties that frequently transpire within the un-
regulated bond industry.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE BOND SYSTEM
A. The English System
The United States bail system was modeled after the pretrial deten-
tion ideology of the English common law. 13 Under English common law,
a surety was bound "body for body," meaning that if the defendant failed
to appear for trial, the surety, or bondsman, was "liable to suffer the pun-
ishment that was hanging over the head of the released prisoner.' 14 To
prevent flight, the surety was given custody of the defendant, allowing
them to act as a type of jailor.' 5 During this period of history, however,
flight was rare because the compact nature of English development al-
lowed for widespread public recognition of defendants.' 6 English com-
mon law classified custody of a defendant as a "single, continuous event,
when the surety exercised authority over a suspect, the law considered
his actions the offspring of the state's.,' 7 Because the surety was the le-
II. Seeid.atll21.
12. See id. at 1123-24 & n. 14 (applying the test for determining state action under the Fourth
Amendment used in United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) instead of the Supreme
Court case Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)); see also Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins. Co.,
505 F.2d 547, 556-61 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F. 2d
426, 430 (4th Cir. 1987).
13. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 744 n.57 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 744 (citation omitted).
15. Chamberlin, supra note I, at 1179-80; Drimmer, supra note 3, at 747.
16. Chamberlin, supra note 1, at 1180; Drimmer, supra note 3, at 748.
17. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 747.
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gal equivalent of a jailor, there developed an "inextricable link between
his conduct and that of the state."
' 18
The English system was originally adopted by the United States in
its entirety, but because of rapid expansion in both land development and
population, the small, personalized system that worked so efficiently in
England failed to perform similarly in the United States. 19 As America
became more diversified, the bond system grew increasingly commer-
cialized. This commercial system replaced the personalized approach
that relied on the cooperation of friends and family as an effective disin-
centive to skipping bail. 20 Despite this change, the idea that a bondsman
was equivalent to a jailor, and that bond was a continued imprisonment
from the initial capture by the state, lived on.2' Defendants released on
bail were treated as being in a state of "perpetual flight," giving bonds-
men the authority to recapture them on a whim, notwithstanding the idea
that defendants were presumed innocent until proven guilty.
22
The English bond system had been effectively policed by night
watchmen, but the commercialization of the American bond system and
the geographic expansion of police forces throughout the country made it
less and less feasible for American police to assume responsibility for
returning fugitives to distant courts.2 3 This lack of performance by state
officials was the underlying issue that led the U.S. Supreme Court to
their reasoning in Taylor v. Taintor, the outdated piece of law that con-
tinues to grant bounty hunters the extremely broad, constitution-skirting
powers they enjoy today.
24
B. The American System
1. Early Cases Delineating Bounty Hunter Authority
a. Nicolls v. Ingersoll
25
One of the earliest American cases to recognize the extensive au-
thority of a bounty hunter over a bailee was the New York Supreme
Court's decision in Nicolls v. Ingersoll. Before a trial in New Haven,
Connecticut, P. Edwards, the bond company for the defendant Nicolls,
ordered two bounty hunters to retrieve Nicolls from his New York home
in the middle of the night.26 The bounty hunters broke down Nicolls'
door and removed him from his home without his coat or vital posses-
18. Id.
19. Fisher, supra note 8, at 207-08.
20. Id. at 208.
21. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 749-50.
22. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1872); Drimmer, supra note 3, at 749.
23. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 208.
24. See id.
25. 1810 N.Y. LEXIS 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
26. Id. at *3.
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sions, and extradited him to Connecticut.27 Nicolls brought suit against
the bounty hunter for battery, assault, trespass, and false imprisonment.
28
The court rejected these claims, stating "the law considers the prin-
cipal as a prisoner, whose jail liberties are enlarged or circumscribed, at
the will of his [bondsman]., 29 The court held that bondsmen may exer-
cise their control over the accused at "all times and in all places' 30 be-
cause the defendant is "always upon a string, which [the bondsmen or
bounty hunters] may pull whenever they please."'', The court further held
that a bounty hunter or bondsmen "may break open the outer door of the
principal.., in order to arrest him." 32 This line of reasoning was an early
indication of the broad power to search that bounty hunters enjoy today.
b. Taylor v. Taintor
33
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the general common law princi-
ples of Nicolls in its 1872 decision, Taylor v. Taintor.34 The defendant in
Taylor, Edward McGuire, was arrested for grand larceny and released on
bond in Connecticut.35 His bondsmen permitted him to return to his
home in New York, where the governor of Maine had him extradited to
answer for a burglary in Maine.36 McGuire was incarcerated in Maine
and failed to appear for his Connecticut hearing. The Connecticut supe-
rior court held the Connecticut treasurer was entitled to recover the
amount of the bond from McGuire's sureties.37 The sureties appealed,
and the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming common law bond princi-
ples, determined that because the sureties were liable for McGuire, it was
38their negligence that caused them to forfeit the bond.
Taylor remains the authoritative case on the rights of bounty hunt-
ers, and the "Rule of Taylor" continues to influence courts that seek to
establish operational boundaries for the industry.39 The "Rule of Taylor"
is the notion that bounty hunters "may pursue [the principal] into another
27. Id.
28. Id. at *1.
29. Id. at *17.
30. Id. at *18.
31. Id. at *16.
32. Id. at *18.
33. 83 U.S. 366 (1872). Taylor has been superseded by statute in some jurisdictions, but the
U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled the opinion. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gardner, No. 8:09-2605-
CMC-BHH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113027, at *5, n.l (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2009) ("Although the
Supreme Court of the United States has not overruled Taylor v. Taintor, an unrelated portion of the
decision in Taylor v. Taintor, which concerned the right of sureties to apprehend principals, has been
superannuated by statute in Texas.)
34. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 371-72 & n. 10.
35. Id. at 368-69.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 373 & n.15.
39. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987); Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins.
Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1974).
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State; may arrest [the principal] on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may
break and enter his house."'4 The Taylor Court affirmed English com-
mon law by stating, "The seizure is not made by virtue of new process.
None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping
prisoner. ' 41 As attorney Rebecca Fisher summarizes, "'The Rule of Tay-
lor' . . . gives extraordinary common law powers to bounty hunters,
which makes it unusually difficult to criminally prosecute them. 42
c. In re Von Der Ahe
43
Taylor was further interpreted in 1898 by In re Von Der Ahe, which
sheds further light on the unique relationship between bounty hunters and
their principals. 44 The Von Der Ahe court explained that the powers of
the bondsman-and implicitly, bounty hunters as the agents of bonds-
men-arose from the "relationship between the parties," and was
founded in contract instead of judicial process.45 The court went on to
say that this relationship created "a fundamental difference between the
right of arrest by [a bondsman] and arrest under warrant where such right
to arrest is based upon a court process, which, per se, can have no extra-
jurisdictional power or efficacy."
46
The rules established in Nicolls, Taylor, and Von Der Ahe are still
good law. As one commentator stated, "[a]lthough these early decisions
granting extraordinary powers to bounty hunters may seem more like a
memorable piece of United States history than good law, these basic
principles still survive today in many jurisdictions. '"47 As Part EI reveals,
many courts still cite to these outdated cases as the grant of authority to
modem bounty hunters.48
2. An Ancient Legal Fiction in a Modern Legal Environment
The Taylor case, its application to Von Der Ahe, and various com-
mentaries continually analogize bondsmen to jailors and the arrests
bounty hunters make to those made by sheriffs.49 Despite this acknowl-
edged relationship, most courts nonetheless reach the conclusion that
bounty hunters are not classifiable as state actors for the purposes of im-
posing constitutional and civil liability.50 The primary rationale for this
40. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 37 1.
41. Id.
42. Fisher, supra note 8, at 204.
43. 85 F. 959 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898).
44. Id. at 962-63.
45. See id. at 960.
46. Id.
47. Chamberlin, supra note 1, at 1184.
48. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987); Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins.
Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1974).
49. See Von Der Ahe, 85 F. at 963 (quoting Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371 (1872));
Chamberlin, supra note 1, at 1180; Drimmer, supra note 3, at 747.
50. See, e.g., Von Der Ahe, 85 F. at 960; see also Drimmer, supra note 3, at 763.
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classification is that because the arrest of a defendant stemmed from a
private contract (instead of a judicial order such as a warrant), the fact
that the bounty hunters were functioning as state proxies is irrelevant.5 1
Attorney Jonathan Drimmer calls this conceptualization of bounty hunter
rights by nineteenth century courts a "legal fiction," and notes its impli-
cations by stating that, "because bounty hunters' participation in the
criminal justice system did not originate by any ... state action, federal
courts determined that the constitutional protections that generally pre-
served the rights of criminal defendants did not limit the conduct of
bounty hunters." 52 Consequently, bounty hunters even today enjoy the
search and arrest powers of a sheriff without the constraints of the Con-
stitution.53
Despite the concerns raised by the "Rule of Taylor," state reliance
on bounty hunters within the criminal legal system has expanded drasti-
cally because of the cost effectiveness of the private bail system.
54
"While a court sets the bail amount, most frequently the bondsman de-
termines whether the financial risk posed by a particular defendant
should allow for actual release, and thus whether a suspect must languish
in prison until guilt can be determined. 55 Over the past several decades,
cuts in police budgets have caused the recovery of fugitives to become
almost completely impractical. 56 These cuts have forced the justice sys-
tem to use bounty hunters to perform activities traditionally reserved to
the police, such as "searching for, arresting, and transporting the [fugi-
tives] to court., 57 Because the performance of these duties by bounty
hunters stems from the original arrest and not from judicial decree, courts
continue to treat the relationship between the bounty hunter and the fugi-
tive as one of contract.5 8 Thus, the legal fiction established in 1872 re-
mains effective today, despite the drastic societal and legal developments
that have occurred over the last 138 years.
Despite the heightened frequency of their use in the American crim-
inal justice system, most jurisdictions still do not consider bounty hunters
state actors. They still enjoy disproportionately broad, police-like powers
without having to adhere to constitutional safeguards.59 These broad
powers have, on several occasions, led to tragic homicides and violations
of constitutionally protected rights.6° Such incidents have triggered sev-
51. See In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. at 960; Drimmer, supra note 3, at 754.
52. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 754-55.
53. Id at 756, 758.
54. Id. at 757-59.
55. Id. at 761.
56. id. at 762.
57. Id
58. See Von DerAhe, 85 F. 959,961 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898).
59. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 763.
60. See Chamberlin, supra note I at 1175-76 (discussing the tragic double homicide in an
Arizona case where bounty hunters entered the wrong house and a shootout ensued, and another
incident of bounty hunters breaking a fugitive's neck).
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eral attempts to regulate the industry, both from state legislatures and the
federal government.6' Though never enacted, the Bounty Hunter Respon-
sibility Act of 199962 "remains the most comprehensive legislation pro-
posed to date on bounty hunting." 63 This legislation sought to hold
bondsmen statutorily liable for constitutional violations of their bounty
hunters by classifying them as state actors64 Further, the bill would have
required "the U.S. Attorney General to publish model guidelines for
states to control and regulate . . . whether bounty hunters should be re-
quired to complete a State approved course in the criminal justice system
[and] . . . whether they should be required to submit to a finger-print-
based criminal background check before beginning to perform their du-
ties of employment." 65 This proposed legislation sought to limit the ex-
cessive authority granted to bounty hunters under the "Rule of Taylor."
66
The Bounty Hunter Responsibility Act demonstrates the federal
government's willingness to reform bounty hunter practices in America.
However, in the absence of legislation commencing a reform initiative,
courts are only left with the outdated precedent of Taylor, Nicolls, and
Van Der Ahe. Following that dubious guidance, courts are increasingly in
agreement as to an absence of state action within the bond industry.
H. THE "STATE ACTOR" PROBLEM
In order to understand the circuit court decisions addressing bounty
hunters as state actors, it is important to give attention to the test used to
determine when a private actor may become classified as a state actor.
A. Early Cases
1. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.
6 7
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. established the "generic state action
test" for determining when a party is acting as an agent of the state.
68
Lugar provides a two-prong test for when a party acts under color of
state law. Namely, the party must (1) cause a deprivation of a constitu-
tionally protected ight; and (2) "the deprivation must be caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State ... [and] the par-
ty charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said
to be a state actor."
69
61. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 218-21, 223-25.
62. Bounty Hunter Responsibility Act of 1999, H.R. 2964, 106th Cong. (1999).
63. Fisher, supra note 8, at 223.
64. H.R. 2964 § (2)(a).
65. Fisher, supra note 8, at 225; see H.R. 2964 § (4).
66. Fisher, supra note 8, at 225.
67. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
68. United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1124 (10th Cir. 2009).
69. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
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The Lugar test was derived from an action for enforcement of
§ 1983.70 This section of the code was originally intended to provide
redress for African-Americans adversely affected by Southern govern-
ments by allowing for "enforcement ... of the Constitution on behalf of
every individual citizen of the Republic ...to the extent of the rights
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. 71 Section 1983 requires state
action causing a constitutional deprivation in order for a plaintiff to have
a cause of action.72 Because common bounty hunting activities like
searches and arrests potentially violate rights under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments, plaintiffs seeking redress for bounty hunter abuse
usually elect to sue under § 1983, but must prove state action.
73
The Lugar test assigns § 1983 liability to state officials such as
sheriffs and policemen, but is less informative when the actor is a private
party.74 This is because the second prong of the Lugar analysis does not
offer any insight into how a private party may become a state actor. Sub-
sequent court decisions, such as that in Green v. Abony Bail Bond, have
addressed this sub-issue in greater detail.
2. Green v. Abony Bail Bond75
Green v. Abony Bail Bond provides guidance on the second prong
of Lugar within the bounty hunter context. In Green, bounty hunters
seeking to seize a principal on an outstanding five hundred dollar bond
forcibly entered the principal's home and assaulted him and his wife.7 6
The man's injuries resulting from the intrusion were so severe that they
required a twenty-three day hospitalization.77 When the principal brought
suit under § 1983, the court found that bounty hunters were not state ac-
tors and dismissed the action with prejudice.78
Although its precedent as a federal district court case is limited,
Green provides a relatively comprehensive synopsis of the theories under
which a private party bounty hunter may be considered a state actor.79
The court stated that there existed only three situations when a private
party may have its actions attributed to the state.80 First, the court out-
lined the "state compulsion test," which will assign state actor status to a
70. See id. at 924.
71. Id. at 934 (alteration in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess., 569
(1871)); Fisher, supra note 8, at 209; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
73. Fisher, supra note 8, at 209
74. /d. at 210.
75. 316 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
76. Id. at 1256-57.
77. Id. at 1257
78. Id. at 1258-1262.
79. See id. at 1259-60 (citing Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
80. Green, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
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private party if "the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged
the action alleged to violate the Constitution.'
Second, the court discussed the "public function" test, which as-
signs status to a private party when the party performs a public function
that was "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. 82 The Rule
of Taylor virtually precludes the application of the public function analy-
sis by considering the bounty hunter-fugitive relationships as a voluntar-
ily formulated private contract.83 Moreover, it has been noted that since
the earliest instances of the bail bonding, bondsman have almost always
been privately operated companies. 84 Thus, the public function test to
impart state actor classification on bounty hunters fails to address the
reality that the bounty-hunter industry has never been "traditionally the
prerogative of the state" and the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor
specifically identifies the function of a bounty hunter as private.
Third, the court discussed the "nexus/joint action test," commonly
referred to as the "symbiosis" test.85 To assign state actor status to a pri-
vate party under the symbiosis test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
"State had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
the [private parties] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise. 86
B. The Symbiosis Test
One of the earliest applications of the symbiosis test came in the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity. Burton involved a state-run parking building that provided space for
a privately owned restaurant that refused to serve African-Americans.
87
A customer who was refused service brought an action for a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief against the restaurant, claiming that the
private discrimination constituted state action because of the economic
relationship between the restaurant owner and the parking authority.88
The Court found that because both parties benefited from the rela-
tionship-the restaurant having the ability to operate in a government
building, and the parking facility the ability to provide public parking
while receiving revenues from the restaurant-a symbiotic relationship
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1259-60.
83. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371 (1872); In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959, 961
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898); see also Fisher, supra note 8, at 209.
84. Green, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
85. See id. (quoting Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11 th Cir. 2001)); see also Fish-
er, supra note 8, at 210 n.78.
86. Green, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see, e.g.,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
87. Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
88. Id.
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existed.89 Therefore, the Court concluded, the discrimination constituted
state action. 9°
Cases subsequent to Burton have determined that the threshold re-
quirement in demonstrating a symbiotic relationship between a private
party and the state is a "mutual benefit" between the parties.9' Once this
requirement is met, factors such as licensing and regulation are relevant
to the symbiosis analysis, but no single factor is determinative. 92 How-
ever, courts often afford greater weight to relationships where the state
reaps financial benefits from arrangements with private parties.93 As
Drimmer summarizes, "lower courts continue to rule that when a private
entity plays an indispensable role in a state program, provides economic
benefits to the state, and the state and the entity enjoy mutual advantages
from the entity's involvement with the state, state action exists and the
entity must abide by constitutional limitations."
94
The three tests outlined in Green offer significant guidance in clas-
sifying private parties as state actors for the purposes of the second prong
of Lugar. In the bounty hunter context, the symbiosis test has been used
to successfully classify bounty hunter action as symbiotic to the state. 95
This argument appears to be the most promising method available in
reforming bounty hunter jurisprudence so that constitutional liberties are
protected.96 The following section outlines the approaches taken by the
federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue.
III. BOUNTY HUNTERS AS STATE ACTORS: THE CIRCUIT COURT
DECISIONS
Five circuits have decided whether or not bounty hunters as state ac-
tors. The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits are in accord with the
precedent of Taylor.97 The Fourth Circuit has departed from strict adher-
ence and assigned bounty hunters state actor status for the purposes of
constitutional rights enforcement.
98
A. Ouzts v. Maryland National Insurance Co.
The Ninth Circuit's 1974 opinion in Ouzts v. Maryland National In-
surance Company was one of the first cases to thoroughly address the
89. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (analyzing the holding of Bur-
ton).
90. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
91. Id. at 724-25; see also Drimmer, supra note 3, at 783.
92. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 782 & n.289.
93. Id. at 782.
94. Id. at 783.
95. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987).
96. See Drimmer, supra note 3, at 784-88.
97. Fisher, supra note 8, at 210; see United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1123-24 (10th Cir.
2009) (holding that bounty hunters are private actors, though not citing directly to Taylor).
98. Jackson, 810 F.2d at 429.
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issue of bounty hunters as state actors. Ouzts involved the extradition of
a Nevada defendant by bounty hunters in California.99 After a failed at-
tempt to recover the defendant Ouzts with their own agents, Maryland
National Insurance Company hired contract bounty hunters who forcibly
apprehended Ouzts at his residence in California. 0 Ouzts claimed the
bounty hunters represented themselves as affiliates of the Los Angeles
County Police Department and displayed badges of authority. '0 After his
arrest, he was extradited to Nevada against his will.102 The plaintiff
claimed that the bounty hunters violated his civil rights under § 1983.03
The majority in Ouzts explicitly affirmed the Rule of Taylor in its
decision by stating:
[W]e note that the common law right of the bondsman to apprehend
his principal arises out of a contract between the parties and does not
have its genesis in statute or legislative fiat. Because it is a contract





The court explicitly rejected the appellants' symbiosis argument that the
bounty hunters were "an arm of the court," calling it a "strange thesis."
' 05
In doing so, the court noted that the justice system had its own "official
arms" available for securing fugitive defendants. 0 6 They continued by
stating that the state system of extradition is "separate and distinct from
the private reclamation interests ... of the bondsman."',
0 7
The Ouzts majority also introduced the idea of analyzing a bounty
hunter's intent to assist the justice system in determining state action by
observing that "the bail bondsman is in the business in order to make
money and is not acting out of a high-minded sense of devotion to the
administration of justice."10 8 The court in this case seemed to find it per-
suasive that bounty hunters were not subjectively intending to assist the
government.1' 9 This view is also popular in later cases, but fails to con-
sider the objective police roles that bounty hunters play, and similarly,
the jailor roles that bondsmen play in the American justice system.
0
99. Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 549-50.
100. Id. at 549-51.
101. Id. at 550.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 550; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
104. Id. at 551.
105. Id. at 554.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 554-55 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1931)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. at 555.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1124 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding no state
action, even when the state benefitted, because bounty hunters were primarily motivated by financial
gain).
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While its rigid adherence to Taylor and introduction of subjective
bounty hunters's intentions was not extraordinary, the more interesting,
and perhaps more intuitive, part of the Ouzts case was the dissenting
opinion by Judge Hufstedler."' Judge Hufstedler was more sympathetic
to the appellant's symbiosis argument than the majority and explained
that state involvement "need not be exclusive or direct."' 1 2 Extensively
citing Supreme Court decisions, she stated that the real question the court
should be addressing was "whether the state significantly involved itself
with the defendant's unlawful conduct,"'" 3 and pointed out that signifi-
cance was evaluated only by "sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances."' 14
The dissent continued by explaining that only through a system of
substantial government cooperation was it possible to maintain the struc-
ture of a "quasi-private bail," noting that the bail system "does not inure
solely to the benefit of the private bondsman" because the system saves
time and money associated with incarceration, and helps to insure the
continued function of the justice system. 1 15 The dissent concluded by
stating that "[t]he state, through its law enforcement and judicial officers,
and private sureties are joint participants in the present system of bail,"
and noted that that the prerequisites of Burton were met because the par-
ties were insinuated into a position of interdependence so that conduct
"cannot be considered to have been . . . purely private."''16 Judge
Hufstedler's dissent in Ouzts seemed to leave the issue ripe for argument
in other circuits, but it was not until 1987 that another circuit would ad-
dress the issue.
B. Jackson v. Pantazes
In Jackson, a Fourth Circuit case from Maryland, a bounty hunter
and a police officer forcefully entered the home of the plaintiff looking
for the plaintiffs son. 1 7 The plaintiff was assaulted and physically re-
strained while the two intruders kicked down doors and searched the
house." 18 When asked if the bounty hunter-Mr. Pantazes-was allowed
to behave this way, the police officer replied that Mr. Pantazes could "do
whatever he wants."'"19
111. See Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 555 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966)).
113. Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 557 (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Ouzis, 505 F.2d at 557 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Ouzis, 505 F.2d at 557.
116. Id. at 558 (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 725) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 427-28 (4th Cir. 1987).
118. Id. at 428.
119. Id.
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The Jackson opinion made clear that the Fourth Circuit would use
the test in Lugar to determine if Mr. Pantazes qualified as a state actor.
20
The court then outlined two separate reasons why the circumstances of
the case satisfied the Lugar test and imposed state actor status on Mr.
Pantazes. 
21
First, the Jackson court addressed whether the right to arrest a prin-
cipal without process satisfied the first prong of Lugar.122 The court paid
special attention to the fact that Mr. Pantazes was exercising power con-
ferred on him by state law that could deprive individuals of their lib-
erty-specifically, the power to arrest. 23 This power was a right or privi-
lege created by the state, and therefore satisfied the first part of Lugar.
124
The Jackson court then discussed the second part of the Lugar test,
and held that because Pantazes and a law enforcement officer were work-
ing together, the state actor element of Lugar was also satisfied. 125 The
court explained that, "in cases where a private party and a public official
act jointly to produce the constitutional violation, both parts of the Lugar
test are simultaneously satisfied."'
126
In a brief paragraph, the Fourth Circuit adopted the dissenting opin-
ion in Ouzts and embraced the symbiosis argument for imposing state
actor status upon bounty hunters. 27 The court explained that "both parts
of the Lugar test are satisfied where the nature of the relationship be-
tween the state and private actors is one of interdependence, or 'symbio-
sis."" 28 The court articulated this analysis by stating that bondsmen de-
pend for their livelihood on the bail bond system and that they must be
licensed by the state.' 29 "In return, [they] facilitate the pretrial release of
accused persons, monitor their whereabouts and retrieve them for tri-
al."'' 30 The Jackson court appeared to recognize that bounty hunting with-
in the bond industry, and the modem justice system had developed into a
state of interdependence.'3 1 The court cited many examples of bounty
hunters performing the functions of the court and the law enforcement
system, and noted that the government-run licensing program that was
120. Id.
121. Id. at 429.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 428-29.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 429.
127. Id. at 430; see Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 557 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler,
J., dissenting).
128. Jackson, 810 F.2d at 430 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961)).
129. Jackson, 810 F.2d at 430.
130. Id.
131. See id. (concluding that "the symbiotic relationship between bail bondsmen and the Mary-
land criminal court system suffices to render Pantazes's conduct state action").
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present in Maryland helped to demonstrate how intertwined the bond
industry was with the legal system.1
32
By identifying bounty hunting duties as symbiotic to the state court
system, it appeared that Jackson had taken the first step to reigning in the
days of bounty hunting unrestrained by constitutional limitations. De-
spite its potential sweeping implications for reform, this analysis has not
been embraced by any other circuit. For the next nine years, the circuit
courts were silent on the issue of bounty hunters as state actors. Then in
1996 and 1997, there was a brief resurgence of cases presenting the sym-
biosis argument.
C. Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc.'
33
In Landry, the plaintiff was charged with felony theft and released
on bond provided by the defendant, A-Able Bonding. The plaintiff Lan-
dry then violated the terms of his bond by leaving Louisiana and fleeing
to Texas. 134 Upon locating Landry, the defendants drove to Texas, appre-
hended Landry, handcuffed him, transported him back to Louisiana, and
presented him to the sheriff. Landry brought a § 1983 action against the
bondsman for deprivation of liberty, which required showing the bonds-
man's conduct involved state action. 1
35
The Fifth Circuit stated in a footnote that they were not persuaded
by the reasoning in Jackson,'36 and maintained that, when addressing the
issue of bondsmen and state action, the "majority of federal courts ...
have based their decisions on whether the bondsmen enlisted the assis-
tance of law enforcement."'' 37 This analysis parallels the first part of
analysis in Jackson, which found both prongs of Lugar were satisfied
when law enforcement aided bondsmen. 138 The court declined, however,
to follow Jackson's reasoning behind the symbiosis approach to its natu-
ral conclusion. Instead, the Landry court chose to follow the reasoning of
the Ouzts majority by considering the bounty hunters' subjective per-
sonal intentions and by agreeing with the idea that bounty hunters oper-
ate for their personal gain and not for a "high-minded sense of devotion
to the administration of justice."
1 39
132. See id.
133. 75 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1996).
134. Id. at 203
135. Id.
136. Id. at 205 n.5.
137. Id. at 204.
138. See Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426,429 (4th Cir. 1987).
139. Landry, 75 F.3d at 205 n.5 (quoting Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 554-55
(9th Cir. 1974)).
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D. Dean v. Olibas
4 °
In 1997, the Eighth Circuit followed Landry's analysis. In Dean v.
Olibas, a man charged with a DWI falsely convinced the arresting officer
and the bondsman, Olibas, that he was Michael Dean. 141 When the ar-
restee failed to appear in court, Olibas tracked down the real Michael
Dean in Arkansas and had him arrested by the Arkansas police.142 Subse-
quently, Dean brought an action for malicious prosecution, false impris-
onment, and violation of his civil rights.
143
Just as the Fifth Circuit had done in Landry, the Dean court only
briefly considered the reasoning in Jackson before dismissing it in a
footnote.' 44 The Dean court flatly rejected the symbiotic relationship
between bondsmen and state actors by following the reasoning in Ouzts
and Landry with little additional consideration of its own. 45 This deci-
sion placed Dean with the majority of circuit courts, conforming to Ouzts
and placing a strong emphasis on bounty hunter intent.
After Dean, very little attention was given to this question at the ap-
peals level for several years. The circuit courts were split in their hold-
ings, with the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits finding no state action
through symbiotic relationship, and the Fourth Circuit recognizing state
action. In 2009, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals added its view to the
mix.
E. United States v. Poe: The Tenth Circuit Weighs in on Bounty Hunters
as State Actors
The Tenth Circuit addressed the question of bounty hunters as state
actors in United States v. Poe.'46 The case presented the Tenth Circuit
with a chance to align itself with the circuit majority or to adopt the
Fourth Circuit's minority analysis. The court chose the former.
Aaron Dale Poe, who was released on bond, failed to appear at his
criminal trial in Oklahoma. 47 Bounty hunters attempting to locate Poe
stalked Poe's girlfriend to her place of work, questioned her about her
relationship with Poe, threatened to break down her door, and staked out
her house to wait for Poe. 48 Upon seeing one of Poe's acquaintances
leave the house, they ordered him to get on the ground. 149 After posi-
tively identifying Poe, the bounty hunters entered the home and wrestled
140. 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 1003.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1006 n.4.
145. Id. at 1005-06.
146. United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 113, 1124 (10th Cir. 2009).
147. Id. at 1117.
148. Id. at 1118.
149. Id.
2010]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
him to the ground.150 During the arrest and a subsequent search of the
room in which Poe was apprehended, the bounty hunters discovered
drugs, drug-related paraphernalia, and a loaded gun.'51 Police were called
after Poe was restrained and, upon obtaining consent to search the prem-
ises from the homeowner, located and catalogued the contraband origi-
nally identified by the bounty hunters.'
52
Poe moved to suppress the drug and gun evidence at trial, arguing
the bounty hunters that located the drugs, paraphernalia, and the gun
were state actors conducting a warrantless search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.' 53 The district court denied his motion, and Poe was
convicted on three counts: possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a fel-
ony. 154 Poe appealed.
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Jacobsen 55 and its own decision in United
States v. Smythe.156 In Jacobsen, employees of a private shipping com-
pany searched through a suspicious package that appeared to contain
drugs.'5 7 The employees notified federal drug agents to report their find-
ings, and agents eventually determined that the package contained co-
caine. 158 In denying Jacobsen protection under the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Court stated that when a private individual conducts a
search "not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participa-
tion or knowledge of any governmental official," the Fourth Amendment
is not implicated no matter how unreasonable the search. 159 In Smythe,
the Tenth Circuit applied Jacobsen to similar actions by a private indi-
vidual and acknowledged that a private search may be transformed into a
governmental search "if the government coerces, dominates or directs the
actions of a private person conducting the search or seizure."' 6 In Poe,
the Tenth Circuit applied principles from Jacobsen and Smythe to deter-
mine whether the bounty hunters who searched Poe were state actors
subject to the Fourth Amendment, or whether the bounty hunters were
acting for their own benefit without government influence.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1118-19.
153. Id. at 1120.
154. Id. at 1117.
155. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
156. 84 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1996).
157. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at I 11.
158. Id. at 111-12.
159. Id. at HI3.
160. Smythe, 84 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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This application of Smythe and Jacobsen suggests that the Tenth
Circuit has adopted a narrower version of the Lugar analysis to deter-
mine state action because the language seems to be derived solely from
the state compulsion test outlined in Green.'61 This idea, while consistent
with the Fourth Circuit's application of the Lugar test when government
officials are involved, 62 narrows the scope of the government action to
coercion, domination, or direction when imposing state actor status on a
private party performing a search. This framework appears to embrace
the state compulsion argument, but discards the symbiotic relationship
arguments discussed in Green.'
63
The Poe court then applied the test established in United States v.
Souza' 64 to determine if a search by a private individual constitutes state
action.' 65 Souza involved a delivery service employee who searched a
suspicious package after she was essentially instructed to do so by a gov-
ernment agent. 166 The search was held to violate the Fourth Amendment
despite the private actor status of the employee.' 67 In Souza, a govern-
ment search occurs when (1) the government knew of and acquiesced to
the individual's intrusive conduct, and (2) the party performing the
search intended to assist law enforcement efforts rather than furthering
their own ends.'
68
Applying Souza, the Poe court concluded that the state was not in-
volved in the intrusive conduct until after the bounty hunters entered the
house, apprehended Poe, and located the drugs.' 69 The court also con-
cluded that the second prong of the inquiry was not met "because the
bounty hunters primarily intended ... to further [their] own ends-their
financial stake in Poe's bail-rather than to assist" the state.170 When Poe
argued that there was a symbiotic relationship between law enforcement
and bail bondsmen, the court flatly rejected the idea as "unpersuasive."'
' 7'
The court made clear that the inquiry was not whether "the police bene-
fited from the private conduct, but if the bounty hunters had a legitimate,
independent motivation to conduct the search.' 72 "Because the bounty
hunters [in this case] did not intend to assist law enforcement," the court
concluded, "they are not state actors.
''173
161. See Green v. Abony Bail Bond, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2004), discussed
supra Part n.A.2.
162. Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 428-29 (4th Cir. 1987); see supra Part III.B.
163. See Green, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
164. 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000).
165. United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2009).
166. Souza, 223 F.3d at 1200.
167. Id. at 1201.
168. Id. (quoting Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 1989)).
169. Poe, 556F.3dat 1124.
170. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id.
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IW. POE FOLLOWS A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF LUGAR AND
UNDULY EMPHASIZES ACTOR INTENT
The Tenth Circuit's dismissal of the symbiosis analysis advanced by
Poe on appeal represents a missed opportunity to introduce restraints on
an otherwise unrestrained industry. In Poe, the bounty hunters entered
and searched Poe's girlfriend's home without a warrant; an offense clear-
ly in violation of the Fourth Amendment if performed by state actors.'
74
Because the court determined that Poe had a reasonable expectation of
privacy despite his not being settled at the location, and because the
bounty hunters worked in a symbiotic relationship with the state, this
search should have been held unconstitutional.175 Instead, the court chose
to apply a test that unduly emphasizes subjective intent over objective
realities.
The Souza inquiry embodies rationale from earlier decisions on how
to classify private actors as state actors. The first half of Souza requiring
"knowledge and acquiescence" sets a very high bar for classifying a
search as government action, and if applied loosely, could ultimately
blend into the inquiry of whether the state acted in concert with the pri-
vate party.
The second half of the Souza test reflects the Ninth Circuit's ration-
ale in Ouzts v. Maryland National Insurance Co. by placing a heavy em-
phasis on the subjective intent of the searching party-in this case, the
bounty hunters. 176 The Poe court concluded that the Souza inquiry is in
essence the same test as the second leg of Lugar, a rule for defining state
actors. 177 This result departs from the rules synthesized in Green by arti-
ficially narrowing the inquiry to government knowledge and subjective
intent.178 This prong fails to appreciate the objective role that bounty
hunters play in the legal system, and instead focuses on their personal
intentions-most prominently, whether they were working for money or
in order to further a deep-seated sense of justice.
This logic is flawed. To distinguish between state and private actors
on the basis of intent suggests that official state actors are motivated by
some altruistic pursuit of justice without regard to their own financial
gain. Sheriffs and police officers are, at some level, merely doing their
jobs. While police officers are clearly state actors, the financial compen-
sation they receive also clearly furthers their self-interests. There is no
change in the status of these civil servants from state actors to non-state
174. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable searches and seizures).
175. See Poe, 556 F.3d at 1122-23 (clarifying that a person "does not need to be 'settled' at a
location to have a reasonable expectation of privacy" (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,96-97
(1990))).
176. See Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1974).
177. Poe, 556 F.3d at 1124.
178. See Green v. Abony Bail Bond, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259-60 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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actors depending on their subjective intentions in carrying out their du-
ties-whether for the money or for some greater good. It seems that sim-
ply being employed as a sheriff or police officer is enough to overcome
the fact that these actors are working to further their own ends. Today,
bounty hunters perform duties traditionally performed by law enforce-
ment. 179 They too receive financial compensation for their efforts. Thus,
because bounty hunters are quasi-employed as police, it stands to reason
that, like law enforcement, their independent financial motivations
should play no role in their determination as state actors.
Despite the problems with identifying state action through subjec-
tive intent, the Poe court seemed set on applying the narrower version of
Lugar articulated in Souza. The court stated that it doubted the panel
"could abandon this line of authority at this late date," suggesting that
even if the symbiosis analysis was a legitimate argument, they would not
accept it.' 80 This analysis of state actor status looks only to the state
compulsion test articulated in Green and the subjective intentions of the
searching party emphasized in Ouzts, while completely dismissing the
broader, over-arching symbiotic relationship between the bond industry
and the criminal justice system. 81
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Poe is consistent with the reason-
ing of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, and while it applies a nar-
rower test than the other circuits, the underlying rationale is consistent
with the majority of other decisions on the subject. 82 While the Poe
court chose to follow the majority of circuits, had it followed the Fourth
Circuit's minority view in Jackson, they would have embraced a more
comprehensive ideology that takes into account the objective roles of
bounty hunters in the modern legal system by holding them civilly liable
for constitutional violations. The circuit majority approach places en-
tirely too much emphasis on bounty hunters' intent, and completely ig-
nores the extensive police-like role that these actors play in the criminal
justice system. Jackson's minority approach-finding state action
through symbiosis-accounts for this discrepancy because it accepts that
bounty hunters are performing traditionally police activities that are inex-
tricably integrated with the pretrial detention system. Jackson's holding
suggests that the inquiry into subjective actor intent is overridden by the
reality of the bounty hunting industry as symbiotic to the justice system.
179. Drimmer, supra note 3, at 762.
180. See Poe, 556 F.3d at 1124.
181. See Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 555; Green, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1259; Drimmer, supra note 3, at
784-88.
182. Compare Poe, 556 F.3d at 1123-24, and Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1006 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1997), and Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 205 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996), and Ouzts,
505 F.2d at 555 (holding that bounty hunters are not actors of the state and placing emphasis on the
intent of the bounty hunter), with Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
that bounty hunters are actors of the state and examining their objective role in the justice system).
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The Tenth Circuit-and the other circuit courts of appeal-would have
done well to recognize the same.
CONCLUSION: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Poe unpersuasively dismisses the
symbiotic role of bounty hunters in the modern justice system. The tests
the court applied are artificially narrow and fail to account for the in-
strumental roles of these types of actors. Had the court found bounty
hunters to be acting under the color of the state, they would have af-
forded constitutional protections to citizens who could be potentially
harmed by these "private" actors performing official duties. The decision
in Poe is a step in the wrong direction, crystallizing a history of decisions
further isolating the bond industry from the constitutional limitations
historically assigned to those performing the same police duties that
bounty hunters perform today.
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